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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
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by
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Professor Syed M. Ahmed, Major Professor
In the U.S., construction accidents remain a significant economic and social problem.
Despite recent improvement, the Construction industry, generally, has lagged behind
other industries in implementing safety as a total management process for achieving zero
accidents and developing a high-performance safety culture. One aspect of this total
approach to safety that has frustrated the construction industry the most has been
“measurement”, which involves identifying and quantifying the factors that critically
influence safe work behaviors. The basic problem attributed is the difficulty in assessing
what to measure and how to measure it – particularly the intangible aspects of safety.
Without measurement, the notion of continuous improvement is hard to follow.
This research was undertaken to develop a strategic framework for the measurement
and continuous improvement of total safety in order to achieve and sustain the goal of
zero accidents, while improving the quality, productivity and the competitiveness of the
construction industry as it moves forward. The research based itself on an integral model
of total safety that allowed decomposition of safety into interior and exterior
characteristics using a multiattribute analysis technique. Statistical relationships between
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total safety dimensions and safety performance (measured by safe work behavior) were
revealed through a series of latent variables (factors) that describe the total safety
environment of a construction organization. A structural equation model (SEM) was
estimated for the latent variables to quantify relationships among them and between these
total safety determinants and safety performance of a construction organization. The
developed SEM constituted a strategic framework for identifying, measuring, and
continuously improving safety as a total concern for achieving and sustaining the goal of
zero accidents.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 General
In the U.S., construction accidents remain a significant economic and social problem,
with over 400,000 injuries and 1,200 deaths annually (BLS 2010). Compared to the high
risk sectors, construction involves frequent but relatively small scale accidents, with
many and diverse hazard sources. Construction work involves a large number of work
processes that need to adapt to the project-specific requirements and context. As a result,
construction work processes are loosely-defined, unlike the well-defined procedures of
the high-risk systems (such as aviation, nuclear and chemical plants). Furthermore, the
complex, dynamic, and often unpredictable construction tasks and environments,
combined with high production pressures and workload create high likelihood of errors.
With the continuous pressures for speed, productivity and competitiveness, the
challenge for construction researchers and practitioners is to develop work systems that
are simultaneously highly productive and highly reliable and can function safely and
effectively in the dynamic, complex and competitive conditions of construction projects.
(Mitropoulos et al., 2009). This requires a more fundamental understanding of the
workplace elements and processes that generate accidents, and new approaches to safety
management. In order to achieve a high-performance safety culture, it is critical that
construction organizations must not approach construction safety and health as just
another step in avoiding unwanted accidents or federal fines, but as a strategic tool, that if
implemented effectively, has the potential to maximize competitiveness and profit. This
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strategic approach to construction safety requires an assessment of safety from a total
perspective, i.e. an assessment of all aspects determining the total safety of an
organization. This treatment allows a fundamental understanding of the key factor sets
that govern safe behaviors of workers, and aids in determining the underlying key factors
that control these behaviors.
This integral or total approach to safety can be instrumental in providing excellence
in construction safety through continuous improvement by the total involvement and
dedication of each individual who is in any way a part of business. It is a structured
approach to improvement. If correctly applied, it assists a construction company in
continuously improving its total safety performance and achieving the goal of zero
accidents in their organizations.
1.2 Background and Motivation
Great strides towards a safe workplace environment have been made in the
construction industry over the last few decades. Majority of construction companies have
comprehensive safety plans, but the quality of the plan does not necessarily correlate to a
company’s safety performance. Written safety plans have the potential to be very
effective, but companies must go beyond the safety plan and create a true “safety culture”
(Hinze, 1997).
Most current safety practices in the construction sector are based on the normative
approach (compliance with prescribed safety rules) (Mitropoulos et al., 2009). They focus
on measures to control hazards, and means to control workers’ behaviors so that they
comply with prescribed safe practices. This approach emphasizes (1) management
commitment and policies to prevent unsafe conditions and (2) workers’ training and
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motivation to prevent unsafe behaviors. Safety programs – such as contractor’s selection,
training, inspections, motivation, enforcement, etc., as well as efforts towards safety
culture, and behavior-based safety aim at increasing the workers’ compliance with
prescribed ‘safe behaviors.’ This approach has resulted in significant improvements, but
is still nowhere close to reaching the zero-accident goal.
While the traditional application of normative approach aims at creating safe work
behaviors, it ignores how the characteristics of the individual, production system and
team processes influence the work behaviors and affect the possibility of errors and
accidents (Mitropoulos et al., 2009). First, it does not account for the production and
economic pressures for efficiency, and the workers’ natural tendency for least effort.
Second, the normative approach does not account for the factors that shape the work
situations such as, individual commitment of a worker or teamwork practices of a crew.
These factors generate the situations the workers face, and the crew’s ability to cope with
these situations. Rasmussen et al. (1994) explains how the workers’ behaviors tend to
migrate closer to the “boundary of loss of control” due to two primary pressures: the
production pressures for increased efficiency, and the tendency for least effort, which is a
response to increased workload. Safety programs attempt to counter the above pressures
and prescribe safe behaviors away from the boundary. However, the pressures that push
workers toward the boundary require that safety efforts are continuous. From a practical
perspective, a key concern is that at the work level, there is a continuous tension between
safety and production or costs; in the short term, such conflicts are usually resolved in
favor of production, because production efforts have relatively certain outcomes and
receive rapid and rewarding feedback (Reason 1990). A study of safety on international
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projects (Mahalingam and Levitt 2007) also illustrated that economic pressures were
stronger determinants of work behavior than the safety regulations.
As a result of these pressures, efforts to improve safety through technical
advancements (new methods and improved safety features) tend to be ineffective because
the behavior “migrates” close to the new boundary of loss of control (Mitropoulos et al.,
2009). Thus, human adaptation compensates for safety improvements. This phenomenon
of “risk homeostasis” has been observed in transportation, navigation, and traffic research
and explains why technological safety improvements have not generated the expected
improvements in safety (Wilde 1985; Fuller 2005). Furthermore, in interdependent
systems, the boundary of safe behavior for one actor depends on the possible violation of
defenses by other actors (Rasmussen 1997). Thus, the stage for an accident may be
prepared as a result of several actors’ behaviors that erode the “error margin.”
The current safety strategies in construction, which are largely oriented towards
technical advancements, have proven to be inadequate for the increasingly competitive
and dynamic conditions of the workplace (Mitropoulos et al., 2009). The challenge for
researchers and practitioners is to develop total safety systems that are simultaneously
highly productive and highly reliable and can function effectively in the dynamic,
complex, and competitive conditions that construction projects face. This requires a
treatment of safety from a total perspective taking into consideration the impact on safety
of organizational work culture, production pressures, team processes, individual
characteristics and the like. This treatment will allow a fundamental understanding of the
key factor sets that govern safe behaviors of workers, and will aid in determining the
underlying key factors that control these behaviors. This would allow a strategic move
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towards a high-performance and continuously improving safety culture, with the result of
achieving and sustaining the goal of zero accidents.
1.3 Problem Statement
The Construction industry, generally, has lagged behind other industries in
implementing safety management as a total process for achieving zero accidents and
developing a high-performance safety culture. The main reason for this has been the
perception that safety as a total management process is hard to implement in the
construction industry. One aspect of this total approach to safety that has frustrated the
construction industry the most has been “total safety measurement”, which involves
identifying and measuring the factors that critically influence safe behaviors. The basic
problem attributed is the difficulty in assessing what to measure and how to measure it –
particularly the intangible aspects of safety. Without measurement, the notion of
continuous improvement is hard to follow.
Traditionally, safety on construction sites is measured by level of implementation of
safety rules and procedures, and hazard control mechanisms. This systems approach to
safety measurement fails to address the “person”, “culture", and “behavior” components
associated with total safety. Recent advancements in construction safety, such as the
move towards “safety culture” and “behavior-based safety” have proven to generate
better results; however, these approaches also fail to acknowledge safety as an “integral”
or “total” process encompassing multiple dimensions, i.e. person, culture, behavior and
process, which cumulatively determine the true safety performance of a construction
company. Furthermore, safety performance on construction sites is usually measured
using “lagging” indicators (such as accidents) and not by using “leading” indicators (such
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as safe work behaviors). The effect of adopting these traditional approaches to safety has
been three-fold:
1. Construction companies invest all/ major safety related efforts on reducing the
number of accidents/ injuries by adopting related control mechanisms and
incentive/ disincentive mechanisms based on accidents/ injuries, rather than
investing in safety efforts for inculcating total safety in the workforce and
adopting measures for “total” safety process analysis and improvement in order to
achieve sustainable safety;
a. Construction companies (and administrative bodies observing their safe
behaviors, such as OSHA) measure their safety performance based on
number of accidents/ injuries over a certain period of time (number of lost
work hours) and not in terms of the company processes being safe or
unsafe. Hence the leading indicator to safe performance is taken as
“reduced number of accidents” rather than “safe behaviors”. It is
important to note here that, although the earlier can be a result of good
safety performance, it can very well be a representative of accidents not
reported or accidents not happening because the near-misses have
fortunately not been converted to accidents.
2. Construction workers tend to hide their unsafe acts (injuries) to the extent possible
because until they do not reveal their unsafe acts/ injuries to top management,
they are likely to be considered as safe workers and will not be punished for
unsafe behaviors. This worker attitude shifts their focus from behaving safely to
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hiding unsafe acts, which, although may reduce the number of accidents reported,
will not help in inducing total safety culture in the workers.
3. Construction workers find themselves working in an environment where, although
they usually have an incentive to act safely, do not have any obligation,
commitment or motivation to see to it that their co-workers are also behaving
safely.
Considering above, it can be inferred that it is a dire need that safety be addressed
from the perspective of “total measurement and improvement” rather than from the
perspective of “controlling the outcome (accidents)”. This need translates to the objective
of developing a measurement model – with tools and methodologies for the identification
and measurement of factors determining total safety for continuous safety improvement.
Another aspect of this total approach to safety that has frustrated the construction
industry is that there exists no common and overarching methodology to implement
safety as a total management process. Consequently, contractors do not fully recognize,
and realize, the value of strategic safety management as a total process. A direct
consequence of this has been that safety is usually considered the responsibility of “safety
personnel” (such as safety department, safety director, safety manager, etc.) in an
organization and is seldom considered the responsibility of “everyone” in the company.
Workers usually do not find themselves responsible for their unsafe acts unless 1) they
get converted to incidents, and 2) they are observed as incidents by the safety personnel.
With the above problem statement established, it is obvious to state that it is highly
significant to demonstrate how a strategic framework for safety improvement in the
construction industry based on an integral or total approach to safety can be developed.
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This framework is oriented towards enforcing a total safety culture in construction
organizations. The core objective of the framework is to provide a mechanism to measure
total safety using leading indicators and improve total safety by improving the underlying
factors influencing safe behaviors. This would allow a strategic move towards a highperformance and continuously improving safety culture, with the result of achieving and
sustaining the goal of zero accidents.
1.4 Research Hypothesis
It is the premise of this research that individual intentions as well as group culture
(corporate safety culture) have as much, or more, to do with the safety performance than
the safety program. This research develops itself on an integral approach to safety
containing four dimensions (person, culture, behavior and process) that collectively
define the interior and exterior pursuits necessary to determine the true safety
performance of a construction organization. It is hypothesized that all four pursuits offer
complementary, rather than contradictory, perspectives. That is, it is possible for all to be
correct and necessary for a complete account of safety existence. Also, each by itself
offers only a partial view of reality. Hence an integral or total view of construction safety
can only be achieved if integration is made of these four areas of knowledge through an
acknowledgement of them as the four fundamental dimensions of safety. The research
then endeavors into correlating these total safety dimensions to the safety performance of
a company. It is further hypothesized that all four pursuits by their very nature cultivate
successful safety performance. While these hypotheses seem intuitive, little research has
been conducted to specifically identify and measure critical characteristics as related to
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all the four dimensions that, in integration, influence safety. This research attempts to
quantify the relationship between total safety dimensions and safety performance.
1.5 Research Goal
This research endeavored to develop a strategic framework to continuously improve
safety in order to create a high-performance safety culture on construction worksites,
with the strategic aim of achieving zero accidents. This framework took an integral or
total approach to safety by including the key factors in all four dimensions (person,
culture, behavior, and process) that collectively determine the true and total safety
performance of a construction organization. Since the framework was based on
fundamental issues and endeavored to measure the total safety environment, it is
envisaged that the systems developed using the proposed framework would
simultaneously be highly productive and highly reliable, in addition to being functioning
safely and effectively in the dynamic, complex and competitive conditions of
construction projects.
This framework is envisaged to be instrumental for inculcating total safety
environment in construction organizations. The core objective of the framework would be
to provide a mechanism to measure total safety using leading indicators and improve it by
improving the factors influencing safe behaviors. This would allow a strategic move
towards a high-performance and continuously improving safety culture, with the result of
achieving and sustaining the goal of zero accidents. This approach is contrasting from the
traditional approach of treating safety from an “outcome” (accidents) perspective. The
framework is simple in nature, facilitating its wide implementation.
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1.6 Research Objectives
As mentioned earlier, the primary goal of the study was to develop a strategic
framework based on approaching safety as a total process in the construction industry for
the measurement and continuous improvement of safety in order to achieve and sustain
the goal of zero accidents, while improving the quality, productivity and the
competitiveness of the construction industry as it moves forward.
Consistent to the above goal, the objectives of the research study were:
1. To assess the current state of safety in the construction industry and establish the
need for addressing safety as a total process in construction contracting
organizations;
2. To identify the factors determining the total safety environment of a construction
contracting organization, which are most suitable and appropriate for
measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role in strategic safety
improvement; and
3. To develop a strategic framework for defining, measuring, and improving total
safety in the construction industry in order to achieve and sustain the goal of zero
accidents.
1.7 Scope of Study
Although equally applicable to other construction sectors, the study limited itself to
commercial building construction sector only. This was owing to the limited timeframe in
which the study needed to get completed.
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1.8 Significance of the Research Study
The major significance of this research seeking to develop a strategic safety
improvement framework can be related as follows:
1. It is important to manage the multifaceted safety risks associated with
construction projects not only to secure work and make profit, but to also act
responsibly and provide a safe work environment to the employees.
2. The developed framework can be adopted by U.S. contractors to continuously
improve their safety performance and hence achieve the goal of zero accidents.
3. The current financial crisis has put the role of safety risk management in the
construction business into focus. For U.S. firms engaging themselves in the
construction business, one of the most effective means of mitigating financial
risks is through a strategic safety management model.
1.9 Research Methodology
In order to achieve the research objectives, the research process was carried in a twophase approach. The steps followed in each of the phases are described in the following
sub-sections.
The main goal of the study, as stated earlier, was to demonstrate how a total safety
framework can be developed for the measurement and continuous improvement of safety
in order to achieve and sustain the goal of zero accidents.
1.9.1. Research Phase I
This phase of research was conducted to achieve objective 1 of the study. It consisted of
the following tasks.
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1.9.1.1.

Literature Review

In the initial process of research, a thorough literature study was conducted in order to
form a firm basis to develop detailed questionnaire surveys. Published literature on
current safety scenario in the construction industry and construction industry safety
performance was thoroughly studied. Information gathered was used, in particular, to
develop questionnaire surveys targeting construction contractors in the U.S. to assess the
following aspects of safety in the construction industry:
1. Current safety attitudes and approaches of contractor management in construction
industry,
2. Current safety attitudes and approaches of supervisors and foremen in
construction industry,
3. Criticism on OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) with
respect to its lack of success in acting as a catalyst to incorporate total safety in a
construction organizations, and
4. State of adoption and implementation of safety as a total management process in a
contracting firm’s management system.
1.9.1.2.

Data Collection

In this phase, detailed questionnaires were developed and sent to construction
contractors consistent to achieving objective 1 of the study. This phase provided a
comprehensive database and valuable data on the current state of safety in the
construction industry.
The results obtained from surveys conducted in this phase of research were analyzed
to establish a rationale of the need of addressing safety as a total process in the
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construction industry. Once the rationale was established, the next phase of research was
undertaken.
1.9.2. Research Phase II
The second objective of this research study was to identify the factors which could be
instrumental in continuously improving the safety performance of construction projects.
These factors were considered under several domains, viz., person, culture, behavior, and
process. The factors in each domain were obtained from literature review and expert
input. The premise was that when these factors are improved then we can attain
continuous safety improvement in the construction industry.
Once the multi-dimensional factors impacting safety performance were established, a
zero-accident safety improvement framework was established based on an integral
approach to safety. This constituted the third objective of the study. The framework
development required collecting relevant data from the industry and applying modeling
techniques to develop a measurement and improvement model for total safety in the
construction industry.
The framework provides a strategic safety performance evaluation and improvement
mechanism for a construction firm and the construction industry. This strategic
improvement framework facilitates total safety concepts and techniques to be
incorporated into the existing management systems in a contracting organization. Also, it
allows a contracting organization to focus its efforts on those factors that would
strategically improve safety performance of the organization as well as will provide
opportunity for continuous safety improvement and hence achieving and sustaining the
goal of zero accidents.
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1.10. Results
This research has developed a strategic framework for the construction industry for
the measurement and continuous improvement of total safety in order to achieve and
sustain the goal of zero accidents, while improving the quality, productivity and the
competitiveness of the construction industry as it moves forward, without adding
complexity and administrative burden. The developed framework could be used as a tool
by the industry to measure and continuously improve safety. It not only provides the
construction participants a clear picture of the safety performance of the company, but
also identifies areas to be improved. Although the framework was developed based on
data collected from the commercial building construction sector in the U.S., the
framework is fundamental in nature and is highly adaptable by other sectors of the
industry as well by other nations.
1.11 Relevance of Research to Strategic Goals of NIOSH and OSHA
The research has direct relevance with Strategic Goal 8 of the National Construction
Agenda (NORA 2008) of NIOSH (National Institute of Occupational Safety And Health).
The goal states:
“Increase understanding of factors that comprise both positive and negative
construction safety and health cultures; and, expand the availability and use of effective
interventions at the policy, organizational, and individual level to maintain safe work
practices 100% of the time in the construction industry.”
The above strategic goal consists of the following two intermediate goals:
“Intermediate Goal 1: Create a working definition and framework for construction
industry safety and health culture and improve understanding of the factors that
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contribute to a positive or negative safety and health culture in the construction
industry.”
“Intermediate Goal 2: Develop and expand the use of validated measurement
methods for evaluating safety culture and safety climate in the construction industry”
Also, National Construction Agenda suggests that there is overlap between strategic
goal 8 and Safety and Health Management in Construction. Aspects of safety and health
management (such as top management commitment, teamwork, production systems)
affect safety culture in an organization.
Moreover, the research is also in line with the strategic plan put forward by OSHA
(Occupational Safety and Health Administration) (OSHA 2008):
“All OSHA programs are designed to reduce fatalities, injuries, and illnesses, but the
approaches differ depending on the circumstances and nature of the underlying cause of
the problem. Direct interventions achieve the outcomes by engaging in one-to-one
relationships with employers and employees. Direct intervention will always be
necessary to ensure workplace safety and health. At the same time, lasting solutions will
come about because employers, workers, and many others embrace a workplace safety
and health culture. From OSHA's perspective, its resources devoted to realizing this goal
have the potential to multiply its effectiveness - by instilling safety and health values
among the broad population and enlisting them in pursuing the same goals. Achieving
this goal will require concerted effort, enhancement of OSHA's compliance assistance
skills, innovation, and continued dedication to safety and health ideals.”
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1.12 Organization of Dissertation
The dissertation is logically organized into seven (7) chapters and appendices:
Chapter one is the introduction and is composed of background, problem statement,
research hypothesis, goal, objectives and scope of study.
Chapter two comprises of literature review on current safety scenario in the U.S.
construction industry, safety research paradigms, current safety strategies and limitations,
and zero accident approach to safety.
Chapter three describes in detail the methodology followed in this research.
Chapter four discusses phase I of the data analysis process, which was undertaken to
determine the need for addressing safety as a total management process in construction
contracting organizations in order to achieve the goal of zero accidents.
Chapter five discusses phase II of the data analysis process, which was undertaken to
identify the factors (latent variables/ constructs) determining the total safety environment
of a construction contracting organization, which are most suitable and appropriate for
measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role in achieving and sustaining
the goal of zero accidents.
Chapter six delves into the development of the strategic safety improvement model
based on the identified factors and their associated indicators. This model is estimated
using structural equation modeling (SEM) technique to identify latent constructs that
describe total safety and to quantify relationships among them and between these total
safety determinants and safety performance of a construction organization.
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Chapter seven summarizes the conclusions of this study and recommendations for
further research based on the research findings and insight developed during the course of
this study.
The appendices include the questionnaires used in the study.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
Safety record in construction is one of the poorest (Hinze, 2005; Hallowell and
Gambatese, 2009; Mitropoulos et al., 2009, Molenaar et al., 2009; Mohamed, 2002).
Construction has the highest rate of accidents among all industries (Hinze, 1997;
Sawacha et al., 1999; Ahmed et al., 2000). Traditional research in safety has largely
focused on the prescriptive approach to safety (safety programs, compliance, rules,
management procedures, etc.). Available safety management models invariably revolve
around compliance, and more recent models have been developed around safety culture,
safety climate, and behavior improvement. However, there have been few studies in the
area of total safety and much of this research is of qualitative nature. The discussion in
this chapter leads the reader to conclude how the existing research lacks a strategic total
approach to safety.
2.2 Current Safety Scenario
The construction industry in the United States accounts for about 10 percent of the
gross domestic product, having an annual dollar volume of about $450 billion. The
industry employs five percent of the nation’s work force—yet that five percent
experiences a disproportionate 20 percent of all traumatic occupational fatalities and 12
percent of the total number of disabling injuries (BLS, 2010).
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Accident data prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2010) show that the
construction industry has performed much worse than the average of all industries.
Although the safety performance of the construction industry has improved dramatically
in the 1990s and 2000s, injury rates in the construction industry are still 50% higher than
that of all industries, lagging all industries by about 10 years. With an average
employment of approximately 7% of the industrial workforce, the construction industry
has regularly accounted for over 1,100 construction worker deaths per year or nearly 20%
of all industrial worker fatalities (www.bls.gov). These accidents have also resulted in
great economic losses. The research conducted by Everett and Frank (1996) concluded
that the total costs of construction accidents accounted for 7.9–15.0% of the total costs of
new, nonresidential projects. A more recent research study by Coble and Hinze (2000)
showed that the average workers’ compensation insurance costs could be conservatively
estimated as constituting 3.5% of the total project costs. In order to reduce and eventually
eliminate construction accidents, researchers have explored techniques implemented by
different construction parties to realize the “zero-injury objective.”
Research shows that development and implementation of effective safety programs
reduce accidents. Unfortunately, when it comes to spending time and money on safety,
many do not feel safety is vital to the success of their projects. This attitude stems from a
failure to recognize that effectively implementing project safety techniques will, while
reducing job injuries, also reduce the workers’ compensation premium by 50 to 90
percent and the indirect costs of injury by a like amount (CII, 1993).
In the last couple of decades, the industry has taken major steps in identifying and
eliminating the causes of accidents on construction sites. On many construction sites,
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safety has become one of the most important emphasis areas. Construction firms are
realizing that the initial investment, and the continuous efforts to maintain a good safety
record, do pay off by not only reducing injuries on the job site, but by also contributing to
an “on time” and “within budget” project delivery.
The larger construction companies have generally been the most aggressive firms in
pursuing the goal of zero accidents. Many of these firms are the pacesetters and therefore,
the safety record and the way safety is structured in these firms are of great importance to
the construction community. It is the large construction firms in the United States that
have made important strides toward improving construction safety. The strides in safety
are so significant that injury frequency rates that were once the goals of firms have now
become unacceptable levels of safety performance for many firms.
Despite recent improvements and a number of success stories, the safety performance
of the construction industry, in general, remains poor (Hinze, 2008; Hallowell and
Gambatese, 2009; Mitropoulos et al., 2009; Molenaar et al., 2009; Mohamed, 2002) and
is far from achieving the goal of incident and injury free environment (a.k.a. zero
accidents). It is important to investigate as to why the safety performance of the
construction industry is not up to par. This investigation requires a fundamental
understanding of the various safety research paradigms as explained in the next section.
2.3 Safety Research Paradigms
Rasmussen (1997) identifies three paradigms in the evolution of research on accidents
and occupational safety. The first paradigm focuses on normative, prescriptive theories
concerning the way people ought to act. Efforts to prevent occupational accidents focus
on task design and safe rules of conduct—they attempt to control behavior through
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normative instruction of the ‘one best way,’ selection and development of ‘competent’
personnel, and motivation and punishment. The current safety practices in the
construction sector are grounded on this safety paradigm (Mitropoulos et al., 2009).
The second paradigm focuses on descriptive models of work behavior in terms of
deviations from the normative, ‘best way’ of working—that is errors and biases. This
paradigm guides efforts to control behavior by removing causes of errors. It includes
studies of errors (Rigby 1970, Rasmussen et al.1981), management errors and resident
pathogens (Reason 1990).
The third paradigm takes a cognitive approach to safety. The cognitive approach
focuses on the interaction of the individual and the work system. It is concerned with the
characteristics of the work system (the features of the task, tools and environment) that
influence the individual decisions and actions and the possibility of errors (Rasmussen et
al. 1994). From a cognitive perspective, an error is not a ‘human failure’ but a symptom
of a problem in the work system (Dekker 2005). This paradigm provides descriptive
models of work behavior in terms of the behavior-shaping features of the work
environment. Such models include the risk homeostasis theory (Wilde 1985),
Rasmussen’s (1997) model of migration to accidents, and the Task-Capability Interface
Model (Fuller 2005). The cognitive approach to safety attempts to prevent accidents by
increasing the workers’ ability to successfully adapt to the work environment. It aims at
making visible the constraints and work affordances of the workplace (Flach et al. 1998).
Most current safety practices in the construction industry are based on the normative
approach, which has its own strategic limitations as discussed in the next section.
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2.4 Current Safety Strategies and Limitations
The current safety practices in the construction industry are mostly based on
compliance with prescribed safety rules. They focus on measures to control hazards, and
means to control workers’ behaviors so that they comply with prescribed safe practices.
“A systems approach to safety” label term is widely used in literature (Flin et al. 2000) to
refer to this normative approach to safety. It encompasses all aspects of the organization’s
safety management system including safety policies, procedures, committees, etc. This
system provides a systematic process for planning, implementing, monitoring, and
reviewing safety performance. Elements of the construction safety system include safety
policy and objectives, safety standards and targets, planning and organization of work,
implementation and normal operational practice, monitoring, feedback and audits,
corrective action, review, and continual improvement. The systems approach to safety
has been the core of research in construction safety.
This systems approach emphasizes (1) management commitment and policies to
prevent unsafe conditions and (2) workers’ training and motivation to prevent unsafe
behaviors. Safety programs—such as contractor’s selection, training, inspections,
motivation, enforcement, etc., as well as efforts towards safety culture, and behaviorbased safety aim at increasing the workers’ compliance with prescribed ‘safe behaviors.’
This approach has resulted in significant improvements, but is still far from reaching the
zero-accident goal.
While the traditional application of normative approach aims at creating safe work
behaviors, it ignores how the characteristics of the individual, team and production
system processes influence the work behaviors and affect the possibility of errors and
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accidents. First, it does not account for the production and economic pressures for
efficiency. Second, the normative approach does not account for the factors that shape the
work environment such as individual commitments, cultural norms, attitudes and
perceptions of an individual and group, etc. These factors generate the environment the
workers work in, and the crew’s ability to continuously and consistently perform safely.
With regard to production and economic pressure, from a practical perspective, there
is a continuous tension between safety and production or costs at the work level; in the
short term, such conflicts are usually resolved in favor of production, because production
efforts have relatively certain outcomes and receive rapid and rewarding feedback
(Reason 1990). A recent study of safety on international projects (Mahalingam and Levitt
2007) also illustrated that economic pressures were stronger determinants of work
behavior than the safety regulations. As a result of these pressures, efforts to improve
safety through technical advancements (new methods and improved safety features) tend
to be ineffective (Mitropoulos et al., 2009) because human adaptation compensates for
safety improvements. This phenomenon of “risk homeostasis” has been observed in
transportation, navigation, and traffic research and explains why technological safety
improvements have not generated the expected improvements in safety (Wilde 1985;
Fuller 2005). Furthermore, in interdependent systems, the boundary of safe behavior for
one actor depends on the possible violation of defenses by other actors (Rasmussen
1997). Thus, the stage for an accident may be prepared as a result of several actors’
behaviors that erode the “error margin.”
With regard to factors that shape the work environment such as individual
commitments, cultural norms, attitudes and perceptions of an individual and group, these
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factors interact with the systems and produce work behaviors that may prove to be
unhealthy or unsafe. Efforts to improve safety through systems and technical
advancements (without an integral treatment of these factors) tend to be ineffective
because the behavior change is only temporary and is not usually sustainable.
Hence the current safety strategies in construction, which are largely oriented towards
systems advancements and behavior control, prove to be inadequate to achieve and, more
importantly, sustain the goal of zero accidents because of these fundamental flaws in the
approach.
The key challenge for researchers and practitioners is to develop total safety systems
that are simultaneously highly productive and highly reliable and can function effectively
in the dynamic, complex, and competitive conditions that construction projects face. This
requires a treatment of safety from an integral perspective taking into consideration all
dimensions of safety and their inter-dependence. This treatment will allow a fundamental
understanding of the individual, organizational and production system characteristics that
govern both the safe behaviors of workers and the effectiveness of safety systems, and
will aid in determining the underlying factors that control the true total safety
performance of a company.
Recent research in safety (mostly in the last two decades or so) has targeted safety
culture, safety climate and behavior based safety as significant contributors/ measures of
safety performance of a construction organization. This direction of safety research has
generated fruitful results and is discussed in the next section.
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2.5 Safety Culture, Climate and Behavior Based Safety Research
A generic definition of corporate culture is helpful in the understanding of safety
culture. Hampden-Turner (1990) define corporate culture as “a pattern of basic
assumptions in vented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope
with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well
enough to be valid and to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think,
and feel in relation to these problems.” Numerous other definitions of corporate culture
exist in the academic literature. Examples of a few selected definitions are tabulated in
Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Selected Corporate Culture Definitions
Reference

Definition of corporate culture

Hai, 1986

Corporate culture is a collection of uniform and enduring beliefs,
customs, traditions, and practices that are shared and continued
by the employees of a corporation.
Corporate culture is a collection of shared beliefs that define the
fundamental characteristics of an organization and create an
attitude that distinguishes one organization from all others.
Culture is the unique configuration of norms and attitudes that
characterize the manner in which employees combine to
accomplish tasks.
Corporate culture refers to the values held by employees of an
organization that tend to persist even when membership changes.

Maloney and
Federle, 1990
Graves, 1986
Kotter and Heskett,
1992

Corporate culture is instrumental in an organization’s success. It provides the
workplace environment for the employees of an organization. When people work in an
environment that they perceive as rewarding, they are more likely to perform at a high
level. Furthermore, a company’s success is the result of the organization performing
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certain tasks very well (Maloney and Federle, 1990). Corporate culture is what
determines these work environments, as well as the tasks in which an organization excels.
Safety culture can be considered as a particular aspect or subset of corporate culture.
Strictly speaking, the organization (or one of its subunits) has one underlying culture, and
that culture has characteristics that may be more or less supportive of safety, quality,
productivity or any other performance target. Thus, a more useful formulation than
talking about the safety culture is to ask whether an organization's culture is supportive of
safety. Yet definitions of the term “safety culture” exist in literature and the tem is often
coined when describing the subset of organizational culture that affects workers’ attitudes
and behaviors in relation to an organization’s ongoing safety performance.
The Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI 1993)
provides the definition that “the safety culture of an organization is the product of group
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the
commitment to and the style and proficiency of an organization’s health and safety
management.” Numerous definitions of safety culture exist in the academic literature.
Examples of a few selected definitions are tabulated in Table 2.2. Most of the definitions
are relatively similar in their belief perspectives, with each focused, to varying degrees,
on the way people think and/or behave in relation to safety. Though definitions vary,
there is a consensus of safety culture being a proactive stance towards safety. This now
has been almost universally accepted if not always practiced (Lee and Harrison, 2000;
Choudhry et al., 2007).
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Table 2.2: Selected Safety Culture Definitions
Reference

Definition of safety culture

Hale (2000)

Safety culture refers to “the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions
shared by natural groups as defining norms and values, which
determine how they act and react in relation to risks and risk
control systems.”
Safety culture is defined as those aspects of the organizational
culture that will impact on attitudes and behavior related to
increasing or decreasing risk.
Culture is “the product of multiple goal-directed interactions
between people (psychological), jobs (behavioral) and the
organization (situational); while safety culture is ‘that
observable degree of effort by which all organizational
members direct their attention and actions toward improving
safety on a daily basis.”
Safety culture is a subfacet of organizational culturethat
affects workers’ attitudes and behavior in relation to an
organization’s ongoing safety performance.

Guldenmund (2000)
Cooper (2000)

Mohamed (2003)

Zohar (1980) introduced “safety climate” as “a summary of molar perceptions that
employees share about their work environment.” Researchers considered it as a
subcomponent of the safety culture (Cooper, 2000; Neal et al., 2000; Choudhry and Fang
2005) and a reflection of actual safety culture (Lee and Harrison, 2000; Flin et al., 2000;
Guldenmund, 2000). Mohamed (2003) suggested that safety culture is concerned with the
determinants of the ability to manage safety (top-down organizational approach);
whereas, safety climate is concerned with the workers’ perceptions of the role safety
plays in the workplace (bottom-up perceptional approach). Thus, culture is something
that is more deeply embedded and long term, taking longer to change and influencing
organizational performance across many areas of functioning. Climate, on the other hand,
changes faster and more immediately reflects the attention of leadership. As specific
events occur that influence the organization, the climate for safety (or for any other
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factor) changes. The most striking example is the impact on safety climate immediately
following a serious injury or fatality. Most of the time, such an event triggers a
strengthening of the safety climate. However, this change often does not last over the
long term.
Behavior-based safety (BBS) refers to the systematic application of psychological
research on human behavior. It is an analytic or data-driven approach, where critical
behaviors get identified and targeted for change. In BBS, primary attention is directed at
specific safety-related behaviors that are, typically, performed by workers (Krause et al.
1984). Workers’ performance gets systematically observed to know base-period scores.
Using these scores, goal-setting meetings are arranged, with the participation of workers,
to set realistic and attainable targets of performance. Workers are encouraged to practice
safe behaviors. Providing feedback is essential to reinforce desired safety behaviors, thus
fostering continuous improvement. It is noteworthy that more than 80% of all workplace
accidents and incidents are attributed to unsafe behaviors (HSE, 2005).
In recent years, there has been a movement away from safety measures purely based
on retrospective data or “lagging indicators,” such as accident rates, toward so-called
“leading indicators,” such as measurements of safety climate (Flin et al. 2000; Mohamed,
2002). The shift of focus has been driven by the awareness that organizational,
managerial, and human factors rather than purely technical failures are prime causes of
accidents (Weick et al. 1999; Langford et al., 2000; Mohamed, 2002) developed a model
to examine and assess relationships between safety climate determinants and the safety
climate in construction site environments, and the correlation between the safety climate
and workers’ safe behavior. Molenaar et al. (2009) developed a model to measure critical
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cultural characteristics that influence safety and to quantify the relationship between
culture and safety performance. Grote and Kunzler (2000) presented a sociotechnical
model of safety culture that links the safety management system and safety culture to the
general organizational design. Geller (1994) put forward a model distinguishing three
dynamic and interactive factors, namely, person, behavior, and environment. Three years
later, a total safety culture model, which included this safety triad and recognized the
dynamic and interactive relationship between them, was proposed (Geller 1997). Cooper
(2000) argued that organizational culture is the product of multiple goal-directed
interactions between people, jobs, and the organization, and presented a model
recognizing the presence of an interactive or reciprocal relationship between
psychological, situational, and behavioral factors. Choudhry et al. (2007) integrated three
related concepts, namely, safety climate, behavior-based safety, and safety system, into a
safety culture model allowing different dimensions of construction safety culture to be
measured individually or in combination.
A previous safety research of note that provided the stimulus to this research was that
by Molenaar et al. (2009), which developed a structural equation model of corporate
culture as it affects safety performance. This research was based on the hypothesis that
construction safety performance (measured by EMR – Experience Modication Rating) is
predictable on the basis of corporate safety culture. The research proposed that
construction organizations can have inherent characteristics that predispose them to be
susceptible to accidents. The characteristics that influence corporate safety culture were
classified into three main categories: (1) people; (2) process; and (3) value. The primary
results of the study can be summarized by stating that corporate safety culture is
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significantly related to safety performance. From an integral strategic perspective of
safety, the limitations of this research study were: 1) the study only looked at the
“culture” domain of the fundamental domains defining total safety; 2) the study used a
lagging indicator (EMR) to measure safety performance; and 3) the data collected to
develop the model was limited. The research in hand attempts to overcome these
limitations and builds upon a large data set, considers an integral view of all fundamental
total safety dimensions (person, culture, behavior and process), and uses a leading
indicator (safe work behavior) to measure safety performance.
Another research study of note that also provided stimulus for this research was that
conducted by Mohamed (2002), which examined the relationship between the safety
climate and safe work behavior in construction site environments. This study also utilized
the technique of structural equation modeling to come up with a relationship model
between safety climate determinants and safety performance (as measured by safe work
behaviors). From an integral strategic perspective of safety, the limitations of this
research study were: 1) the study looked at the “culture” (in fact climate) and the
“behavior” domains of the fundamental total safety dimensions; 2) the study ignored
interaction effects between the factors determining the safety climate; and 3) the study
was only based on data collected from construction workers and did not take into account
the perspectives of top management and supervisors. The research in hand attempts to
overcome these limitations and builds upon an integral view of all fundamental total
safety dimensions (person, culture, behavior and process), considers the interaction
effects between the factors determining total safety, and basis itself on a large data set
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with data collected from top management, supervisors, foremen, and construction
workers.
While all these models are intuitive and have addressed safety from a cultural, climate
or behavior-based perspective, they still lack a total approach to safety i.e. an approach
that would take into consideration the entire personal, group, behavioral, process and
production system factors as an integrated model determining the true total safety
performance of a construction organization. Furthermore, objective measurement and
improvement of total safety (as identified by all dimensions defining and determining
total safety) remains a concern yet to be addressed by prior research. This very gap in the
body of knowledge concerning construction safety is the motivator that proved to be the
driving factor for the research in hand.
2.6 Effectiveness of OSHA as a Strategic Safety Improvement Organization
In the United States, all construction safety is legislated by the Occupational Safety &
Health Administration (OSHA), a federal agency that is part of the U.S. Department of
Labor, which was created by the Congress under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
in 1970. Credible statistics reveal that OSHA has had a beneficial influence on the US
construction industry in terms of reducing workplace accidents and occupational injuries.
Undoubtedly, OSHA has played a pivotal role in the development of a safer work
environment over the years. Nevertheless, the agency still has received substantial
criticism from construction organizations for a number of reasons. Even though the
number of workplace accidents and casualties has dropped down drastically in the
construction industry ever since OSHA regulations have been implemented, construction
firms have viewed OSHA's regulations and standards in a negative light as well. This is
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despite the numerous attempts by the agency to promote training, consultation, and
outreach services.
One of the more common arguments against OSHA is that its heavy fines and
ambiguous standards restrict an organization’s ability to develop as well as compete. An
analysis of OSHA citations that were contested by employers before the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), for the years 1991–1993 (reported in
the Occupational safety and health reporter published by the Bureau of National Affairs,
and comprised of 255 citations) shows that in the majority of the OSHA citation cases,
the arguments centered around the vagueness in the interpretation of OSHA standards.
Several standards, for example, simply read that the employer must provide safety
equipment. While the employer interpreted this to mean ‘‘make available,’’ OSHA
interpreted it to mean ‘‘require use of.’’ A further analysis of these citations reflects that a
significant increase in the dollar amounts penalized is seen from 1991–1992 to 1993. This
was due to the new minimum sevenfold increase in penalties implemented by OSHA to
make the impact of its citations a clear priority to contractors. Larger penalties
presumably draw more attention from construction companies, and they may be more
willing to allocate adequate money for safety programs to avoid these lofty penalties.
However, it also entails the industry view that OSHA is more concerned with generating
revenues (via penalties) than strategically improving safety in the industry.
Assessing the issues why OSHA has not been completely successful in achieving and
sustaining the goal of zero accidents in the construction industry is important in terms of
determining the need of a strategic safety improvement framework for the industry
targeted towards incident and injury free work environment. Existing literature fails to
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identify these issues and hence the current study would delve into highlighting the key
concerns with respect to OSHA’s lack of performance.
2.7 Zero Accident Approach to Safety
In the past decade the terms “zero accidents”, “zero injuries” and “incident and injury
free” have been used a great deal by construction firms espousing their commitment to
safety. Studies have shown that many construction firms, especially those in the industrial
sector, have enjoyed significant improvements in their safety performances. These
performance statistics have been considerably better than those of the overall
construction industry and provide clear testimony of the effectiveness of efforts to
improve safety.
With the advent of increasing numbers of owners and contractors who are achieving
zero lost workday injuries on construction projects, a new concept is emerging – zero
injury. This new-found reality for some has become a sought-after possibility for others.
Zero injury defines a unique attitude on projects achieving the category of “safety
excellence.” This attitude appears as a zealous commitment by top management to the
concept that zero injury is the only acceptable goal. Any other goal implies that injuries
are expected and acceptable. The zero injury concept simply means that essentially all
serious injury to workers can be successfully prevented.
The zero injury philosophy is based on the belief that eliminating all worker injuries
on projects for significant periods of time is possible. The first essential criterion required
is the acceptance of the zero injury concept by those in charge and the effective
communication of this to the workers. Further, it is essential that owners and contractors
devote resources for the development and implementation of the safety techniques that
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provide the highest impact on achieving zero injury projects. The construction industry
needs to recognize that elimination of injuries is vital to the efficient execution of
construction projects, and that productivity and safety are so intertwined in the
workplace, that spending time and energy on safety not only improves safety
performance but also improves schedule and reduces costs.
In 1993, the CII released its report on zero accidents, called Zero Injury Techniques
(CII, 1993). From this study, evolved the five high-impact zero accident techniques,
summarized as follows, in decreasing order of relative importance:
1. Preproject/ pretask planning for safety
2. Safety orientation and training
3. Written safety incentive programs
4. Alcohol and substance abuse programs
5. Accident/incident investigations
In 1998, the National Center for Construction Education and Research and the M. E.
Rinker Sr. School of Building Construction at the University of Florida conducted a
survey to examine changes made since the zero accidents research was publicized. The
purpose of the study was to further assess the status of the safety performance of large
construction companies and to identify the-then best practices in the construction industry
that made a difference in safety performance and that move the industry toward the goal
of zero accidents.
The results generated by the study reconfirmed the importance of several traditional
safety methods and techniques employed by the construction industry and it also
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identified some effective new techniques. These findings are summarized in the
following ten key areas that contribute to improved safety performance:
1. Demonstrated management commitment
2. Staffing for safety
3. Planning: pre-project and pre-task
4. Safety education: orientation and specialized training
5. Worker involvement
6. Evaluation and recognition/reward
7. Subcontract management
8. Accident/incident investigations
9. Drug and alcohol testing
10. Contract Type
While the idea of zero accidents is intuitive, not much research has been done
specifically in terms of developing a strategic safety improvement model for the
construction industry that would allow continuous measurement and improvement of
factors determining the safety performance of a construction organization, and hence
would be instrumental in reaching and sustaining the goal of zero accidents. Hence the
current study would delve into developing such a model directed towards the goal of zero
accidents.
2.8 Total Safety Management
Total Safety Management (TSM) bears its roots from Total Quality Management
(TQM), which is ingrained on Deming’s Fourteen Points. Although not much research
has been done on TSM in construction industry, for the last couple of decades, TSM
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philosophy has found its way in construction safety research (Geller, 1994; Geller, 1997;
Hinze, 2005). TSM focuses on safety as an integral process, not the management of
safety, on continuous improvement of process in order to improve every facet of an
organization. The implementation of TSM is fundamentally a process of culture change.
Although ‘Total Safety Management’ has been a magic word, methods and techniques to
implement Total Safety in an Industry are still to be developed. Moreover, no accurate
information regarding the adoption and implementation of TSM in the construction
industry is available. Hence the current study would delve into establishing the current
state of adoption of TSM in the construction industry and the readiness of the
construction organizations to embrace TSM philosophy.
Much of the research done on TSM in construction industry has been of qualitative
nature. One aspect of TSM that has frustrated the construction industry the most has been
“measurement” of total safety, which involves identifying and quantifying the factors that
critically influence safe work behaviors. The basic problem attributed is the difficulty in
assessing what to measure and how to measure it – particularly the intangible aspects of
safety. Without measurement, the notion of continuous improvement is hard to follow.
Hence the need of the research in hand was pre-established i.e. to develop a strategic
framework for the measurement and continuous improvement of total safety in order to
achieve and sustain the goal of zero accidents, while improving the quality, productivity
and the competitiveness of the construction industry as it moves forward.
The key challenge for researchers and practitioners is to develop total safety systems
that are simultaneously highly productive and highly reliable and can function effectively
in the dynamic, complex, and competitive conditions that construction projects face. This
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requires a treatment of safety from an integrated perspective taking into consideration all
fundamental dimensions of safety and their inter-dependence. This treatment will allow a
fundamental understanding of the individual and organizational characteristics that
govern both the safe behaviors of workers and the effectiveness of safety systems, and
will aid in determining the underlying factors that control the true safety performance of a
company.
2.9 An Integral Entity Model
Ken Wilber (Wikipedia, 2011) defines four dimensions for every entity. Each entity
or unit of reality that is both a whole and a part of a larger whole, has an interior and an
exterior. It also exists as an individual and (assuming more than one of these entities
exists) as a collective. Observing the entity from the outside constitutes an exterior
(objective) perspective on that entity. Observing it from the inside is the interior
(subjective) perspective, and so forth. If these four perspectives are mapped into
quadrants, these constitute four quadrants, or dimensions as depicted in Figure 2.1.
The above concept leads to defining four dimensions of every entity: 1) Behavioral
i.e. exterior individual (or, in Figure 2.1, the upper-right); 2) Intentional i.e. interior
individual (upper-left); 3) Cultural i.e. interior collective (lower-left); and 4) Process i.e.
exterior collective (lower-right).
All four pursuits – behavioral, intentional, cultural and process – offer
complementary, rather than contradictory, perspectives. It is possible for all to be correct
and necessary for a complete account of human existence. Also, each by itself offers only
a partial view of reality. Further, according to Wilber, these four perspectives are equally
valid at all levels of existence.
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Individual

Intention

Group

Interior (Subjective)

Culture

Exterior (Objective)

Behavior

Process

Figure 2.1: Integral Entity Model (adapted from the work of Ken Wilber)
Note that the right sides of the quadrants are concerned with empirical observation—
what does it do? The left sides of the quadrants focus on interpretation—what does it
mean?
This integral entity model forms the basis of the current research and will be
discussed more in the following chapters.
2.10 Concluding Remarks
Literature review shows that a vast amount of research has been conducted on
construction safety in the past few decades. Recent advancements have been made in
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viewing safety as a cultural issue. OSHA has played its part and has done extremely well
in terms of reducing workplace accidents. However, safety research to date in the
construction industry lacks a total treatment of safety as a strategic concern in business
value. These limits are creating barriers to improved construction safety. There are a
number of signs of this phenomenon, such as the invisible "vision," where the corporate
safety policy has little to do with the day-to-day functional issues of safety. Safety
performance reporting is typically limited to meeting regulatory-driven information
requirements. Rarely is it recognized as a potentially effective means of communicating
positive safety results. And, regardless of the quality of the company's safety
performance, the basic relationship with the relevant regulatory agencies is still largely
adversarial in nature. Companies must realize that they can benefit from voluntary
initiatives and potential "partnering" arrangements where mutual interests with regulators
may exist. Viewed in this light, even the current leaders in construction safety
management will need to make important changes in their existing management systems.
They must cultivate a vision for the future that elevates safety concerns and effectively
integrates them into the overall management mix. For this very reason, a need for a
strategic approach to safety improvement is called for, which forms the premise of this
research.
It is the premise of this research that individual intentions, commitments, group
culture, and work behaviors have as much, or more, to do with the safety performance
than the safety management system. This research develops itself on an integral approach
to safety (as explained in section 5.3) that collectively define the interior and exterior
pursuits necessary to determine the true total safety environment of a construction
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organization. It is hypothesized that an integral view of construction safety can only be
achieved if integration is made of these areas of knowledge through an acknowledgement
of them as the fundamental dimensions of safety. It is further hypothesized that all safety
pursuits by their very nature cultivate successful safety performance. While these
hypotheses seem intuitive, literature review has highlighted that little research has been
conducted to specifically identify and measure critical characteristics as related to all the
dimensions that, in integration, define as well as influence total safety. This forms the
core aim of this research.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
The literature review discussed in Chapter 2 provides a background of the various
facets of the current body of knowledge in relation to construction safety and highlights
the lack of a comprehensive integral model of continuous strategic total safety
improvement in the construction industry. Based on the information gathered from the
literature review a specific research methodology was developed and is described in this
chapter.
More elaborately, this chapter outlines the specific research methodology employed
in the development of the strategic model for continuous safety improvement in the
construction industry, including the data collection procedures, survey instruments
development, and data analysis techniques. Various statistical test procedures including
structural equation modeling technique were used in the research investigation.
The data for this research was collected through the use of five (5) surveys targeting
construction contractors in the U.S. in order to achieve the following three (3) objectives:
1. To assess the current state of safety in the construction industry and establish the
need for addressing safety as a total process in construction contracting
organizations in order to achieve the goal of zero accidents;
2. To identify the factors (latent variables/ constructs) determining the total safety
performance of a construction contracting organization, which are most suitable
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and appropriate for measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role
in achieving the goal of zero accidents; and
3. To develop a measurement model to measure the effect of the key determinants of
safety performance (the critical factors) on a construction organization’s safety
performance.
In order to achieve the research objectives, the research process was carried in a twophase approach. The steps followed in each of the phases are described in the following
sub-sections.
3.2. Research Phase I
3.2.1. Literature Review
In the initial process of research, a thorough literature study was conducted in order to
develop the research rationale as well as form a firm basis to develop survey instruments
to be used in the study. Published literature on current safety scenario and strategies in
the U.S. construction industry was thoroughly studied, with particular emphasis on
current safety statistics, prevalent safety management practices of construction
contractors (policies, procedures, programs, systems, etc.), safety performance
measurement and improvement, safety culture & climate measurement and improvement,
use of behavior-based safety techniques in construction, role, success and criticism on
OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), zero accident strategies in
construction, and the move towards Total Safety Management (TSM) in construction
industry. Furthermore, studies were done to identify what other developed countries (like
U.K., Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, etc.) have been doing and achieving in terms of
construction worker safety.
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3.2.2. Data Collection Phase I
3.2.2.1. Scope and Relevance to Study Objectives
This phase of data collection was undertaken to achieve objective 1 of the study, i.e.
to determine the need for addressing safety as a total management process in construction
contracting organizations in order to achieve the goal of zero accidents. This objective
(objective 1 of the study) had four key sub-objectives as defined below:
1. To evaluate the current safety attitudes and approaches of contractor management
in construction industry,
2. To evaluate the current safety attitudes and approaches of supervisors and
foremen in construction industry,
3. To analyze the state of success (and failure) of OSHA (Occupational Safety and
Health Organization) as a regulatory agency to incorporate safety as a total
process in construction organizations; and
4. To investigate the state of adoption and implementation of safety as a total
management process in a construction contracting firm’s management system,
and to identify the benefits and obstacles.
3.2.2.2. Data Collection Method
Knoke and Bohrnstedt (1994) define data collection as an activity of developing
primary data records for a given sample or population of observations. Babbie (1992)
discussed different modes of data collection including experimental, survey, unobtrusive
and evaluation. Because survey research involves collecting data through asking people
questions, it was deemed the most appropriate method of data collection for this phase of
the study.
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3.2.2.3. Survey Research
The survey research employed in this phase of the study has a fundamental
characteristic as described by Fowler (1993): Collecting information by asking questions
to industry personnel with industry & project experience in safety.
The survey research was done via structured questionnaires and interviews from
industry experts. A synopsis of the methodology adopted for safety spot analysis is given
as follows:
1. Identifying the key areas of safety concern (research aspects) to be investigated.
2. Developing and conducting surveys for each area of concern. For each research
aspect, the survey development and administration methodology consisted of the
following steps:
1.1 Conducting relevant literature review i.e. collecting base knowledge essential
for survey development.
1.2 Developing questionnaire surveys targeted to construction contracting
organizations/ workers to elicit information on the research aspect being
diagnosed.
1.3 Conducting pilot surveys via face-to-face meetings with selected professionals
including short-listed experts representing contractors and various staff levels
of contracting organizations, with the objective to fine tune the survey
instruments on the basis of expert feedback.
1.4 Administering full-fledged questionnaire surveys through postal mail,
electronic mail, fax, personal interviews and meetings.
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1.5 Validating returned questionnaires (in terms of respondent profile and
consistency of feedback).
2. Developing a centralized database system to store the collected data from
structured surveys for the purpose of analysis, and structuring the data in the
database.
3. Analyzing the data to compile the findings.
4. Devising conclusions from the findings and developing recommendations
consistent with the major objective of this phase of data collection i.e. to
determine the need for addressing safety as a total management process in
construction contracting organizations.
The research methodology for each area of concern can be represented as a flowchart
as shown in Figure 3.1.
Research
Design

Literature
Review

Research
Analysis

Research
Administration

Research
Validation

Findings – Issues and Possible
Directions to Improvement

Conclusions and
Recommendations

Figure 3.1: Research methodology – Research Phase I
The methodology is described in more detail in the following sub-sections.
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3.2.2.3.1. Identifying Key Areas of Safety Concern
Consistent to the four sub-objectives of objective 1 of the study, the following four
(4) key areas of concern related to construction safety were identified via preliminary
literature review for further investigation:
1. Current safety attitudes and approaches of contractor management in construction
industry,
2. Current safety attitudes and approaches of supervisors and foremen in
construction industry,
3. OSHA – success, barriers and limitations;
4. Safety as a total management process in construction industry – adoption,
implementation, readiness, benefits and obstacles.
3.2.2.3.2. Survey Development, Administration and Validation
3.2.2.3.2.1. Survey Instruments Development
Extensive literature review provided the base information on each of the four (4) key
areas of safety concern (as identified in section 3.2.2.3.1), which was used to develop the
following four (4) surveys for this research as part of Data Collection Phase I .
1. Evaluation of the current safety attitudes and approaches of contractor
management in construction industry;
2. Evaluation of the current safety attitudes and approaches of supervisors and
foremen in construction industry;
3. Analysis of the state of success (and failure) of OSHA (Occupational Safety and
Health Organization) as a regulatory agency to incorporate safety as a total
process in construction organizations; and
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4. Investigation of the state of adoption and implementation of safety as a total
management process in a construction contracting firm’s management system,
and to identify the benefits and obstacles.
3.2.2.3.2.2. Pilot Surveys
Subsequent to the development of each survey instrument, pilot surveys were
conducted via face-to-face meetings with select professionals including short-listed
experts from construction contracting organizations representing their top management
and middle/ project management, all having expertise in or exposure to safety issues. The
intent of these pilot surveys was to pretest the questionnaires on select professionals so as
to obtain such versions of the surveys (after appropriate modification in each as and if
needed) that would achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity.
With input from these local contractor representatives, the questionnaires were
appropriately modified to best capture the information specific to research needs. The
first section of the first questionnaire collected company demographic information, which
was analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The survey included
questions regarding the company’s location, nature of work, number of employees,
annual turnover, etc. The entire set of questionnaires is given in Appendix I.
3.2.2.3.2.3. Survey Administration
3.2.2.3.2.3.1. Survey Method
Data gathering is complex. So, the decision on which survey method depends on the
particular research topic, characteristics of the sample, and availability of staff and
resource (Fowler 1993). Assessing the methodologies for data collection against the
objective of this phase of the research led to the determination that questionnaires send by

47

electronic mail and postal mail with as-necessary follow-up telephone calls were the most
suitable for this phase of research work. Because of the nature of structured interviews, it
was determined that these would best be achieved by in-person interviews, However,
because of geographic constraints many were done by telephone. For the questionnaire
component of data gathering, telephone or facsimile correspondence were used only
when the response to the questionnaire was behind scheduled due dates, or when the
respondents contacted the researcher with questions or requests for further information.
An exhaustive list of industry contractors was prepared as a first step of survey
administration. Various published and unpublished sources were used to develop a list of
commercial construction contractors in the U.S. construction industry. This identification
was done, in particular, from the following sources:
1. Engineering News Record (ENR) publications, including the list of Top 500 U.S.
Contractors;
2. The general contractors list published by the Associated General Contractors
(AGC) of America; and
3. A customized list of general contractors and subcontractors prepared from the
yellow pages, trade magazines and other published and unpublished sources.
3.2.2.3.2.3.2. Data Sample
The theoretical population of this phase of research was the top management, senior
project managers, and safety managers/officers of all general contracting firms as well as
subcontracting firms in the United States. No limits on the size of construction firms or
annual turnover of the construction firm were established. There were not a minimum
number of years of experience an individual should have to qualify to be a participant.
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This population description is in line with the major objective of this phase of research
i.e. to assess the current state of safety in the construction industry and determine the
need for addressing safety as a total management process in construction contracting
organizations in order to achieve the goal of zero accidents.
The final data sample was selected by a combination of sampling methods. The
researcher first used purposive sampling. In purposive sampling “the participants are
hand-picked from the accessible population” (Gliner & Morgan, 2000). The participants
were selected because of their experience as senior corporate and project managers for
commercial construction firms. Firstly, the liaison of Florida International University
(FIU) with the local construction industry was utilized for selecting appropriate
construction companies. Secondly, since many of the government organization (counties
and cities) employees are students at FIU Construction Management (CM), Civil and
Environmental Engineering (CEE) and other engineering departments, these employees
were approached first hand for their voluntary contribution in the research. Thirdly, the
CM department at FIU also has an advisory committee made up of a number of large
commercial construction contractors in the South Florida region. These advisory
committee members were also approached first hand with the request to voluntarily
contribute to the research.
Convenience sampling was also used to solicit participants for this phase of the
research. In convenience sampling, “the participants are selected on the basis of
convenience rather than chosen in a serious attempt to select participants who are
representative of the theoretical population” (Gliner & Morgan, 2000). Senior managers
working for companies in Florida to which the researcher had access were given the
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opportunity to volunteer for participation. In some cases the companies were known to
the researcher and in other cases the companies were randomly selected from the three
sources identified above.
Snowball sampling was also used. “Snowball sampling is a modification of
convenience or accidental sampling …. People are asked for additional references”
(Gliner & Morgan, 2000).
The major chunk of data was collected using random sampling. According to good
survey practice (Tull and Hawkins, 1990), a letter was sent to the Chief Executive/
Managing Director of companies randomly selected from the three sources of
identification indicated above. This letter was sent to introduce the research and request
voluntary input. Referred to in the letter was a request for names of the key personnel
associated with safety management processes and safety decision making in the
companies, who would subsequently be canvassed for opinions.
The surveys were carried out over the period extending from September 2008 to
February 2009. The questionnaires were posted to named individuals in September 2008,
with a suggested date for return at the end of November 2008. Questionnaires returns
were received over the next five months, in some cases after a phone call reminder.
3.2.2.3.2.3.3. Delimitations
The focus was delimited to general contractors and specialty contractors with major
experience in commercial building construction. In future studies, research may be
expanded to other types of construction such as residential, heavy-civil, or industrial.
3.2.2.3.2.4. Survey Validation
Research validation was done in three steps.
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Firstly, it was confirmed that the survey was filled by personnel with appropriate
profile and experience. Construction industry experience of respondents ranged from 9
to over 28 years, and all participants had at least 11 years of experience in construction
safety. On the basis of their position and work experience, it was inferred that the
respondents had adequate knowledge of safety related activities in their organizations as
well as in the industry and their responses were a reasonable representation of required
data.
Secondly, to avoid the problem of bias, it was decided not to use data provided by an
organization with less than 5 responses on a particular survey. Based on this decision, the
following was determined:
1. Data from six (6) companies was discarded for survey instrument 1, since a total
of 19 responses were received from these companies for survey instrument 1;
2. Data from five (5) companies was discarded for survey instrument 2, since a total
of 14 responses were received from these companies for survey instrument 2;
3. Data from three (3) companies was discarded for survey instrument 3, since a
total of 7 responses were received from these companies for survey instrument 3;
and
4. Data from four (3) companies was discarded for survey instrument 4 since a total
of 11 responses were received from these companies for survey instrument 1.
Moreover, 18 questionnaires were determined to be outliers and were also decided to
be discarded. Hence a total of 69 questionnaires were discarded from the analysis.
Thirdly, the conclusions drawn on the basis of the responses were further verified
through interviews with experts to ascertain that they were unbiased. Twelve (12) face-
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to-face unstructured interviews were conducted in the vicinity of Miami, Florida from a
selected cross-section of local construction industry experts to discuss the results and
validate the findings. The targeted audience included top management and middle
management representatives of leading contractors and subcontractors working in the
commercial building construction sector in the South Florida region.
The survey instruments generated quite substantial and valuable data on the current
state of safety performance in the U.S. construction industry, specifically, the safety nonperformance causes. The results obtained were particularly useful in developing the
rationale of the need of an integral model of construction safety with the objective of
continuously improving safety to reach the goal of zero accidents.
3.2.2.3.2.5. Developing the Database and Data Analysis Mechanism
Appropriate data storage mechanisms were developed and the data stored for the
purpose of analysis. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to
categorically compile and sort the data collected in the form of filled questionnaires,
minutes of meetings, interviews, etc.
Tables and Forms collecting data on SPSS were interfaced with Microsoft Excel for
the purpose of data analysis. Data analysis was done using SPSS and major findings
compiled.
3.3. Research Phase II
Phase II of the research was consistent in achieving objectives 2 and 3 of the study. The
scope and relevance of this phase of research with the study objectives is explained
below.
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The second objective of this research study was to identify the factors which could be
instrumental in continuously improving the safety performance of construction
organizations. This was achieved as follows.
Based on the findings of the phase I of research, the research premise was established
that an integral or total approach to safety was essential to determine the factors
instrumental for total safety improvement in the industry. Further literature review
enabled to outline four dimensions of construction safety with respect to a construction
worker as an entity: 1) behavior i.e. exterior individual; 2) person i.e. interior individual;
3) culture i.e. interior collective; and 4) process i.e. exterior collective. These dimensions
collectively define the interior and exterior pursuits necessary to determine the true safety
performance of a construction organization. It was envisaged that an integral view of
construction safety can be achieved if integration is made of these four areas of
knowledge through an acknowledgement of them as the four fundamental dimensions of
safety.
Defining the interior as well as exterior pursuits to safety was a complex task. This
research began by decomposing safety dimensions into measurable attributes using a
multiattribute analysis technique. Through expert interviews and an exhaustive literature
review, a multiattribute hierarchy of safety pursuits was defined. The highest level of the
hierarchy decomposed safety into four principal dimensions, viz., intent, culture,
behavior and process. These four categories were then subdivided and decomposed into
measurable safety characteristics that formed the basis of a questionnaire to measure
safety.
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This study adopted safe work behaviors (observable actions) as the safety
performance indicator. This selection was based on the justification that that leading
indicators are better measures of safety performance than lagging indicators. Traditional
measures of safety performance rely primarily on some form of accident or injury data.
The main problems are that such data are insufficiently sensitive, of dubious accuracy,
retrospective, and they ignore risk exposure. Although accident statistics are widely used
throughout the construction industry, it is almost impossible to use accidents as a safety
indicator for a single construction site. This is because of random variation, where many
sites will have no accidents, and it is not possible to determine whether these sites with
zero accidents are safer than sites with four or five accidents.
The questionnaire contained two sections: Part I constituted statements to measure
safety characteristics, while Part II consisted of items to measure safe work behavior as
the safety performance indicator. To the extent possible, the different statements used in
developing the questionnaires were drawn upon scales that had been previously used by
researchers. To achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity, draft
questionnaires were constructed and pretested on a few graduate students and a few
construction safety managers. Their input was used to refine the original questionnaire.
The questionnaire contained, in its final form, a total of 140 statements (138 statements
listed in Part I and 2 statements listed in Part II) about safety issues at the organizational,
group, and individual levels. A number of negatively worded statements were presented
in the scale, as recommended in the measurement literature.
A survey methodology was selected to collect data regarding the dimensions of safety
because it offered the best opportunity to capture a cross section of the beliefs, values,
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systems and behaviors in multiple companies in a timely and efficient manner. As the
survey sample, the research targeted top management, senior project managers, safety
managers/officers, supervisors, foremen, and construction workers of general contracting
firms as well as subcontracting firms. This is in line with the major objective of the
research – seeking a correlation between total safety determinants and safe work behavior
in construction organizations. Appropriate modifications were made in the questionnaire
in order to address the various levels of respondents (from field personnel to middle
management to upper management).
The data analysis technique used was structural equation modeling (SEM). Before the
SEM analysis began, a rough estimate of the latent variables (factors) was derived from a
confirmatory factor analysis. A principal factor analysis (PFA) using the varimax rotation
method with Kaiser normalization was utilized. Based on the factor analysis results, the
23 subcategories defined for the domains of factor sets were reduced into 6 factors (latent
variables/ constructs/ underlying dimensions). The research premise was that when these
factors are improved then we can attain continuous safety improvement in the
construction industry.
Once the multi-dimensional factors impacting safety performance were established, a
base structural equation model (SEM) was developed following the broad hypothesis that
safe work behaviors (and, thus, their reciprocal, unsafe behaviors) are consequences of
the existing safety dimensions in a construction organization, which is determined by the
inter-dependent factors identified earlier. Hypothesis was developed for each of the
factors/ constructs to define paths in the structural model. Numerous iterations were
performed to arrive at a final SEM specification. Hence a zero-Accident safety
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improvement framework was established based on an integral approach to safety, which
constituted the third objective of the study. Note that objective 3 of the dissertation had
two sub-objectives:
1. To develop a measurement model describing the relationship between the
indicators and the factors.
2. To develop a structural model describing the relationships amongst the
factors, and the relationships between the factors and safety performance (as
measured by safe work behavior).
The program used for SEM analysis was AMOS (version 19.0). Both the
measurement model and the structural model were developed using SEM analysis on
AMOS. The initial SEM was constructed using various combinations of the factor
analysis results and then model improvements were performed using a combination of
modification indices and solid theoretical support until a final satisfactory model was
identified. In essence, asymptotic t-statistics and R-square goodness of fit (GOF)
measures were employed to assess the regression equations in the model.
Both the measurement and structural components of the SEM provided insight into
the influence of total safety determinants on safety performance. The discussion is given
in chapter 6 of the dissertation.
It is envisaged that the framework developed would provide a strategic safety
performance measurement and improvement mechanism for a construction firm. This
strategic improvement framework would allow a contracting organization to focus its
efforts on those factors that would strategically improve safety performance of the
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organization as well as would provide opportunity for continuous safety improvement
and hence achieve the goal of zero accidents.
The methodology flow chart for the entire research effort is shown in Figure 3.2.
3.4 Summary
This chapter outlined the background information collected, development of the
Safety improvement framework, and the design and administration of the data collection
instruments used in this research. The structured interviews used to determine
background information, and the subsequent framework development process took
approximately 16 months. The data collection was accomplished in two phases. The
overall process of data collection took almost a year to complete. Statistical techniques
such as factor analysis and structural equation modeling were undertaken to analyze the
data and verify the research hypotheses. The following chapter discusses background
information on the two major analysis techniques used during the study, i.e. confirmatory
factor analysis and structural equation modeling.
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Figure 3.2: Research methodology – Overall Research
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS PHASE I
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 3, the methodology implemented to conduct this research endeavor was
discussed. This chapter discusses phase I of the data analysis process, which was
undertaken to achieve objective 1 of the study, i.e. to establish the need of addressing
safety as a total management process in construction contracting organizations in order to
achieve the goal of zero accidents.
To establish the need of addressing safety as a total management process, the
following two specific research questions were deemed significant to address, which
determined the key tasks at hand:
1. Are the safety strategies currently employed by industry participants helping in
strategically improving safety in construction organizations?
• Task 1: Assess contractor management attitudes and approaches
• Task 2: Assess supervisor-level attitudes and approaches
• Task 3: Assess OSHA’s lack of performance
2. Are the current safety improvement strategies instrumental in nurturing total
safety in construction organizations?
• Task 4a: Investigate the state of adoption and implementation of total safety
in a contracting firm’s management system.
• Task 4b: Investigate the readiness of construction organizations to embrace
total safety.
• Task 4c: Investigate the barriers towards implementing total safety.
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To achieve the aforementioned tasks, survey research was done via structured
questionnaires and interviews from industry experts. Extensive literature review provided
the base information on each of the four (4) tasks constituting the key areas of safety
concern (as identified in section 3.3.2.3.1), which was used to develop the following
surveys for this phase of research:
1. Assessment of current safety attitudes and approaches of contractor management
in the construction industry;
2. Assessment of current safety attitudes and approaches of supervisors and foremen
in the construction industry;
3. Analysis of the criticism on OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health
Organization) with respect to its lack of success in acting as a catalyst to
incorporate total safety in construction organizations; and
4. Investigation of the state of adoption and implementation of safety as a total
management process in construction contracting firms’ management systems, and
to identify the obstacles.
This chapter outlines the data collection and analysis process of each of the four
surveys conducted in this phase of research. This begins with a brief description of the
survey instruments and a discussion of the data collection process. This is followed by
assessing the survey response rates and respondents’ profile. Subsequent to this, a
detailed description of each survey along with a discussion of the key results is presented.
This is done with particular emphasis to their utility towards establishing the rationale of
the research i.e. determining the need for addressing safety as a total management process
in construction contracting organizations in order to achieve the goal of zero accidents.
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4.2 Brief Description of Survey Instruments and Utility toward Overall Research
Objective
4.2.1. Survey Instrument 1: Assessment of Current Safety Attitudes and Approaches
of Contractor Management in the Construction Industry
Contractor management plays an important role in organizing and implementing
safety policies on construction sites (Mohamed, 2002). The interaction and
communication of management with workers in terms of their commitment, support and
motivation can have a positive (or negative) influence on workers’ perceptions, attitudes,
competence, and behaviors towards safety.
The objective of this survey was to assess the current safety attitudes and approaches
of the top management of U.S. construction contracting firms in terms of providing
commitment and support for implementation of key safety management policies,
procedures and practices. Conclusions drawn from this research were to strengthen or
weaken the argument that contractor management in construction organizations in the
U.S. is generally focused towards safety compliance rather than safety participation.
From the perspective of the overall aim of this dissertation, the underlying intent of
this specific study was to collect and analyze data on contractor management attitudes
and practices, which would serve as a basis to establish the rationale of this research:
need for a strategic zero-accident safety management framework in the construction
industry to achieve continuous and sustainable safety improvement.
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4.2.2. Survey Instrument 2: Assessment of Current Safety Attitudes and Approaches
of Supervisors and Foremen in the Construction Industry
The construction supervisor/ foreman is typically the key person of contact for
workers in the field on a construction project. This person is responsible for the direct
daily supervision of activities with the key task is to see that all work elements are fitted
together in the right sequence and at the right time. The supervisor plays an important
role in organizing and managing productivity, quality, and safety outcomes.
The objective of this survey was to assess the current safety attitudes and approaches
of supervisors and foremen in U.S. construction contracting firms in terms of providing
commitment, support and training/ coaching for promoting safety among workers and in
the work environment. Conclusions drawn from this research were to strengthen or
weaken the argument that the supervisors (and foremen) in construction organizations in
the U.S. are generally focused towards safety compliance rather than safety participation.
From the perspective of the overall aim of this dissertation, the underlying intent of
this specific study was to collect and analyze data on the attitudes and practices of
construction supervisors and foremen, which would serve as a basis to establish the
rationale of this research: need for a strategic zero-accident safety management
framework in the construction industry to achieve continuous and sustainable safety
improvement.
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4.2.3. Survey Instrument 3: Analysis of the Criticism on OSHA with Respect to its
Lack of Success in Acting as a Catalyst to Incorporate Total Safety in
Construction Organizations
Empirical evidence exists that, over the years, organizations have viewed OSHA and
their numerous regulations, standards, and strict penalties in a negative light. One of the
more common arguments against the agency is the fact that their heavy fines and
guidelines deliver an overbearing and unwanted presence that greatly restricts an
organization’s ability to develop as well as compete. This places a heavy burden on
organizations by forcing increased operational fees and the costs associated to retrofit
outdated equipment rather than investing on improving the processes for achieving longterm safety objectives. A similar argument is that the agency is not actively participating
in the necessary research to view and incorporate safety as an industrial development
process, and hence their regulations do not support implementing safety as a total
management process.
This research collected industry opinions in order to more elaborately assess the
criticism on OSHA with respect to its failure to act as a catalyst to incorporate total safety
in a construction organization. In particular, the research attempted to delve into the
reasons as to why OSHA has not been as successful as it should have been.
From the perspective of the overall aim of this dissertation, the underlying intent of
this specific study on OSHA was to collect and analyze data on OSHA criticism, which
was to serve as a basis to establish the rationale of this research: need for a strategic zeroaccident safety management framework in the construction industry to achieve
continuous and sustainable safety improvement.

63

4.2.4. Survey Instrument 4: Investigation of the State of Adoption and
Implementation of Safety as a Total Management Process in Construction
Contracting Firms’ Management Systems, and to Identify the Obstacles
Today’s construction projects are growing in complexity and in order to succeed on
the global level, construction organizations must not approach construction safety and
health as just another step in avoiding unwanted accidents or federal fines, but as a
strategic tool, that if implemented effectively, will have the potential to maximize
competitiveness and profit. This strategic approach to safety can be accomplished via a
total management approach to safety.
Literature review highlighted that no accurate information regarding the extent of
usage of safety as a total management process in the construction industry was available.
Hence this survey was conducted wherein the contractors and subcontractors were asked
to identify the extent of adoption and implementation of safety as a total management
process in their businesses. The results of the survey included measurements on the
extent of knowledge of the industry personnel about safety as a total management
process, and the use of techniques of implementing safety as a total management process
in the industry. The survey further reflected industry opinions as to the benefits and
obstacles of the application of total safety techniques to the construction industry in terms
of achieving the goal of zero accidents.
Conclusions drawn from this study were to strengthen or weaken the argument that
the safety improvement strategies currently adopted by construction organizations in the
U.S. are generally focused towards safety compliance rather than total safety
management.
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From the perspective of the overall aim of this dissertation, the underlying intent of
this specific study was to collect and analyze data on safety improvement practices, and
Total Safety Management adoption and readiness, which would serve as a basis to
establish the rationale of this research: need for a strategic zero-accident safety
improvement framework in the construction industry to achieve continuous and
sustainable safety improvement.
4.3 Survey Administration
The surveys were carried out over the period extending from September 2008 to
February 2009. The questionnaires were posted to named individuals in September 2008,
with a suggested date for return at the end of November 2008. Questionnaire returns were
received over the next five months, in some cases after a phone call reminder.
The four surveys were administered via a consistent set of data sample of
construction contractors and sub-contractors. More specifically, the final data sample
included general contractors, structural steel contractors, poured concrete contractors,
precast concrete contractors, masonry contractors, electrical contractors, mechanical and
HVAC contractors, etc. representing 102 different companies (37 general contractors and
65 specialty contractors) working in the building construction sector (commercial and
institutional). These 102 companies selected shared many common traits. They were
mostly medium to large size firms on the basis of their employee counts and annual
turnovers; they all performed all or some of their own work (such as carpentry, concrete
placement, masonry work, etc.); they all primarily concentrate on large commercial
buildings; and all were willing to actively take part in data collection.
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The focus was delimited to general contractors and specialty contractors with major
experience in commercial building construction. In future studies, research may be
expanded to other types of construction such as residential, heavy-civil, or industrial.
4.3.1. Survey Response
Over 2120 copies of the four questionnaires (approximately 530 each) were
distributed to the identified companies through electronic and postal mail. To avoid the
problem of bias, it was decided to collect data from no less than 5 employees working for
the same organization. A total of 817 questionnaires were returned. However, 69
questionnaires were either determined to be outliers or were discarded owing to
possibility of bias. A total of 738 questionnaires were input into an SPSS database to be
used for analysis. Overall survey response rates for each of the four surveys (in terms of
individual participation) are depicted in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of
responses in terms of organizational participation.
Table 4.1: Overall response rates

Survey 1
Survey 2
Survey 3
Survey 4
Total

Total
questionnaires
distributed

Questionnaires
returned

530
530
530
530
2120

212
197
223
185
817
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Total
number of
potential
responses
212
197
223
185
817

Total
valid
responses
received
192
174
201
171
738

Percentage
of valid
responses
36.22%
32.83%
37.92%
32.26%
34.81%

Table 4.2: Breakdown of responses with respect to type of organization
Type of Organization
General Contractor
Subcontractor
Total

Approached

Responded

128
183
311

37
65
102

Response
%
28.91%
35.52%
32.80%

The survey response rates depicted in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (34.81% for individual
participation and 32.80% for organizational participation) are very good for a
construction industry questionnaire survey and should not be considered as biased
(Akintoye and Macleod). In similar type of surveys, Panthi et al. (2007) received a
response rate of 19.4%, Ahmed and Azhar (2004) received 30.4% and Wang et al. (2004)
received a very low response rate of 7.75%. Baker (1998) reported that statistically
reliable conclusions can be obtained from a sample size of 20 or more. Moreover, the
conclusions drawn on the basis of the responses were further verified through interviews
with experts, and hence can be considered as unbiased.
4.3.2. Respondent Organizations’ Profile
Figure 4.1 depicts information about distribution of respondent organizations in terms
of their nature of work.
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Figure 4.1: Nature of work of Respondent Organizations
Figure 4.2 depicts information about the size of respondent organizations. The
organization size is decided on the basis of number of employees as follows: 050small; 51-250medium; and >250large. The results indicate that the majority of
respondents are medium and large size companies. The annual turnover of these
companies varies from $5 million to over $50 million.
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Figure 4.2: Size of Respondent Organizations

Table 4.3 depicts information about the geographic profile (states of operation) of
respondent organizations. Most of the organizations had multi-state operations with
major or minor businesses in more than 4 states. The average number of organizations
surveyed per state was 10.9 with a high of 35 (for Florida) and a low of 5 (for
Washington D.C.).
Table 4.3: Geographic Profile (states of operation) of Respondent Organizations
No. of
No. of
No. of
State Participating State Participating State Participating
Firms
Firms
Firms
AL
11
IA
9
NV
8
AZ
8
KS
11
NH
7
AR
9
KY
12
NJ
11
CA
18
LA
14
NM
12
CO
6
ME
13
NY
22
CT
7
MD
12
NC
16
DE
8
MA
8
ND
13
DC
5
MI
10
OH
7
FL
35
MN
7
OK
8
GA
18
MS
6
OR
5
ID
12
MO
9
PA
6
IL
14
MT
11
RI
7
IN
11
NE
12
SC
10
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State
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

No. of
Participating
Firms
12
11
18
12
7
9
11
8
11
9

Table 4.4 shows the collective distribution of respondent organizations In terms of the
four regional divisions defined by the United States Census Bureau. It is evident from
Table 4.4 that all the four regions share a reasonably balanced distribution of
participation (the average share of participation of firms per state per region is 2.04%
with a high of 2.30% (for region 3) and a low of 1.82% (for region 1).
Table 4.4: Geographic Profile (regions) of Respondent Organizations
Share of
Participating
Firms
(No.)
88
126
210
112

Region
Region 1 (Northeast) – 9 states
Region 2 (Midwest) – 12 states
Region 3 (South) – 17 states
Region 4 (West) – 11 states

Share of
Participating
Firms
(%)
16.42%
23.51%
39.18%
20.90%

4.3.3. Demographic Information
Middle management (mainly project managers and safety directors) and upper
management (mainly vice presidents and senior managers) completed surveys 1, 3 and 4,
while supervisors and foremen completed survey 2. Demographic information for the
survey respondents is presented in Tables 4.5(a) and 4.5(b).
Table 4.5a: Participants’ construction experience (Surveys 1, 3 & 4)

Years in Construction
Years as Executives/ Managers

Average
Years
29.42
17.68
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Most
Experience
38
27

Least
Experience
12
5

Table 4.5b: Participants’ construction experience (Survey 2)

Years in Construction
Years as Supervisors/
Foremen

Average
Years
23.17
12.54

Most
Experience
29
23

Least
Experience
9
5

Table 4.5(a) shows that the average construction experience of the participants for
surveys 1, 3 and 4 was 29.42 years with a high of 38 years and a low of 12 years, while
the average executive construction experience was 17.68 years with a high of 27 years
and a low of 5 years. The average construction experience that these participants had
before moving into the executive role was approximately 12 years.
Table 4.5(b) shows that the average construction experience of the participants for
survey 2 was 23.17 years with a high of 29 years and a low of 9 years, while the average
supervisor-level or foremen-level construction experience was 12.54 years with a high of
23 years and a low of 5 years. The average construction experience that these participants
had before moving into the supervisory/ foremen role was approximately 10 years.
Table 4.6 presents the educational qualification of the participants. This wide range of
formal education among the participants did not produce a wide range of differences in
the data.
Table 4.6 shows that more than 80% of the participants had postsecondary degrees. A
further diagnosis of the major concentrations for the postsecondary degrees held by these
participants indicated that, including Civil Engineering and Architecture, 58.5% of the
participants with a postsecondary degree had that degree in a construction related
concentration (such as construction management, construction engineering and the like),
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24% of the participants had that degree in business concentration (such as business
administration and the like), while the remaining had diverse academic backgrounds
ranging from majors in English, Psychology, Education, etc.
Table 4.6: Participants’ education
Number of
Participants
Survey
1
Survey
2
Survey
3
Survey
4
Total
(%)

192
174
201
171
738

PostMaster’s
Degree

Master’s
Degree

Bachelor’s
Degree

Associate’s
Degree

12

54

89

21

Some
College
(No
Degree)
10

0

12

25

86

35

16

17

48

103

18

9

6

11

37

97

14

7

5

40
(5.42%)

151
(20.46%)

314
(42.55%)

139
(18.83%)

61
(8.27%)

33
(4.47%)

High
School
Degree
6

On the basis of their position, education, and work experience, it can be inferred that
the respondents have adequate knowledge of the safety related activities in their
organizations as well as in the industry.
Overall, the data set (Table 4.6) accounts for a reasonable representation of the
companies participating in this study, and produces statistically significant results as
described later in this study.
In accordance with established survey procedures and in recognition of the sensitive
nature of the data collected, strict confidentiality was maintained during this survey
research and no identities have been divulged.
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4.4 Data Analysis
4.4.1. Survey 1: Assessment of current safety attitudes and approaches of
contractor top management in the construction industry
4.4.1.1.Survey Description
Corporate management plays an important role in organizing and implementing
safety policies on construction sites (Mohamed, 2002). The interaction and
communication of management with workers in terms of their commitment, support and
motivation can have a positive (or negative) influence on workers’ perceptions, attitudes,
competence, and behaviors towards safety. O’Toole (2002) proposed that there is a
connection between management’s approach to safety and employees’ perception of how
important safety is to the management team. For instance, the management approach to
safety generates as well as reinforces employee perceptions about what gets rewarded,
supported and expected in a particular setting. Neal et al. (2000) identified two distinct
management approaches to safety: 1) safety compliance, which involves requiring
adherence to safety procedures and carrying out work in a safe manner, and 2) safety
participation, which involves supporting and helping workers, promoting the safety
program within the workplace, demonstrating initiatives, and putting efforts into safety
for improving the safety performance. Hence the management approach/ attitude towards
safety must be taken into account while addressing the safety performance of a
construction organization.
For the purpose of this study, the evaluation of safety attitude of management in the
industry was done by conducting a safety attitude survey in construction organizations
that examined the management approaches and practices as a predictive tool to

73

demonstrate how safety is operational within the construction organizations in the
industry. A survey was designed and distributed to contractor and subcontractor top
management for assessing the overall safety attitudes in their companies by taking into
account

their safety policy, commitment and support , responsibility structures,

communication and authority, decision making, training and orientation, administration
and procedures, inspections, accident investigation and reporting, and safety nonperformance issues. Conclusions drawn from this research will strengthen or weaken the
argument that the top management in construction organizations in the U.S. is generally
focused towards safety compliance rather than safety participation.
From the perspective of the overall objective of this dissertation, the underlying
objective of this study on contractor top management was to collect and analyze data on
top management attitudes and practices, which served as a basis to establish the rationale
of this research: need for a strategic zero-accident safety management framework in the
construction industry to achieve continuous safety improvement.
4.4.1.2.Methodology
Structured surveys were conducted to achieve the study objectives. The methodology
of survey development and administration was the same as discussed in section 3.2.2.3.
The following sections illustrate the major findings of the research conducted for the
key question at hand: Are the strategies, approaches, methods and operations currently
employed by contractor top management helping in strategically improving safety in the
construction industry?
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4.4.1.3.Data Collection
On the basis of literature review, six key constructs (factors) were identified along
with a number of associated indicators (observable items in terms of survey questions) to
analyze contractor top management attitudes and approaches with respect to strategically
improving safety in their organizations. The constructs are described in the following
sub-section.
4.4.1.3.1. Constructs
The following six constructs (factors) were used to analyze the various facets of
contractor top management attitudes and approaches towards safety.
4.4.1.3.1.1.Safety Policy
This construct consisted of various indicators determining the nature of safety
policies in construction organizations, such as, presence of a written safety program
manual and field manual, constituent elements of the policy, communication of the policy
to the workforce, policy review and revision procedures, and safety criterion in
recruitment policy of workers, managers, supervisors, subcontractors, suppliers, and
vendors.
4.4.1.3.1.2.Management Commitment and Support
The role management plays in promoting safety cannot be overemphasized.
Management’s role has to go beyond organizing and providing safety policies and
working instructions. Several studies show that the management’s commitment and
involvement in safety is the factor of most importance for a satisfactory safety level
(Jaselskis et al. 1996). Langford et al. (2000) found that when employees believe that the
management cares about their personal safety, they are more willing to cooperate to
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improve safety performance. Thus, the greater the level of management commitment
toward safety, the more improved the safety performance. This construct consisted of a
number of indicators determining the nature and extent of management commitment and
support towards safety in construction organizations. These included demonstrated
emphasis of safety over productivity, setting of corporate safety goals, executive
management involvement in safety activities, executive management review process on
safety, employee empowerment to providing feedback on health and safety matters,
continuous support for updating health and safety procedures, presence of a safety
responsibility structure at the organizational level, presence of project safety committees,
delegation of authority to safety officers to respond independently in case of unsafe acts,
provision of appropriate safety support personnel on work sites, and safety performance
evaluation of supervisors.
4.4.1.3.1.3.Safety Communication and Decision Making
Management is expected to use a variety of formal and informal means of
communication to promote and communicate its commitment to safety (Baxendale and
Jones 2000). Simon and Piquard (1991) suggests that both management communication
and employee feedback are critical for suggesting safety improvements and reporting
near misses as well as unsafe conditions and practices. Thus, the more effective the
organizational communication dealing with safety issues, the more improved the safety
performance. This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature
and effectiveness of safety communication and decision making by top management in
construction organizations. These included requirement of site managers and supervisors
engage themselves in regular safety talks with operatives, presence of formal behavior
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observation programs on work sites, encouragement provided to workers to raise safety
concerns with their supervisors, a work environment provided by management wherein
safety problems are openly discussed between workers and supervisors, involvement of
workers in preparation of site safety plans, communication of lessons learned from
accidents to workers, and involvement of workers and subcontractor representatives in
site safety decisions
4.4.1.3.1.4. Safety Training and Orientation
Training is a major component of safety. Safety training can modify worker safe
behavior; the workers can understand the work potential hazard such that they can
prevent it (Hallowell and Gambatese, 2009). This construct consisted of a number of
indicators determining the nature and effectiveness of safety training and orientation
procedures provided by management in construction organizations. These included
presence of a health and safety training program/ plan, review and revision process of the
training program, levels of training focused in the program, inclusion of safety training as
a line item in project budget, requirement for conductance of site safety orientation for
every new person to a job site, requirement of safety training meetings for each
supervisor (foreman and above), requirement for holding tool box/ tailgate safety
meetings focused on specific work operations/exposures, emphasis on site managers and
supervisors in meetings to maintain a positive attitude towards safety so that workers take
safety on the site seriously, requirement of equipment operation/certification training,
requirement for conductance of safety inductions for site visitors, requirement for
subcontractor workers to attend formal standard safety orientation, requirement for
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subcontractors to hold regular safety meetings, and monitoring of the effectiveness of
health and safety training checking new skills.
4.4.1.3.1.5.Safety Administration and Procedures
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature and
effectiveness of safety administration and procedures provided by management in
construction organizations. These included constituent administrative procedures of
company’s written safety program, documentation of safety work rules for various site
operations, review and revision process of work rules, requirement for pre-task safety
meetings, discussion of safety at all preconstruction and progress meetings, requirement
to perform site layout planning before commencement of work, maintaining first aid
facilities on work sites, conductance of emergency response drills, provision of safety
bulletin boards, safety signs and posters, system of incentive mechanisms, system of
disincentive (penalty) mechanisms,

established mechanism to recognize safety

accomplishments, maintaining Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) on work sites,
procedures to ensure proper use of PPE, requirement to maintain a site hazard register
containing hazards, impacts and preventive measures, conducting regular job site safety
inspections, conducting routine safety inspection of equipment, maintaining jobsite safety
checklists (or similar tools) for inspection, a system to monitor the effectiveness and
thoroughness of safety inspection, s system to collect and analyze the results of safety
inspections, and a system to ensure that action is taken as a result of the findings of safety
inspections.
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4.4.1.3.1.6.Accident Investigation and Reporting
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature and
effectiveness of accident investigation and reporting procedures employed by
management in construction organizations. These included presence of a procedure to
investigate accidents, a system to ensure that appropriate steps be taken to prevent similar
accidents in future, requirement to report incidents/ near misses in your reporting system,
investigation of near misses to help prevent accidents, keeping of organizational safety
records and logs, and a system to effectively use safety records and logs to enhance safety
performance.
4.4.1.3.2. Questionnaire
A quantitative research method was chosen to examine the contractor top
management attitudes and approaches toward safety, since it was exploratory in nature.
Questionnaire survey was used in order to facilitate the collection of information from
construction organizations. All indicators (observed variables) were measured through a
five-point Likert-type response format. Items, relating to each of the constructs, were
used in the form of statements to measure individual constructs under investigation.
Participants were asked to endorse the statements using a five-point Likert-type scale
(from 1=‘‘strongly disagree’’ to 5=‘‘strongly agree’’). Questionnaire survey is presented
in Appendix A.
To achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity, draft
questionnaires were constructed and pretested via face-to-face meetings with select
professionals including short-listed experts from construction contracting organizations
representing their top management and middle/ project management, all having expertise
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in or exposure to safety issues. Their input was used to refine the original questionnaire.
The questionnaire contained, in its final form, a total of 97 statements about contractor
top management attitudes and approaches toward safety. The research targeted top
management personnel for general contractors and subcontractors as the survey sample.
Based on all the gathered information, quantitative analysis was performed and the
results are discussed in the following section.
4.4.1.4.Data Analysis
The indicators (questionnaire items) in the survey were assumed to reflect the
unobserved, underlying construct, with the construct giving rise to (or ‘‘causing’’) the
observed measures. For example, constructs such as management commitment &
support, and safety communication & decision making are typically viewed as underlying
factors that give rise to something that is observed. Accordingly, their indicators tend to
be realized as reflective.
4.4.1.4.1. Assessment of Data Reliability and Validity
Prior to data analysis, the reliability and validity of data was assessed using the
methodology adopted in similar research (such as Mohamed, 2002). Specifically, three
measurement properties need to be examined to ensure that the data has a satisfactory
level of reliability and validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). The first of these is the
individual item reliability, where loadings (or simple correlations) of the items on their
respective constructs are assessed, using 0.70 as a cutoff point (Fornell and Larcker
1981). Exceeding this value simply implies that less than half of the item’s variance is
due to error. Obtained values for items exceeded this threshold, with all loadings in the
range of 0.75–0.90, demonstrating the satisfactory level of individual item reliability.
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Convergent validity (also referred to as the homogeneity of the construct or
composite reliability) is the second measurement property to be examined, and is
evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for each construct is
listed in Table 4.7. All constructs have acceptable convergent validity, as a value of 0.70
is usually accepted as the minimum desired value of the Cronbach’s alpha (Litwin 1995).
The third measurement property is the discriminant validity – that is, the extent to
which each construct differs from other constructs in the analysis. It is assessed by using
the average variance extracted (Av), suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) (Table 4.7).
This measure should be greater than the variance shared between the construct and other
constructs in the model (i.e., the squared correlation between two constructs). This can be
demonstrated in the correlation matrix, shown in Table 4.8, which includes the
correlations between different constructs in the lower left off-diagonal elements of the
matrix, and the square root of the average variance extracted (Av) calculated for each of
the constructs along the diagonal. Having all of the diagonal elements greater than any
other corresponding row or column implies adequate discriminant validity.
Having satisfied the three measurement properties, it can be concluded that the
constructs are measured with adequate precision.
Table 4.7: Convergent Validity of Independent Constructs
Construct

Cronbach’s alpha Average variance
extracted (Av)
1. Safety Policy
0.912
0.71
2. Management Commitment and Support
0.875
0.73
3. Safety Communication and Decision Making
0.832
0.69
4. Safety Training and Orientation
0.901
0.67
4. Safety Administration and Procedures
0.854
0.74
5. Accident Investigation and Reporting
0.873
0.78
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Table 4.8: Discriminant Validity Analysis
Construct
1. Safety Policy
2. Management Commitment and
Support
3. Safety Communication and Decision
Making
4. Safety Training and Orientation
5. Safety Administration and
Procedures
6. Accident Investigation and
Reporting

Construct
3
4
-

1
0.84
0.09

2
0.85

5
-

6
-

0.13

0.18

0.83

-

-

-

0.15
0.17

0.15
0.20

0.07
0.13

0.82
0.18

0.86

-

0.19

0.11

0.17

0.12

0.16

0.88

4.4.1.4.2. Results and Conclusion
This section presents the results of the survey. Contractor top management attitudes
and approaches towards safety were determined by six independent constructs – safety
policy, management commitment & support, safety communication & decision making,
safety training & orientation, safety administration & procedures, and accident
investigation and reporting, Strictly speaking, support was found for the impact of
contractor top management safety policy, commitment & support, communication &
decision making, training & orientation, administration & procedures, and accident
investigation and reporting on the strategic safety improvement in the construction
industry.
Descriptive analysis was performed to analyze the results. To assess the extent of
impact of each of the measured indicators (survey items) with respect to top
management’s approach to safety, the mean values of survey responses for each item
were used. A mean score of 5 in the final analysis represented best performance on the
measured indicator, while a mean score of 1 represented worst performance on the
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measure under consideration. A mean response score of 4.50 was considered least
significant in terms of that particular measure generating (minimal) negative impact on
the related construct. In order to distinguish the measures with respect to their extent of
impact, the following indicator criticality indexing and zoning criteria was used (Table
4.9).
Table 4.9: Indicator Criticality Indices & Zones
Mean Score
Range
<=2
2.01-2.50
2.51 – 3.00

Indicator
Criticality
Index
6
5
4
3

3.01-3.50
3.51 – 4.00
4.01 – 4.50
4.51 – 5.00

2
1
0

Indicator
Criticality
Zone
Major High
Major Low
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Minor High
Minor Low
NonCritical

Tables 4.10-4.15 show the mean response scores and indicator criticality indices for
all the items measured in the survey, organized under their respective constructs. The
tables have been sorted in descending order of criticality of the indicators measured
(based on their mean values).
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Table 4.10: Safety Policy Construct
S.
No.

Top Management Safety Performance
Statement

I

Safety Policy

1

The company has safety related criterion for
subcontractor selection (e.g. past safety
records).
The company has safety related criterion for
workers’ recruitment (e.g. experience, safety
training).
The company has safety related criterion for
managers’ & supervisors’ recruitment (e.g.
experience, safety training).
The revisions (where relevant) are promptly
brought to the attention of all employees.
The review arrangement includes feedback
from employees at all levels.
The safety policy clearly states that decisions
on other priorities should give due regard to
construction safety requirements.
There are effective arrangements for
reviewing the health and safety policy at least
once a year.
The company has a well-written substance
abuse program.
The company has a well-written light-duty,
return-to-work policy.
The policy endeavors to set targets (corporate
safety goals) for health and safety
performance including a commitment to
progressive improvement.
The policy identifies key senior personnel for
overall coordination and implementation of
the policy.
The company has a well established
disciplinary process for enforcement of safety
program/safety plan.
The company has a well-written safety field
manual.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13
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Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1

2.23

5

Major
Low

2.32

5

Major
Low

2.38

5

Major
Low

2.51

4

2.56

4

2.61

4

Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High

2.61

4

Moderate
High

3.76

2

3.96

2

4.01

1

Minor
High
Minor
High
Minor
Low

4.11

1

Minor
Low

4.11

1

Minor
Low

4.16

1

Minor
Low

Table 4.10: Safety Policy Construct (continued)
S.
No.

Top Management Safety Performance
Statement

14

As part of company policy, workers are given
a booklet containing work rules,
responsibilities, and other appropriate
information.
15 The company has a well-written personal
protective equipment (PPE) policy.
16 The policy is explained to new employees as
part of their training and orientation before
entry to a work on-site.
17 The company has a well-written policy on
accident reporting and investigation.
18 The policy explicitly commits the
organization to full compliance with all
relevant health and safety legislation.
19 The company has a well-written safety
program manual/ safety plan.
1
based on Table 4.9

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)
4.16

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Zone1
Index1
1

Minor
Low

4.16

1

4.21

1

Minor
Low
Minor
Low

4.5

1

4.55

0

4.8

0

Minor
Low
NonCritical
NonCritical

4.11: Management Commitment & Support Construct
S.
No.

Top Management Safety Performance
Statement

II
20

Management Commitment & Support
The number of safety officers delegated
on a site depends on the perceived/
evaluated hazards and complexity of the
site.
The management emphasizes on having
project safety committees.
Safety is a mandatory part of the
supervisor’s performance evaluation.
There are effective arrangements to
collect and review worker feedback on
health and safety matters.
The executive management reviews
accident reports.

21
22
23
24

85

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1

0.79

6

Major
High

1.58

6

1.63

6

1.78

6

Major
High
Major
High
Major
High

1.83

6

Major
High

4.11: Management Commitment & Support Construct (continued)
S.
No.

Top Management Safety Performance
Statement

25

The safety officers are delegated the
responsibility and authority to suspend
work if there are unsafe acts.
26 The executive management involves
itself in promoting safety by giving
directions/ motivation.
27 The executive management involves
itself in enacting incentive schemes to
encourage staff and subcontractors to
observe safety
28 The executive management involves
itself in attending or chairing safety
committees.
29 The management clearly emphasizes
safety over productivity.
30 The number of safety officers delegated
on a site depends on the accident records.
31 The executive management reviews
safety statistics.
32 The number of safety officers delegated
on a site depends on the requirements of
the law/ the contract.
33 The executive management reviews
inspection reports.
34 The executive management involves
itself in requiring and facilitating regular
safety inspection on sites.
35 The names and positions with
responsibility lines for safety
performance management are explicitly
identified (such as an organization chart).
36 The management sets corporate safety
goals.
37 The management always keeps someone
in charge of updating health and safety
including changes to regulations, new
codes of practice, newly identified
hazards, and new work practices.
1
based on Table 4.9
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Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)
1.88

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1
6

Major
High

2.38

5

Major
Low

2.7

4

Moderate
High

2.72

4

Moderate
High

2.86

4

3.22

3

3.37

3

3.66

2

Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Minor
High

3.81

2

3.81

2

3.81

2

Minor
High

4.01

1

4.16

1

Minor
Low
Minor
Low

Minor
High
Minor
High

Table 4.12: Safety Communication & Decision Making Construct
S.
No.
III

Top Management Safety Performance
Statement

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)

Safety Communication & Decision Making

38

Management strongly emphasizes that
safety problems be openly discussed
between workers and supervisors.
39 Management strongly emphasizes that
workers be involved in site safety
decisions.
40 As per management directives, a formal
behavior observation program exists on
work sites.
41 Management strongly encourages workers
to raise safety concerns with their
supervisors.
42 Management emphasizes that workers be
involved in preparation of site safety
plans.
43 Management strongly emphasizes that
subcontractors/ subcontractor safety rep/
subcontractor staff be involved in site
safety decisions.
44 Management communicates lessons from
accidents to workers in order to improve
safety performance.
45 As per management directives, site
managers and supervisors are required to
engage themselves in regular safety talks
with operatives.
1
based on Table 4.9
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1.73

6

Major
High

1.83

6

Major
High

2.72

4

Moderate
High

2.91

4

Moderate
High

2.96

4

Moderate
High

3.21

3

Moderate
Low

3.26

3

Moderate
Low

3.26

3

Moderate
Low

Table 4.13: Safety Training & Orientation Construct
S.
No.

Top Management Safety Performance
Statement

IV
46

Safety Training & Orientation
The safety program requires subcontractors
to hold regular safety meetings.
47 The effectiveness of health and safety
training is monitored by the company by
checking new skills.
48 Management strongly emphasizes on site
managers and supervisors in meetings to
maintain a positive attitude towards safety
so that workers take safety on the site
seriously.
49 The safety program requires all subcontract
workers to attend a formal standard safety
orientation.
50 The health and safety training program/
plan exists at the managerial level.
51 The safety program requires holding tool
box/ tailgate safety meetings focused on
specific work operations/exposures.
52 The safety program requires conducting
safety inductions for site visitors.
53 The health and safety training program/
plan exists at the supervisory level.
54 Safety training is always a line or
compulsory item within the budget.
55 The health and safety training program/
plan exists at the workforce level.
56 The safety program requires conducting
site safety orientation for every person new
to the job site.
57 The safety program requires safety training
meetings for each supervisor (foreman and
above).
58 The company has a well-documented
health and safety training program/ plan
59 The safety program requires equipment
operation/certification training.
1
based on Table 4.9

88

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1

1.88

6

Major
High
Major
High

1.93

6

2.43

5

Major
Low

2.77

4

Moderate
High

2.87

4

2.87

4

Moderate
High
Moderate
High

3.12

3

3.32

3

3.51

2

3.61

2

3.71

2

4.16

1

Minor
Low

4.16

1

4.75

0

Minor
Low
NonCritical

Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Minor
High
Minor
High
Minor
High

Table 4.14: Safety Administration & Procedures Construct
S.
No.

Top Management Safety Performance
Statement

V
60

Safety Administration & Procedures
The company has an established system
to recognize safety accomplishments
(such as award given out on a regular
basis with recognition given for good
safety performance.
Any non-compliance to wearing
appropriate PPE is required by the
management to be investigated.
Management motivates workers to work
safely by providing incentives/ awards/
recognitions for good safety
performance (e.g. monetary incentives).
The work rules are regularly updated.
There are appropriate arrangements to
monitor the effectiveness and
thoroughness of safety inspection.
There are appropriate arrangements to
collect and analyze the results of safety
inspections.
There are appropriate arrangements to
ensure that action is taken as a result of
the findings of safety inspections.
The safety program requires having pretask meetings before executing an
activity.
The safety program requires performing
site layout planning before start of work.
The management discusses safety at all
preconstruction and progress meetings.
The company’s written safety program
addresses safety communications
procedures.
The company’s written safety program
addresses safety risk identification and
management procedures.
The company’s written safety program
addresses safety planning procedures.

61
62

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

89

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
1.58

6

60

1.63

6

61

1.93

6

62

2.18
2.23

5
5

63
64

2.28

5

65

2.62

4

66

2.67

4

67

2.72

4

68

2.82

4

69

3.27

3

70

3.27

3

71

3.27

3

72

Table 4.14: Safety Administration & Procedures Construct (continued)
S.
No.

Top Management Safety Performance
Statement

73

Management disciplines workers to
work safely by imposing disciplinary
action (e.g. penalties) for safety nonperformance.
The safety program requires conducting
emergency response drills.
The company’s written safety program
addresses physical controls and rules.
The company’s written safety program
addresses safety organization and
responsibilities.
The company’s written safety program
addresses safety implementation,
monitoring and control procedures.
The company’s written safety program
addresses safety training and awareness
procedures.
The company’s written safety program
addresses safe work procedures.
Safety bulletin boards are provided and
located so that every employee will see
them during working days.
The safety program requires
maintaining a site hazard register
containing hazards, impacts and
preventive measures.
The company’s written safety program
addresses safety reporting procedures.
Safety signs and posters are prominently
displayed on work sites.
The company maintains jobsite safety
checklists (or similar tools) for
inspection.
The company’s written safety program
addresses accident and emergency
response mechanisms.
The safety program requires conducting
regular job site safety inspections/
audits.

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

82
83
84
85
86

90

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
3.27
3
73

3.32

3

74

3.38

3

75

3.42

3

76

3.42

3

77

3.56

2

78

3.61

2

79

3.66

2

80

3.71

2

81

3.76

2

82

3.81

2

83

3.86

2

84

3.91

2

85

3.97

2

86

Table 4.14: Safety Administration & Procedures Construct (continued)
S.
No.

Top Management Safety Performance
Statement

87

The company has documented safety
work rules/ procedures for all site
operations performed by the company
(such as excavation works, trenching
works, high rise work etc.).
88 Site safety inspections are required to
include routine safety inspection of
equipment (e.g., scaffold, ladders, fire
extinguishers, etc.).
89 There are established procedures to
ensure the proper use of PPE as well as
its training and inspection.
90 The company maintains PPE facilities
on worksites.
91 The company maintains continuous
supply of first aid facilities on work
sites.
1
based on Table 4.9

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
4.01
1
87

4.11

1

88

4.31

1

89

4.44

1

90

4.5

1

91

Table 4.15: Accident Investigation & Reporting Construct
S.
No.

Top Management Safety Performance
Statement

VI
92

Accident Investigation & Reporting
The company has a system to effectively
use safety records and logs for
enhancing safety performance.
Management requires investigating near
misses to help prevent accidents.
Management requires reporting
incidents/ near misses in the company’s
reporting system.
After each accident, appropriate steps
are taken to prevent similar accidents in
future.

93
94
95

91

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Zone1
Index1

2.37

5

Major
Low

2.64

4

2.85

4

Moderate
High
Moderate
High

2.96

4

Moderate
High

Table 4.15: Accident Investigation & Reporting Construct (continued)
S.
No.

Top Management Safety Performance
Statement

96

The company always investigates
accidents.
97 Management requires keeping safety
records and logs (such as in a database
that logs injuries on past projects).
1
based on Table 4.9

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)
2.98
3.9

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1
4
2

Moderate
High
Minor
High

After analyzing Tables 4.10-4.15, the major critical contractor top management safety
non-performance indicators (with criticality indices = 5 or 6), ranked in descending order
of criticality (based on mean response score), are shown in Table 4.16. Table 4.16 also
provides mean response rate, associated constructs, and indicator criticality ranking for
these key safety non-performance indicators. The first column in Table 4.16 provides the
serial number of these indicators as given in Tables 4.10-4.15.
Table 4.16: Key Top Management Safety Non-Performance Indicators – All Constructs
S.
No.
20

21
60

Mean
Response
Construct
Score
The number of safety officers
0.79
Management
delegated on a site depends on the
Commitment &
perceived/ evaluated hazards and
Support
complexity of the site.
The management emphasizes on
1.58
Management
having project safety committees.
Commitment &
Support
The company has an established
1.58
Safety
system to recognize safety
Administration &
accomplishments (such as award
Procedures
given out on a regular basis with
recognition given for good safety
performance.
Top Management Safety
Performance Indicator

92

Indicator
Criticality
Ranking
1

2
3

Table 4.16: Key Top Management Safety Non-Performance Indicators – All
Constructs (continued)
S.
No.

Top Management Safety
Performance Indicator

22

Safety is a mandatory part of the
supervisor’s performance
evaluation.
Any non-compliance to wearing
appropriate PPE is required by
the management to be
investigated.
Management strongly emphasizes
that safety problems be openly
discussed between workers and
supervisors.
There are effective arrangements
to collect and review worker
feedback on health and safety
matters.
The executive management
reviews accident reports.

61

38

23

24
39
25

46
47

62

Mean
Response
Construct
Score
1.63
Management
Commitment &
Support
1.63
Safety
Administration &
Procedures

Management strongly emphasizes
that workers be involved in site
safety decisions.
The safety officers are delegated
the responsibility and authority to
suspend work if there are unsafe
acts.
The safety program requires
subcontractors to hold regular
safety meetings.
The effectiveness of health and
safety training is monitored by
the company by checking new
skills.
Management motivates workers
to work safely by providing
incentives/ awards/ recognitions
for good safety performance (e.g.
monetary incentives).

5

1.73

Safety
Communication &
Decision Making

6

1.78

Management
Commitment &
Support

7

1.83

Management
Commitment &
Support
Safety
Communication &
Decision Making
Management
Commitment &
Support

8

1.83
1.88

93

Indicator
Criticality
Ranking
4

9
10

1.88

Safety Training &
Orientation

11

1.93

Safety Training &
Orientation

12

1.93

Safety
Administration &
Procedures

13

Table 4.16: Key Top Management Safety Non-Performance Indicators – All
Constructs (continued)
S.
No.

Top Management Safety
Performance Indicator

63

The work rules are regularly
updated.

1

The company has safety related
criterion for subcontractor
selection (e.g. past safety
records).
There are appropriate
arrangements to monitor the
effectiveness and thoroughness of
safety inspection.
There are appropriate
arrangements to collect and
analyze the results of safety
inspections.
The company has safety related
criterion for workers’ recruitment
(e.g. experience, safety training).
The company has a system to
effectively use safety records and
logs for enhancing safety
performance.
The company has safety related
criterion for managers’ &
supervisors’ recruitment (e.g.
experience, safety training).
The executive management
involves itself in promoting
safety by giving directions/
motivation.
Management strongly emphasizes
on site managers and supervisors
in meetings to maintain a positive
attitude towards safety so that
workers take safety on the site
seriously.

64

65

2
92

3

26

48

Mean
Response
Construct
Score
2.18
Safety
Administration &
Procedures
2.23
Safety Policy

94

Indicator
Criticality
Ranking
14
15

2.23

Safety
Administration &
Procedures

16

2.28

Safety
Administration &
Procedures

17

2.32

Safety Policy

18

2.37

Accident
Investigation &
Reporting

19

2.38

Safety Policy

20

2.38

Management
Commitment &
Support

21

2.43

Safety Training &
Orientation

22

Further assessment of Tables 4.10-4.15 – to identify construct criticality ranking
(based on a value of weighted mean response score for each construct) – results in Table
4.17. Table 4.17 has been arranged in descending order of construct criticality, and also
provide construct criticality ranking and criticality zone.
Table 4.17: Construct Criticality Ranking & Zone

Construct
Safety Communication &
Decision making
Management Commitment &
Support
Accident Investigation &
Reporting
Safety Training & Orientation
Safety Administration &
Procedures
Safety Policy

Weighted Mean
Response Score
(Scale 1-5)

Criticality
Ranking

Criticality Zone

2.74

1

Moderate High

2.78

2

Moderate High

2.95

3

Moderate High

3.22
3.27

4
5

Moderate Low
Moderate Low

3.56

6

Minor High

The major contractor top management safety non-performance indicators (with an
indicator criticality index = 5 or 6) constitute 22 out of a total of 97 indicators i.e.
22.68%. The moderate contractor top management safety non-performance indicators
(with an indicator criticality index = 3 or 4) constitute 36 out of a total of 97 indicators
i.e. 37.11%. Minor contractor top management safety non-performance indicators (with
an indicator criticality index = 1 or 2) constitute 36 out of a total of 97 indicators i.e.
37.11%. The remaining 3 indicators (3.09%) are not perceived by the industry as negative
aspects of contractor top management safety performance.
Safety communication and decision making, management commitment and support,
accident investigation and reporting, safety training and orientation are all important

95

components of a strategic total safety environment. Lack of performance of top
management on these areas undoubtedly indicate that contractor top management is not
performing well in terms of achieving strategic safety improvement in the construction
industry. Hence it can be concluded that the strategies, approaches, methods and
operations adopted by contractor top management are not helping as they should in
strategically improving safety in the construction industry.
4.4.2. Survey 2: Assessment of current safety attitudes and approaches of
supervisors and foremen in the construction industry
4.4.2.1.Survey Description
The construction supervisor/ foreman is typically the key person of contact for
workers in the field on a construction project. He is responsible for the direct daily
supervision of activities and his key task is to see that all work elements are fitted
together in the right sequence and at the right time. He plays an important role in
organizing and managing productivity, quality, and safety outcomes. In regards to safety,
it is critical for a supervisor to be equipped with the training, knowledge, and skills to not
only carry out the safety management practices but to instill safety in the workers’
attitudes and behaviors. The role supervisors play in promoting safety cannot be
overemphasized. Supervisory commitment is a central element of construction safety; a
supervisor with a positive safety attitude is vital in maintaining a safe work environment.
Many key elements dictate a safety conscious working environment, which the supervisor
initiate and instill. The attitude, interaction and communication of supervisors with
workers in terms of their commitment, support and motivation can have a positive (or
negative) influence on workers’ perceptions, attitudes, competence, and behaviors
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towards safety. Furthermore, supervisor is an important link between the workforce and
management. As referenced earlier, Neal et al. (2000) identified two distinct management
approaches to safety: 1) safety compliance, which involves requiring adherence to safety
procedures and carrying out work in a safe manner, and 2) safety participation, which
involves supporting and helping workers, promoting the safety program within the
workplace, demonstrating initiatives, and putting efforts into safety for improving the
safety performance. Based on management preference, the supervisors’ attitude and
approach towards safety can have a significant impact on workers’ safety preferences and
attitudes because the supervisor acts as a bridge between workers and management. For
instance, the supervisor’s attitude to safety generates as well as reinforces employee
perceptions about what gets rewarded, supported and expected in a particular setting.
Hence a supervisor’s attitude towards safety must be taken into account while addressing
the safety performance of a construction organization. This dimension of research is
significant not only to understand supervisors’ role in strategically improving safety in
the construction industry but also to determine how construction supervisors impact
safety performance and hence the worker safety behavior through their management
attitudes and practices.
For the purpose of this study, the evaluation of safety attitude of supervisors in the
industry was done by conducting a safety attitude survey in construction organizations
that examined the supervisory approach and practices as a predictive tool to demonstrate
how safety is operational on sites within the construction organizations in the industry. A
survey was designed and distributed to contractor and subcontractor supervisory staff
(including foremen and line managers) for assessing the overall safety attitudes on sites
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by taking into account their safety commitment and support, safety training and
orientation approach, disciplinary approach towards safety, safety communication,
authority and decision making, and approach towards maintaining a safe work
environment and a positive worker safety attitude. Conclusions drawn from this research
will strengthen or weaken the argument that the supervisors in construction organizations
in the U.S. are generally focused towards safety compliance rather than safety
participation.
From the perspective of the overall objective of this dissertation, the underlying
objective of this research study on construction supervisors was to collect and analyze
data on supervisor attitudes and practices, which would serve as a basis to establish the
rationale of this research: need for a strategic zero-accident safety management
framework in the construction industry to achieve continuous safety improvement.
4.4.2.2.Methodology
Structured surveys were conducted to achieve the study objectives. The methodology
of survey development and administration was the same as discussed in section 3.2.2.3.
The following sections illustrate the major findings of the research conducted for the
key question at hand: Are the strategies, approaches, and methods currently employed by
supervisors helping in strategically improving safety in the construction industry?
4.4.2.3.Data Collection
On the basis of literature review, seven key constructs (factors) were identified along
with a number of associated indicators (observable items in terms of survey questions) to
analyze supervisor attitudes and approaches with respect to strategically improving safety
in construction organizations. The constructs are described in the following sub-section.
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4.4.2.3.1. Constructs
The following seven constructs (factors) were used to analyze the various facets of
supervisor attitudes and approaches towards safety.
4.4.2.3.1.1.Training and Orientation
Safety training is a major component of jobsite safety. Even skilled and experienced
workers need a firm-specific safety and health orientation and training. Safety training
can modify worker safe behavior; the workers can understand the work potential hazard
such that they can prevent it (Hallowell and Gambatese, 2009). Supervisors play a
significant role in the training and orientation process of workers. This support comes in
the form of explaining safety operations and rules to workers, holding regular safety
meetings, coaching workers, providing job-specific safety training, and holding toolbox
safety meetings focused on specific work operations and exposures. The greater the level
of supervisory commitment toward worker safety training and orientation, the better
would be the site safety performance. This construct consisted of various indicators
determining the nature and extent of support provided by supervisors in terms of worker
safety training and orientation.
4.4.2.3.1.2.Safety Administration
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature and
effectiveness of safety administration as provided & facilitated by supervisors in
construction organizations. Aspects of administering safety in the workplace include
taking unsafe tools out of production, reporting and investigating accidents, maintaining a
continuous supply of first aid facilities on site, establishing inspection teams for hazard
analysis, inspecting work, and correcting unsafe conditions and acts.
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4.4.2.3.1.3.Maintaining Discipline
The aim in maintaining discipline in the workplace is to produce a functional working
environment that will maximize productivity and minimize risks. Sites where discipline
in the workplace has been adequately maintained are more likely to provide a high level
of safety performance ((Hallowell and Gambatese, 2009). This construct consisted of a
number of indicators determining the nature and effectiveness of the discipline
maintained by supervisors in construction organizations. Aspects of maintaining
discipline in the workplace include issuing warnings to workers, recommending
promotion or demotion to a worker, granting pay raises to workers, requiring workers to
report any unsafe behaviors by a fellow worker, enforcing the use of personal protective
equipment whenever needed, and conducting emergency response drills.
4.4.2.3.1.4.Safety Communication
Supervisors are expected to use a variety of formal and informal means of
communication to promote safety in the workplace (Baxendale and Jones 2000). Simon
and Piquard (1991) suggests that both management communication and employee
feedback are critical for suggesting safety improvements and reporting near misses as
well as unsafe conditions and practices. This construct consisted of a number of
indicators determining the nature and effectiveness of the safety communication by
supervisors in construction organizations. Aspects of supervisor-level communication
include authorizing timely maintenance/ repairs of equipment, making informed
suggestions to improve safety, discussing safety issues with the top management,
recommending changes in safety policies and procedures if needed, improving work
procedures through worker involvement, keeping an open-door policy on safety issues,
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encouraging feedback from workers on safety issues, and communicating workers’ safety
concerns to top management.
4.4.2.3.1.5.Safety Commitment and Support
Supervisory commitment and support are central to maintaining a safe work
environment. Supervisor’s role has to go beyond organizing and providing safety
administration and work rules. Supervisory commitment and involvement in safety is a
factor of key importance for a satisfactory safety level. Langford et al. (2000) found that
when employees believe that the management cares about their personal safety, they are
more willing to cooperate to improve safety performance. Having demonstrated
supervisory commitment and support to safety develops trust and fosters closer ties
among workers, and between workers and supervisors. This construct consisted of a
number of indicators determining the nature and extent of supervisory commitment and
support towards safety in construction organizations. Aspects of supervisory commitment
and support include emphasizing a no-blame approach to highlight unsafe work behavior,
reminding workers to work safely, facilitating in maintaining a safe workplace
environment, emphasizing on workers to help fellow workers and to maintain good
working relationships, ensuring that the workload is reasonably balanced among workers,
emphasizing on workers to achieve high levels of safety performance, play an active role
in identifying site hazards, report accidents, incidents, and potentially hazardous
situations, maintaining a positive attitude towards safety during meetings, allowing and
encouraging workers to act decisively if they find any unsafe situation, emphasizing on
workers to reflect on safety practice, contribute to accident investigations and job safety
analysis, participating actively in developing / reviewing health and safety procedures,
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ensuring good emergency preparedness among workers, providing safe equipment,
keeping safety as a primary consideration when planning, and identifying potential risks
and consequences prior to execution.
4.4.2.3.1.6.Maintaining a Positive Attitude towards Safety
A positive attitude towards safety refers to the degree of emphasis, encouragement
and support provided by supervisors to their workers in terms of identifying, reporting,
solving, advocating, and prioritizing safety concerns and issues. Having a positive
attitude towards safety by the supervisors demonstrates their unequivocal commitment to
safety and hence the desired and approved worker behaviors. Langford et al. (2000)
indicate that the more positive the attitude of supervisors is towards safety, the more
likely it is that workers will perform safely. This construct consisted of a number of
indicators determining the role of supervisors in maintaining a positive attitude towards
safety in construction organizations. Aspects of maintaining a positive safety attitude by
supervisors include engaging oneself in regular safety talks, discussing safety problems
openly with workers, welcoming the reporting of safety hazards, resolving safety issues,
never advocating working around safety procedures to meet deadlines, valuing ideas from
workers about improving safety, providing the help, authority, information and resources
workers need to behave safely, having safety as one’s top priority, and always informing
workers of safety concerns and issues.
4.4.2.3.1.7.Motivating
Motivating refers to promoting a feeling of belonging, job satisfaction, care for
personal problems, and recognition among workers in order to strengthen the workers’
positive attitude towards safety. Motivation by supervisors strengthens relationships and
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fosters closer ties between the supervisors and workers. It also improves the general
morale and worker attitude towards safety. Motivation may include promoting job
satisfaction among workers, creating a feeling of belonging among workers,
demonstrating a commitment of help and care for workers’ personal problems,
guaranteeing job security, and recommending recognitions and benefits. Langford et al.
(2000) indicate that the more motivated the workers are, the more likely it is that they
will perform safely. This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the
role of supervisors in motivating workers in construction organizations. Aspects of
motivation by supervisors include promoting a feeling of belonging among workers,
promoting job satisfaction, caring for workers’ personal problems, guaranteeing job
security, and recommending recognitions and benefits.
4.4.2.3.2. Questionnaire
A quantitative research method was chosen to examine the supervisor attitudes and
approaches toward safety, since it was exploratory in nature. Questionnaire survey was
used in order to facilitate the collection of information from construction organizations.
All indicators (observed variables) were measured through a five-point Likert-type
response format. Items, relating to each of the constructs, were used in the form of
statements to measure individual constructs under investigation. Participants were asked
to endorse the statements using a five-point Likert-type scale (from 1=‘‘strongly
disagree’’ to 5=‘‘strongly agree’’). Questionnaire survey is presented in Appendix B.
To achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity, draft
questionnaires were constructed and pretested via face-to-face meetings with select
professionals including short-listed experts from construction contracting organizations
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representing their supervisors and foremen, all having expertise in or exposure to safety
issues. Their input was used to refine the original questionnaire. The questionnaire
contained, in its final form, a total of 68 statements about supervisor attitudes and
approaches toward safety. The research targeted supervisory level personnel (including
supervisors, foremen, line managers) from general contractor and subcontractor
organizations as the survey sample.
Based on all the gathered information, descriptive analysis was performed and the
results are discussed in the following section.
4.4.2.4.Data Analysis
The indicators (questionnaire items) in the survey were assumed to reflect the
unobserved, underlying construct, with the construct giving rise to (or ‘‘causing’’) the
observed measures. For example, constructs such as safety commitment & support, and
safety communication are typically viewed as underlying factors that give rise to
something that is observed. Accordingly, their indicators tend to be realized as reflective.
4.4.2.4.1. Assessment of Data Reliability and Validity
Prior to data analysis, three measurement properties need to be examined to ensure
that the data has a satisfactory level of reliability and validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
The first of these is the individual item reliability, where loadings (or simple correlations)
of the items on their respective constructs are assessed, using 0.70 as a cutoff point
(Fornell and Larcker 1981). Exceeding this value simply implies that less than half of the
item’s variance is due to error. Obtained values for items exceeded this threshold, with all
loadings in the range of 0.80–0.95, demonstrating the satisfactory level of individual item
reliability.
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Convergent validity (also referred to as the homogeneity of the construct or
composite reliability) is the second measurement property to be examined, and is
evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for each construct is
listed in Table 4.18. All constructs have acceptable convergent validity, as a value of 0.70
is usually accepted as the minimum desired value of the Cronbach’s alpha (Litwin 1995).
The third measurement property is the discriminant validity – that is, the extent to
which each construct differs from other constructs in the analysis. It is assessed by using
the average variance extracted (Av), suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) (Table
4.18). This measure should be greater than the variance shared between the construct and
other constructs in the model (i.e., the squared correlation between two constructs). This
can be demonstrated in the correlation matrix, shown in Table 4.19, which includes the
correlations between different constructs in the lower left off-diagonal elements of the
matrix, and the square root of the average variance extracted (Av) calculated for each of
the constructs along the diagonal. Having all of the diagonal elements greater than any
other corresponding row or column implies adequate discriminant validity.
Having satisfied the three measurement properties, it can be concluded that the
constructs are measured with adequate precision.
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Table 4.18: Convergent Validity of Independent Constructs
Construct

Cronbach’s
alpha

1. Safety Training & Orientation
2. Safety Administration
3. Maintaining Discipline
4. Safety Communication
5. Safety Commitment and Support
6. Maintaining a Positive Attitude
towards Safety
7. Motivating Workers

0.873
0.892
0.912
0.905
0.868
0.887

Average
variance
extracted (Av)
0.75
0.70
0.73
0.69
0.77
0.74

0.845

0.68

Table 4.19: Discriminant Validity Analysis
Construct
1. Safety Training &
Orientation
2. Safety Administration
3. Maintaining Discipline
4. Safety Communication
5. Safety Commitment and
Support
6. Maintaining a Positive
Attitude towards Safety
7. Motivating Workers

Construct
4
5
-

1
0.87

2
-

3
-

6
-

7
-

0.09
0.13
0.15
0.17

0.84
0.18
0.15
0.20

0.85
0.07
0.13

0.83
0.18

0.88

-

-

0.19

0.11

0.17

0.12

0.16

0.86

-

0.21

0.17

0.09

0.13

0.11

0.19

0.82

4.4.2.4.2. Results and Conclusion
This section presents the results of the survey. Supervisor attitudes and approaches
towards safety were determined by seven independent constructs— safety training &
orientation, safety administration, maintaining discipline, safety communication, safety
commitment & support, maintaining a positive attitude towards safety, and motivating
workers. Strictly speaking, support was found for the impact of above aspects of
supervisory support on the strategic safety improvement in the construction industry.
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Descriptive analysis was performed to analyze the results. To assess the extent of
impact of each of the measured indicators (survey items) with respect to supervisory
approach to safety, the mean values of survey responses for each item were used. A mean
score of 5 in the final analysis represented best performance on the measured indicator,
while a mean score of 1 represented worst performance on the measure under
consideration. A mean response score of 4.50 was considered least significant in terms of
that particular measure generating (minimal) negative impact on the related construct. In
order to distinguish the measures with respect to their extent of impact, the following
indicator criticality indexing and zoning criteria was used (Table 4.20).
Table 4.20: Indicator Criticality Indices & Zones
Mean Score
Range
<=2
2.01-2.50
2.51 – 3.00

Indicator
Criticality
Index
6
5
4

3.01-3.50

3

3.51 – 4.00
4.01 – 4.50
4.51 – 5.00

2
1
0

Indicator
Criticality
Zone
Major High
Major Low
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Minor High
Minor Low
NonCritical

Tables 4.21-4.27 show the mean response scores and indicator criticality indices for
all the items measured in the survey, organized under their respective constructs. The
tables have been sorted in descending order of criticality of the indicators measured
(based on their mean values).
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Table 4.21: Safety Training and Orientation Construct
S.
No.
I
1
2
3
4

Supervisor Safety Performance
Statement
Safety Training and Orientation
I am responsible to provide jobspecific safety training
I am responsible to hold tool box/
tailgate safety meetings focused on
specific work operations/exposures
I am responsible to hold safety
meetings
I am responsible to coach workers

5

I am responsible to explain safety
operations/ rules to workers
6
I am responsible to orient new
workers
1
based on Table 4.20

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1

3.03

3

3.19

3

3.41

3

3.51

2

3.62

2

3.98

2

Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Minor
High
Minor
High
Minor
High

Table 4.22: Safety Administration Construct
S.
No.

Supervisor Safety Performance
Statement

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)

II
7

Safety Administration
I am responsible to establish inspection
teams for hazard analysis
I am responsible to investigate accidents

2.66

4

3.07

3

I am responsible to correct unsafe
conditions
I am responsible to take unsafe tools out
of production
I am responsible to correct unsafe acts

3.19

3

3.22

3

3.28

3

I am responsible to report all incidents/
near misses
I am responsible to authorize regular
maintenance or repair of equipment

2.48

5

3.77

2

8
9
10
11
12
13
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Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Major
Low
Minor
High

Table 4.22: Safety Administration Construct (continued)
S.
No.
14

Supervisor Safety Performance
Statement
I am responsible to report all accidents

15

I am responsible to maintain first aid
facilities
16 I am responsible to conduct (safety)
inspection of my own division of work
17 I am responsible to send the injured or
sick workers for medical attention
1
based on Table 4.20

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)
3.81

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1
2

3.93

2

3.95

2

4.01

1

Minor
High
Minor
High
Minor
High
Minor
Low

Table 4.23: Discipline Construct
S.
No.

Supervisor Safety Performance
Statement

III
18

Maintaining Discipline
I am responsible to require workers to
report any malpractice by a fellow
worker
19 I am responsible to conduct
emergency response drills
20 I am responsible to report a worker for
unsafe acts
21 I am responsible to discharge a
worker’s duties
22 I am responsible to recommend
promotion or demotion to a worker
23 I am responsible to issue warnings to
workers in case of unsafe acts
24 I am responsible to enforce the use of
personal protective equipment
whenever necessary
1
based on Table 4.20
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Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1

2.12

5

Major
Low

3.73

2

2.73

4

2.95

4

3.37

3

3.67

2

4.05

1

Minor
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Minor
High
Minor
Low

Table 4.24: Safety Communication Construct
S.
No.

Supervisor Safety Performance
Statement

IV
25

Safety Communication
I am responsible to recommend
changes in safety policy
26
I involve/ consult workers in
preparation of task safety plan
27
I encourage feedback from workers
on safety issues
28
I am responsible to improve safe
work procedures through worker
involvement
29
I keep an open-door policy on safety
issues
30
I take responsibility to communicate
workers’ safety concerns to
management
31
I take responsibility to make
suggestions to improve safety
32
I take responsibility to discuss safety
problems with the management
1
based on Table 4.20

Mean
Indicator
Response
Criticality
Score
Index1
(Scale 1-5)
2.57

4

2.42

5

2.46

5

2.93

4

2.93

4

3.38

3

3.54

2

3.62

2

Indicator
Criticality
Zone1
Moderate
High
Major
Low
Major
Low
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Minor
High
Minor
High

Table 4.25: Safety Commitment & Support Construct
S.
No.
V
33
34
35
36

Supervisor Safety Performance
Statement
Safety Commitment & Support
I emphasize on workers to contribute to
job safety analysis
I ensure good preparedness for
emergency among workers
I allow workers to act decisively if they
find any situation contrary to safe
conditions on site
I participate actively in developing /
reviewing health and safety procedures
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Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Zone1
Index1
(Scale 1-5)
2.58

4

2.61

4

1.95

6

2.68

4

Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Major
High
Moderate
High

Table 4.25: Safety Commitment & Support Construct (continued)
S.
No.

Supervisor Safety Performance
Statement

37

I take responsibility to ensure that the
workload is reasonably balanced among
workers
I emphasize on workers to contribute to
accident investigations
I continuously emphasize on workers
that safety rules should not be broken,
even when worker believes it affects the
production
I emphasize on a no-blame approach to
highlight unsafe work behavior
I emphasize on workers to achieve high
levels of safety performance
I take responsibility to provide right
equipment to the workers so that they
can do the job safely
I take responsibility to detect potential
hazards as part of the planning exercise
I often remind workers to work safely

38
39

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

I emphasize on workers that everyone
has the responsibility to reflect on safety
practice
I emphasize on workers that safety is the
number one priority while working
I keep safety as a primary consideration
when planning
I take responsibility to never allow
working with defective equipment
I emphasize on workers to report
accidents, incidents, and potentially
hazardous situations
I emphasize on workers to offer help to
fellow workers when needed to perform
the job safely
I emphasize on workers to maintain a
good relationship with fellow workers
I emphasize on workers to play an active
role in identifying site hazards
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Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
2.70
4
Moderate
High
2.74

4

Moderate
High
Moderate
High

2.75

4

2.50

5

2.81

4

2.84

4

2.84

4

2.93

4

2.93

4

2.98

4

3.02

3

3.03

3

3.06

3

2.38

5

Major
Low

2.40

5

3.18

3

Major
Low
Moderate
Low

Major
Low
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low

Table 4.25: Safety Commitment & Support Construct (continued)
S.
No.

Supervisor Safety Performance
Statement

53

I endeavor to maintain a positive attitude
towards safety during meetings so that
workers take safety on the site seriously
54 I take responsibility to identify potential
risks & consequences prior to execution
55 I emphasize on workers to ensure that
individuals are not working by
themselves under risky or hazardous
conditions
56 I react strongly against workers who
break health and safety procedures /
instructions / rules.
1
based on Table 4.20

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
3.20
3
Moderate
Low
3.22

3

2.76

4

3.56

2

Moderate
Low
Moderate
High
Minor
High

Table 4.26: Maintaining a Positive Attitude Construct

S.
No.
VI
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
1

Supervisor Safety Performance Statement
Maintaining a Positive Attitude
I engage myself in regular safety talks
(discuss safety problems openly with
workers and supervisors)
I never advocate working around safety
procedures to meet deadlines
I welcome reporting safety hazards/incidents
I gather ideas from workers about improving
safety when significant changes to work
practices are suggested
I provide the help, authority, information &
resources workers need to behave safely
I always inform workers of safety concerns
and issues.
I take responsibility to solve safety problems

based on Table 4.20
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Mean
Response Indicator
Score
Criticality
(Scale 1Index1
5)

Indicator
Criticality
Zone1

2.97

4

Moderate
High

3.20

3

3.74
2.46

2
5

Moderate
Low
Minor High
Major Low

3.78

2

Minor High

3.89

2

Minor High

3.92

2

Minor High

Table 4.27: Motivating Construct

S.
No.

Supervisor Safety Performance
Statement

VII
64

Motivating
I take responsibility for assuring job
security of workers under my belt
65 I am responsible for recommending
recognition/ reward for good safety
performance
66 I take responsibility for helping and
caring for workers’ personal problems
67 I take responsibility for creating
feeling of belonging among workers
68 I take responsibility for promoting job
satisfaction among workers
1
based on Table 4.20

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 15)

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1

1.70

6

1.97

6

2.31

5

2.91

4

3.52

2

Major
High
Major
High
Major
Low
Moderate
High
Minor
High

After analyzing Tables 4.21-4.27, the critical supervisor safety non-performance
indicators (with criticality indices = 3), ranked in descending order of criticality (based on
mean response score), are shown in Table 4.28. Table 4.28 also provides mean response
rate, associated constructs, and indicator criticality ranking for these key nonperformance indicators. The first column in Table 4.28 provides the serial number of
these indicators as given in Tables 4.21-4.27.
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Table 4.28: Key Supervisor Safety Non-Performance Indicators – All Constructs
S.
No.

Supervisor Safety
Performance Indicator

64

I take responsibility for
assuring job security of
workers under my belt
I allow workers to act
decisively if they find any
situation contrary to safe
conditions on site
I am responsible for
recommending recognition/
reward for good safety
performance
I am responsible to require
workers to report any
malpractice by a fellow
worker
I take responsibility for
helping and caring for
workers’ personal problems
I emphasize on workers to
offer help to fellow workers
when needed to perform the
job safely
I emphasize on workers to
maintain a good relationship
with fellow workers
I involve/ consult workers in
preparation of task safety plan
I encourage feedback from
workers on safety issues
I gather ideas from workers
about improving safety when
significant changes to
working practices are
suggested
I am responsible to report all
incidents/ near misses
I emphasize on a no-blame
approach to highlight unsafe
work behavior

35

65

18

66
50

51
26
27
60

12
40

Mean
Response
Construct
Score
1.70
Motivating

Indicator
Criticality
Ranking
1

1.95

Safety
Commitment and
Support

2

1.97

Motivating

3

2.12

Discipline

4

2.31

Motivating

5

2.38

Safety
Commitment and
Support

6

2.40

Safety
Commitment and
Support
Safety
Communication
Safety
Communication
Maintaining a
Positive Attitude

7

2.42
2.46
2.46

2.48
2.50
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Safety
Administration
Safety
Commitment and
Support

8
9
10

11
12

Further assessment of Tables 4.21-4.27 – to identify construct criticality ranking
(based on a value of weighted mean response score for each construct) – results in Table
4.29. Table 4.29 has been arranged in descending order of construct criticality, and also
provide construct criticality ranking and criticality zone.
Table 4.29: Construct Criticality Ranking & Zone

Construct
Motivating Workers
Safety Commitment and Support
Safety Communication
Maintaining Discipline
Safety Administration
Maintaining a Positive Attitude
towards Safety
Safety Training & Orientation

Weighted Mean
Response Score
(Scale 1-5)

Criticality
Ranking

Criticality
Zone

2.48
2.82
2.98
3.23
3.40
3.42

1
2
3
4
5
6

Major Low
Moderate High
Moderate High
Moderate Low
Moderate Low
Moderate Low

3.46

7

Moderate Low

The major supervisor safety non-performance indicators (with an indicator criticality
index = 5 or 6) constitute 12 out of a total of 68 indicators i.e. 17.64%. The moderate
supervisor safety non-performance indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 3 or 4)
constitute 37 out of a total of 68 indicators i.e. 54.41%. Minor supervisor safety nonperformance indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 1 or 2) constitute 19 out of a
total of 68 indicators i.e. 27.94%.
Worker motivation, safety commitment and support, safety communication,
maintaining a positive attitude towards safety, and safety training and orientation are all
important components of a strategic total safety environment. Lack of performance of
supervisors on these areas undoubtedly indicates that supervisors and foremen not
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performing well in terms of achieving strategic safety improvement in the construction
industry. Hence it can be concluded that the strategies, approaches, and methods adopted
by supervisors are not helping as they should in strategically improving safety in the
construction industry.
4.4.3. Survey 3: Analysis of the criticism on OSHA with respect to its lack of
success in acting as a catalyst to incorporate total safety in a construction
organizations
4.4.3.1.Survey Description
In the United States, all construction safety is legislated by the Occupational Safety &
Health Administration (OSHA), a federal agency that is part of the U.S. Department of
Labor, which was created by the Congress under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
in 1970. OSHA has claimed credible statistics over the years showing that, since its
implementation by Congress has had a beneficial influence on US industries by
significantly reducing workplace accidents. Under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s role is to “assure safe and
healthful working conditions for every working man and woman in the Nation; by
authorizing enforcement of the standards developed under the Act; by assisting and
encouraging the States in their efforts to assure safe and healthful working conditions; by
providing for research, information, education, and training in the field of occupational
safety and health”. (Ballard and Howell, 1998)
OSHA develops a series of specific minimum construction standards, and policies for
enforcing the standards to assist in the safety management process. The construction
industry standards (29 CFR 1926) are not guidelines, but legal requirements that define
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the minimum protections construction organizations must provide their workforce on the
job site. OSHA periodically develops and publishes amendments to standards that
through time may have become outdated or are in need of additional clarification. It is
vitally important that all OSHA regulations and requirements be strictly followed or the
construction organization could be subject to fines and penalties; worker’s compensations
premium may increase; and this may have a negative impact on the company’s ability to
prosper in the marketplace. For that very reason, construction organizations typically
employ a safety manager or a competent person, while larger companies may employ
outside consultants to develop and enforce safety management procedures. Outside safety
consultants can become a valuable member of the team by visiting the jobsite to provide
detailed safety advice, training, and other related safety knowledge as required.
Whatever the solution, an effective construction safety and health program must be a core
element of a construction company’s management strategy, with the ultimate goal to
prevent workplace accidents and reduce occupational injuries.
Credible statistics reveal that OSHA has had a beneficial influence on the US
construction industry in terms of reducing workplace accidents and occupational injuries.
Undoubtedly, OSHA has played a pivotal role in the development of a safer work
environment over the years. Nevertheless, the agency still has received substantial
criticism from construction organizations for a number of reasons. Even though the
number of workplace accidents and casualties has dropped down drastically in the
construction industry ever since OSHA regulations have been implemented, construction
firms have viewed OSHA's regulations and standards in a negative light as well. This is
despite the numerous attempts by the agency to promote training, consultation, and
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outreach services. “To assure safe and healthful working conditions for every working
man and woman in the Nation” – the failed mission statement of OSHA is a constant
reminder of some inherent inefficacies in the strategic operations of the organization.
One of the more common arguments against OSHA is that its heavy fines and
burdensome regulations deliver an overbearing and unwanted presence that greatly
restricts an organization’s ability to develop as well as compete. On one hand, the
overburdening regulations place a heavy impediment on organizations by forcing
increased operational fees and the costs associated to retrofit equipment rather than
investing on improving the processes and culture for achieving long-term (strategic)
safety objectives. Companies that invest but are still unable to meet the regulations owing
to their own deficiencies (which may not necessarily be because of their poor attitude
towards safety) may encounter increased accidents, strict OSHA fines, worker’s
compensation premium increases, and will ultimately have a negative impact on the
company’s ability to succeed in the global marketplace. On the other hand, although the
ultimate goal is safety, the overbearing fines/ penalties have actually put a negative strain
on the never ending battle to make construction companies and their jobsites safer. The
heavy penalties compel organizations to concentrate on avoiding penalties and trying to
“stay away” from OSHA, especially if they are not at par with the standards issued by
OSHA, rather than investing in maintaining the ultimate goal of safe workplaces. This
has created an adversarial relationship between the industry and OSHA in general and
has not allowed OSHA to keep up its role as safety advisors in order to facilitate in
strategically improving safety in the industry.
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There are other arguments as well. Observers have questioned whether the reported
drop in injury rates could be all attributed to OSHA’s enforcement activities. Another
argument is that the agency is not actively participating in the necessary research to view
and incorporate safety as an industrial development process, and hence their regulations
do not support implementing safety as a total management process. Most critics further
charge that the OSHA's inspection and penalty approach is an inappropriate and
ineffective way to ensure workplace safety, and OSHA has been accused of being more
devoted to the numbers of inspections rather than to actual safety and has been criticized
for taking decades to develop new regulations.
This research was aimed to identify the aspects of OSHA ‘s regulations, methods and
approach that seem to provide a negative influx towards developing a strategic safety
culture in a construction organization, as well as identify the reasons that lead to such a
criticism to OSHA’s mode of operation. Conclusions drawn from this research will
strengthen or weaken the argument that OSHA’s current regulations and implementation
methods compel construction organizations to invest in following procedures rather than
to invest in achieving long- term strategic safety objectives. The survey will also
diagnose what the construction contracting organizations feel that OSHA is not putting in
the needed effort in the research and development process of safety and is mainly acting
as a watch dog rather than an organization providing mechanisms for achieving total
safety goals.
From the perspective of the overall objective of this dissertation, the underlying
objective of this research study on OSHA was to collect and analyze data on OSHA
criticism, which would serve as a basis to establish the rationale of this research: need for
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a strategic zero-accident safety management framework in the construction industry to
achieve continuous safety improvement.
4.4.3.2.Methodology
Since no prior formal information (such as journal papers, conference papers, books,
published articles, etc.) as to the effectiveness of OSHA in the construction industry was
available, this research on OSHA criticism was conducted in two steps:
1. Unstructured interviews. These open-ended discussions were done via face-toface meetings and telephonic communication with selected professionals
including short-listed experts representing contractors and sub-contractors. The
interviewed audience included top managers, middle/ project managers and
construction superintendents. A total of 27 interviews were conducted and the
findings compiled. The primary objective of these interviews was to determine the
key information parameters to be used in developing a structured survey in the
next step.
2. Structured surveys. The results of the open-ended interviews were utilized to draft
a structured questionnaire to assess OSHA’s non-performance issues. The
methodology of survey development and administration was the same as
discussed in section 3.2.2.3.
The following sections illustrate the major findings of the research conducted for the
key question at hand: Are the strategies, approaches, methods and operations adopted by
OSHA helping in strategically improving safety in the construction industry? Firstly, the
key findings of the unstructured interviews are discussed. This is followed by the results
of the structured surveys.
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4.4.3.3.Unstructured Interviews
The key criticisms on OSHA’s performance as indicated by the interviewees are
discussed below.
Criticism 1: OSHA’s methodology of implementing and enforcing its policies has
flaws.
OSHA has lately come under wide criticism concerning its methodology of
implementing and enforcing its policies and the high cost incriminated with the
compliance of such, as compared to the rate of reduced work related injuries and deaths.
Most interviewees emphasized that OSHA’s policies can be termed as routine as opposed
to drawing attention to prevention or taming the root causes of the hazards. They
advocated for the focus to shift to preventing the root cause, developing channels for
reporting accidents and conducting detailed scrutiny of the root cause, and rectification to
completion. It was further suggested that the channels of communication should be
defined as such to give room for reporting ‘near misses’.
Criticism 2: OSHA disregards the productivity side of doing business
A key issue and concern in regards to OSHA has been how OSHA policies affect
work productivity. Interviewees claimed that work places have suffered from the
enforcement of OSHA standards in terms of low productivity levels. The argument is that
OSHA should be enforcing standards that provide safe as well as productive work
environment for everyone by developing better procedures. The criticism towards OSHA
is for the failure to create and advance such procedures to be used in work places that will
not reduce production. As suggested by one respondent and endorsed by many: “OSHA
only concentrates on safety side of doing business and totally disregards the productivity
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side. More productive procedures can be safer as well. However, OSHA completely
disregards this aspect and makes its own recommendations without putting in the
research needed to drive a high-productivity safety culture.”
Criticism 3: OSHA is unreasonably slow in incorporating new safety guidelines
Many companies critic OSHA because it is slow to set or improve on new safety
guidelines. OSHA has been accused of emphasizing too much time and resources on
inspections when it should be emphasizing that time and resource on developing new
regulations. A few comments from interviewees in relation to this aspect were as follows:
“If OSHA is there to protect us then why does it take so long to enforce new rules such as
the one for crane lifting? Why the 30 years old lifting regulation is still in effect? OSHA
needs to understand that enforcing a good safety on crane is highly recommended, to
protect workers and surrounding area.” “We understand the governmental requirements
and processes that have to be followed but OSHA needs to work faster on implementing
rules and regulations.” “OSHA needs to start preventing accidents before they happen,
and they need to reinforce some of the old safety rules and regulations.” “It is not a good
way of handling business; OSHA seems to take forever to implement new safety
guidelines.” “OSHA needs to revise guidelines as technology changes”. Commenting on
OSHA’s permissible exposure limit (PEL) on noise, one representative of a mechanical
subcontractor stated: “If OSHA promises us to be safe, how come every other country
updated their system on PEL and OSHA keeps it at the same rate? Personally, I know a
couple of people who used to work on the railroad and lost their hearing at an early age.”
One suggestion given by a number of interviewees was that “the government needs to let
OSHA to act as a separate agency. The government process will always slow down
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OSHA on implementing new rules and regulations. It’s time for OSHA to realize that it
needs to be an agency that does not depend on the government and lawyers to approve
rules, at least on important safety issues.”
Criticism 4: OSHA’s regulations do not comprehensively cover major safety and health
issues
Unsafe practices that are not listed in the known hazards in the OSHA act are grouped
under 'general duty'. This is basically a loophole that ends up limiting numerous unsafe
practices into being classified into general duty. “OSHA lays emphasis to big known
hazards while ignoring others that are apparently more hazardous. For instance, a law on
large explosions and major accidents is most visible in the Act, while job-related health
issues account for more than 80 percent of all problems at the work place.”
Criticism 5: OSHA’s standards are dated
Unfortunately, many professionals complain about OSHA’s standards being outdated.
There are many OSHA standards that are decades old. For example, the standards for
derricks and hoists are based on the 1943 edition of ANSI B30.2 and the standard for
woodworking machinery dates to the 1954 edition of ANSI O 1.1. This is a strong
example indicating how some areas of OSHA have seemed to be untouched. For years,
construction industry experts have complained about this problem of old and outdated
standards. These outdated standards can drastically affect workers’ safety and put harm
into their way. The best resolution to this problem is to have the standards looked over
and replaced with proper up-to-date standards.

123

Criticism 6: OSHA’s penalty mechanism is ineffective and has created serious doubts
as to the agency’s sense of purpose
A major criticism on OSHA has been that, over the years, a pro safety entity has been
becoming a pro revenue collector. To justify this opinion, respondents referred to data
depicting that in 1976, 95 percent of OSHA citations were classified as “non-serious” (in
terms of monetary value) while in 2008, 70 percent of citations were classified as
“serious”. An accusation by most is that OSHA has stepped up its role as a revenue
collector for the federal government. As per the interviewees, this is evident from the
range of OSHA’s maximum allowable penalties which have been increased many-fold
over recent years, and $900 million in additional revenues are expected over the next five
years . “OSHA is now implementing expensive citations to the companies that can range
from 7,000 dollars to 70,000 for a repetitive infraction.” While this increased penalty has
been justified by OSHA personnel as being an effective means of safety enforcement, this
has been viewed by the industry, in general, as a move of OSHA from being a safety
proactive agency to a revenue generation agency for the government. This accusation is
backed by the fact that every governmental entity in the country has to meet certain
objective and economical growth goals so that their funds are not lowered significantly
for the next year. An associated accusation is that OSHA does not respect companies, in
general, as fair and safe employers and mostly acts as any other law enforcer with
penalties as their weapons.
The other side of the picture was depicted by a number of interviewees by reflecting
that although the maximum penalty for violating an OSHA safety standard is $70,000,
willfully violating an OSHA safety standard has no extra penalty unless there has been a
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death of an employee because of that particular violation. In that respect, OSHA’s
penalty mechanism is ineffective, particularly criminal penalties. OSHA is only able to
pursue a criminal penalty when a willful violation of an OSHA standard results in the
death of a worker. The maximum penalty is a misdemeanor with a maximum of 6-months
in jail. Many condemn this practice and believe the time should fit the crime. One of the
respondents, who worked for a government entity as a general contractor, summed up
this part of the debate perfectly when he said, “If you improperly import an exotic bird,
you can go to jail for two years. If you deal in counterfeit money, you’re looking at 20
years. But if you gamble with the lives of your employees and one of them is killed, you
risk only six months in jail.” This is evident by a recent example, which was often cited
by a number of respondents. On Nov. 28, 2008, a Wal-Mart Employee was trampled to
death when opening the doors for the day after Thanksgiving Day sale. Wal-Mart was
only fined $7,000 for not having proper crowd control management. A recent report by
OSHA shows that, in 2010, 1,832 fatalities where investigated and the average penalties
for all convictions came out to $11,543. Besides the fact that one cannot set a price on a
person’s life, a measly $11,543 is actually an insult to the deceased and their family
members. In fact, in OSHA’s 40 years of existence, they have managed to secure only 12
criminal convictions of jail time, which, as stated before, is not harsh enough for the
crime committed.
Criticism 7: Interpretation of regulations is at most times vague
Unlike other government agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration which
hire scientists and leaders in the field the agencies enforce, OSHA is run mostly by
lawyers and senior businessmen. OSHA has come under considerable criticism with the
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issue of imposing fines based on the assertion that rules can be interpreted in different
ways and since lawyers and businessman are not as knowledgeable in construction field
as construction workers, contractors, subcontractors, etc., their interpretation is usually
much different then what actual experience and work environment has taught. A related
example cited by a number of respondents was for the year 2003 in the states of
Massachusetts and Florida where OSHA issued several citations for scaffolding. The
violation was for statute 29 CFR 1926 250(b) (5); the prohibition against leaving more
materials on scaffolding than necessary for immediate operations. The inspector who read
and issued the citations was taking the rule to mean literally and since he either had no or
little experience in the construction field, believed that these companies where creating a
hazardous work environment. It is a common practice in the construction field to leave
materials on the scaffold for many reasons. When laying bricks, workers would want to
have a supply of bricks with them so that they can place the guard rail for safety. Having
to climb up and down continuously to bring bricks up will leave the guard rail unattached
which increases the chances of a workers falling off of the scaffold. It is also a regular
practice to leave materials and tools on the scaffold overnight or between shifts as this
allows the boards to stay in place if a severe gust of wind was to hit the scaffold. Without
the materials on the scaffold, the boards would fly off and could possibly hurt a worker
below. In the same light, having the extra weight of the material while workers are on the
scaffold can help in the stability of the scaffold and that of the board placement. Without
the extra weight on the boards, as a worker moves around, the lack of weight and the
constant vibration will cause the board to shift, which may result in a serious accident.
There are other reasons why extra material on the scaffolds are a good idea and a safe
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practice although one could understand the possible problems of having too much
materials on the scaffold with workers.
Criticism 8: OSHA does not participate enough in research and development
OSHA is strongly critiqued for its lack of participation in the research and
development of new and improved safety procedures, methods, and standards. There is a
constant growth in the working environment and, therefore, a need for continuous study
and exploration to find new and improved methods for building and sustaining a safe
working environment for all.
Criticism 9: OSHA regulations are ambiguous at times
As per the respondents, OSHA has some regulations that employers do not
understand or do not know how to make effective. For instance, one respondent
commented on one OSHA regulation by saying: “OSHA states that plastic gas cans can
be used on manufacturing work sites, but not on construction sites, even if they have been
approved by local fire marshals. As weird as it seems, OSHA contradicts what an
experienced fire marshal allows. This shows a clear contradiction between the two
entities and would not be beneficial for the industry.”
Moreover, safety violations are often grouped into the agency’s “general duty”
clause, allowing inspectors to cite companies for unsafe practices that are not specifically
regulated. This means that there is broad aspect of violations that does not have specific
instructions or guidelines of how to prevent them. This can upset some business owners
who get slapped with fines that they don’t know anything about. This lack of guidelines
makes business owners lose money while, at the same time, lose production. One general
contractor argued that OSHA regulations “are generally broad but necessary in the
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workplaces.” He also stated that while regulations are not thoroughly clear, they are
essential in maintaining a safe and healthy work atmosphere. He and many other
respondents argued for clearer regulations.
Criticism 10: OSHA is not proactive
OSHA has been criticized for not being proactive in their approach but rather being
reactive to circumstances. A good argument was given by a respondent who remarked
that “one reason noise hasn’t gotten the attention it deserves is because it’s not
immediately life-threatening like many other construction hazards. But loss of one’s
hearing destroys a worker’s quality of life and creates safety hazards on the job. Without
OSHA’s support, we’ve had to find other ways to protect people.” One common
argument given by many respondents was that OSHA does fine for violations, but does
not follow through nor does it provide instructions on how to improve existing
conditions. This reactive approach by OSHA was evidenced by a number of citations
from personal experiences given by many respondents. For instance, an earthwork
contractor representative alluded to a jobsite he was working on as a field superintendant.
The foundations to a precast parking structure were under way and were in the excavation
stage. The backhoe operator hit underground utilities and was nearly electrocuted to
death as a result of the strike. OSHA immediately arrived on the scene and scrutinized the
workplace. Soon after, a citation was issued and then the OSHA officials were no longer
seen on the worksite. Neither did they provide any instructions as to how to improve on
the safety of the workplace. This shows that a retaliatory action was taken and then safety
was scrutinized with a fine-toothed comb. However, nothing was done to provide
assistance/ guidance to the employer to improve on safety.
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Another argument posed by a number of respondents was that OSHA should leave a
positive impression on contractors, foreman, and all those involved. “OSHA has set up a
rulebook. You must follow A, B, C, and D to avoid fines rather than establish a safety
culture or mindset.” “Don’t slap me on my hand and simply tell me I did this, show me
how I can be better. Show me how my crews can be better.” Most respondents witnessed
that they have experienced only few inspections unless involved with a high-priority job.
“They are so concerned with documenting violations and snapping photos, versus
mitigating safety. So, naturally, contractors and their subs are going to walk the straight
and narrow, losing sight of the overall picture of a safe workplace.” “Positive
reinforcement is the best method to reach a goal.” “At the end of the day, we’re all trying
to make money. So, reward contractors. Treat them like kindergarten children and reward
a child with a sticker or piece of candy. Reward the good boys and girls who are safe
with a reward such as certificate or documentation that they can present to their insurance
companies to lower their premiums or policy rates. Let their safe track record qualify
them for specific jobs. Treat it like LEED that has caught like wildfire. In today’s market,
who can afford to be unsafe? There is no reason why, if the right incentive is present,
anyone can’t behave in a specified manner.”
Opinions were gathered wherein the respondents proposed that insurance companies,
contractors (and subcontractors), and OSHA should be involved with setting safety goals.
The argument was that it is important to set up long-term objectives that have a reward
for the contractor. This would change the attitude from trying to avoid OSHA violations
towards showcasing the safety of all employees and operations on work site. This cannot
be achieved by merely implementing a reward clause. If this were to be put into effect, it
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would require public meetings and advertising. An example of an ideal scenario is on a
government pre-bid meeting, where an OSHA representative is present to explain the
new incentives and reinforce as to how beneficial it can be. Owners could partake in this
by informing contractors that “X amount of accident-free days will result in Y amount of
added profit.”
Criticism 11: OSHA does not improvise with changing conditions
In an interview with a construction project manager, a valid point was made about the
affect of economy on the safety of work site. The interviewee stated that he has witnessed
how job assurance has caused an increase in safety hazards on the work site. The current
economic conditions have become reason for many people to be worried if they have job
assurance and has forced them to go to great lengths to make sure they will always have a
working position. He also explained how these lengths have come to include putting the
employees themselves and/or other employees at risk to get their job done. What is
upsetting is that despite the obvious hazard nothing has been done upon OSHA’s part to
attempt to reverse this affect. The economy has unfortunately influenced the work
environment negatively in this way and an organization such as OSHA should be doing
something to change this issue into a better solution.
Criticism 12: OSHA has insufficient funds
Respondents criticized that OSHA has insufficient funding from the government,
which could pose to be a big problem for OSHA to be able to function in the way that the
public would like it to. OSHA’s lack of funds has dated back years and is not a recent
problem for the association. “OSHA needs to invest more money if they really want to
protect the public and the area. They need to staff their offices in a way to make the
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public feel safe.” “Hire enough people and pay them well, to do a better job.” “The more
money spent in a project the better result will come out of it.” “The more OSHA invests
on the inspectors the better they will be.”
Criticism 13: OSHA Inspections are Devious
A growing concern of businessmen is OSHA sneaking up on workers. OSHA is no
stranger to the courtroom; people are and have been angry towards OSHA for the way
they operate. “18 state and federal court decisions have been handed down against the
agency for violating the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unlawful search and
seizure.” “This is a direct violation of the constitution; they use sneaky tactics to write
more citations instead of spreading efforts to increase safety in the workplace.” “There is
plenty of evidence that such tactics simply make enforcement all the harder.” “If the
OSHA inspector and I could work together to make my place safe, it would be good. But
if he comes in to get me and fine me, I'm going to hide everything I can from him.” “The
message should be: let’s work together not against each other.”
Criticism 14: OSHA does not conduct regular inspections
Most respondents criticized OSHA for not conducting inspections often enough. It
was found that companies in certain states had spans of 12 years between OSHA
inspections. That’s an outrageous length of time between inspections, and that isn’t the
worst, some reached as long as 22 years between inspections. This obviously puts doubt
into the effectiveness of OSHA if there are such long spans between simple inspections,
which would probably do a lot of good in helping companies to comply with standards
more easily. OSHA only enforcing its standards without properly inspecting them is
somewhat contradictory. Simply surprise inspecting every several years without making
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sure companies are taking the proper approach to the standards set by OSHA via
inspections is not proper operating procedures. A common accusation by respondents was
that that OSHA takes more into effect about fining and charging companies rather than
worrying about having a proper number of inspections. OSHA representatives used to
and still do get paid for the fines that they write for companies that disobey or neglect the
rules. Lives are at great risks on construction job sites and having more professional
inspections by OSHA representatives will greatly reduce the risk of injury or death.
Criticism 15: Some OSHA inspectors lack competence
A common complaint from contractor representatives against OSHA inspectors was
that some OSHA inspectors arriving at construction sites are transfers from other OSHA
areas who do not have any construction experience/ exposure. “The hazards in
construction are much different than those in a plant. That’s one thing that OSHA should
consider with very much attention because if they hire someone without construction
knowledge and/ or experience, they should not expect that person to know what needs to
be done and how it is done correctly.” Apparently, OSHA does not always send qualified
inspectors to jobsites. “Anytime an OSHA inspector comes into one of the facilities
where we are working as mechanical contractors, it is probably the first time they have
ever seen such a large commercial building project at work. The OSHA inspector usually
doesn’t know where to start. In every case, the inspector will invariably find a guard off,
or some other minor, readily apparent violation on the site, but will pass by our process
equipment which, if it failed, could blow up the facility.” This comment surely tells that
people in charge of maintaining safety for a certain project do not even know how the
project participants (various contractors and subcontractors) work. These inspectors have
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to be prepared in what they would encounter. “On repeated occasions I have seen the
results of OSHA inspections where the compliance officers were plainly wrong in what
they were advocating. The issues included misinterpretation of injury data, inappropriate
use of quantitative methods, and dubious recommendations for task improvement. I am
referring to individuals who are not ergonomics professionals, rather inspectors who have
taken a few classes.” “Many of the OSHA field staff have gone their own direction and
have cited companies in ways that are inappropriate and contrary to the understandings of
our discussions in preparing that document, when the OSHA personnel in Washington
D.C. provided sensible interpretations of their intent. I have observed OSHA field staff
insist on actions that have wasted money without helping any workers.”
Criticism 16: OSHA has adversarial relation with construction industry
OSHA’s presence on work sites is mostly viewed as an overbearing organization that
merely means that safety fines and documented violations are soon to follow. Advice
given from contractors is to avoid OSHA “like the plague.” Although this is the industry
attitude towards OSHA, it is not a far stretch of what actually happens once OSHA steps
foot on a jobsite. There are reasons as to why OSHA has been deemed as such a burden
on jobsites and has an adversarial relationship with the industry. Industry experts had to
say the following in relation to OSHA’s relationship with the construction industry. “The
relations between OSHA and construction industry have been unnecessarily adversarial,
and I have observed little or no trust, even in companies that have outstanding safety
efforts.” “I find it sobering when I end up advising companies to set up a two-track
approach — one for worker safety and the other to satisfy OSHA. This is because OSHA
is always focusing on the small picture rather than the strategic one. OSHA has created
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regulations and mandates those would ensure safety, but merely treat them like a
checklist. This is no way to run the nation’s workplace safety process.” “Congress
enacted OSHA in 1970 explicitly to serve as police, not as educators or advisors. This
probably was appropriate then, but not now, and has led to glaringly unsuitable policies.”
“I was told by an inspector regarding a company with an admirable ergonomics program,
“I know [this company] has a good ergonomics program; my job is to poke holes in it.”
OSHA should instead have held a press conference to highlight a success story, but they
chose to cite the company for some minor shortcomings.”
Criticism 17: OSHA’s policies are overly demanding
Data collected revealed that most construction industry individuals strive to meet or
exceed OSHA’s strict policies because they know that an OSHA compliance officer has
the authority to enter, at reasonable times, any site, location, or facility where the work is
taking place without any prior notice to the contractor, and if the OSHA officer has an
issue with the construction site, he/she has the authority to stop work, give a citation and
penalize the job depending on the issue in the field. This is fine as long as the policies are
reasonable as well as implementable. However, the industry had a different opinion.
“Enforcing the stringent mandated requirements, for example, something as simple as the
basic housekeeping takes such an effort from all the subcontractors and the enforcement
from the general contractor on a daily basis that it becomes unreasonable at times.”
“Enforcing one-hundred percent tie off has been the toughest challenge in my career,
whether it is on fork lifts, scissor lifts or any equipment higher than five feet. At often
times, it’s just not practically possible. At other times, there really is no way to
completely tie off and still maintain a reasonable rate of production.” “Being in the
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construction industry for over 20 years, I have witnessed that OSHA officers usually
don’t show up on jobsites unless there’s a complaint, and once they do arrive, they often
ask for implausible resolutions. The actions or steps that they deem required to be taken
as remediating measures are, at often times, unreasonable in terms of time, money and
effort required as against their perceived safety benefits, and, at other times, practically
impossible to implement. Needless to say that the often impracticable OSHA rules are
usually made by white collar well-suited officers sitting in plush seats somewhere in
Washington D.C. who do not have any faintest idea about the real time challenges on
construction work sites.” “OSHA regulations stop us from using another method of safety
that might be more worthwhile as well as safe for the completion of the project. Instead
OSHA sticks by their own recommendations and regulations without compromising to an
idea that makes more sense.”
“OSHA is helping as well as hurting. It helps by having standards to make a job site
safer but all job sites are unique, so it’s hard to apply certain regulations tom all sites.
Some regulations are a bit excessive just like their fines.” “OSHA has overreacted by
jamming every conceivable danger, however remote, into a code that must be the world's
most boring reading. With appropriate illustrations, an OSHA manual seems to instruct
farmers how to avoid slipping on cow dung. In order for people to follow directions or
codes they must be reasonable.” “OSHA inspectors, at often times, are so overdemanding that meeting their expectations would require turning an 8-hour job site into a
16-hour job-site resulting in an eventual collapse of the company. Safety is of prime
importance and must be implemented to the full extent. However, the implementation
requirements must not be demanding to an extent that they become unreasonable and
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overburden. OSHA needs to be more realistic in its approach and the inspectors need to
be well-trained as well as well-equipped with appropriate, reasonable and implementable
safety suggestions specific to construction sites.”
Criticism 18: OSHA has an enforcement/ governance focus rather than a strategic
improvement focus
Interviews revealed that most respondents were of the opinion that OSHA’s tact on
the nation’s work environment is to strongly enforce their standards when the
association’s calling should be to make sure there are laws protecting employees from
health and safety hazard incidents in which the corporation is at fault, the development
and research of better procedures for employees and employers to use, and the assessing
of certain health & safety issues at hand in order to devise proper solutions. As
respondents suggested, this “may be related to their lack of funding and improper
methods”. “The use of enforcing standards strictly has become the main goal to the
agency when it should be sub-category of core principles built within.” “OSHA worries
too much on their inspections and not on implementing new ideas”. “Much of the debate
about OSHA regulations and enforcement policies revolves around the cost of regulations
and enforcement, versus the actual benefit in reduced worker injury, illness and death.” A
former OSHA employee who has worked for OSHA almost since it came into existence
was not happy with the direction of OSHA and its focus and stated “I heard classic
bureaucratic answers: more regulations, more staff, more money, more & more & more,
etc. i.e. more government is the solution to everything. Thousands of years of civilized
earth history prove that more government creates more problems than it solves. This
agency is not exactly doing what is needed to make the workplace safer; more
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government will only lead to a “police state”. OSHA does not promote being creative and
thinking outside the box; rather they make an army of mindless soldiers with their
citation book in hand.”
Majority of the survey respondents were of the opinion that OSHA has not been
focusing on strategic safety improvement. “There has been much controversy and
criticism surrounding OSHA and their regulations. Where did a safety agency go wrong?
The agency has gotten its fair share of criticism just as it got started for mandating that
businesses furnish safety equipment and have safety training for employees. This may
sound fine, but imagine how these new regulations that were and still are enforceable by
law cost these businesses. I would even go as far as saying some small businesses had to
shut down. Some ask the question: is OSHA helping or hurting? Some are convinced
that OSHA is more concerned with the amount of citations and fines than the actual
reduction to workplace illnesses and accidents. Instead of OSHA fining these companies
with citations, it would make more sense to use that money for long term safety
investment. There are companies that are more careless than others and need to be
showed somehow that they need to better their safety environments. By working with the
companies and not against them, they can prevent many small businesses from going
bankrupt and at the same time improve worker safety.” ““OSHA operates against the
employer instead of with. I feel as if they really want to catch you doing something that
deserves a citation.”
“OSHA’s methods restrict construction organizations to invest in following
procedures rather than to invest in achieving long- term safety objectives. By having
regulations and standards that are legally enforceable by fines and, in some cases, jail
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time, the agency cuts profits for companies to grow and improve safety programs. A
workable solution to this dilemma is that OSHA, instead of being what it has been
viewed as, becomes a helping hand assisting companies to improve their safety
performance. Possibly, even reinvesting some or all of the money collected from fines
into helping the companies improve their safety performance with grants for safety
equipment or incentives for the companies to compete and improve. Another suggestion
is to not employ inspectors but rather employ safety personnel whose objective would be
to assist companies to improve on their safety performance.
“The amount of money companies spend on citations is a lost cause; imagine half of
that was put to better use. It would be a great feat to improve on safety with that money
instead of giving the money to the government. Keeping it mandatory for the company to
spend the citation amount on training employees on safety, and purchasing safer and/or
newer equipment would strategically improve the industry level of safety performance
over time.”
“If you give a man a fish, you feed him for a day; show him how to catch a fish, you
feed him for a lifetime. The same rule applies for keeping construction companies safe.
Rather than inspecting whether or not a contractor is up to par with OSHA regulations, it
would be much better and strategic to show the contractor how to be safe.”
A few respondents even suggested that OSHA’s role as a safety enforcement agency
would become unnecessary if workers’ attitudes and behaviors can be improved by longterm safety strategic safety investments by companies. “Workers need to be responsible
on the job site at all times. I never want to see one of “my guys” get hurt. I also believe
they want to be safe. The trick to “No OSHA” is finding or developing good employees.
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If your employees are good, and you have a structured and an organized company with a
strategic concern to safety, OSHA would be completely unnecessary.”
Criticism 19: OSHA’s penalty system restricts strategic safety improvement
Although the ultimate goal is safety, the survey respondents strongly suggested that
overbearing fines and penalties have actually put a negative strain on the never ending
battle to make construction companies and their jobsites safer. The argument given was
that rather than maintaining the ultimate goal of safe workplaces, OSHA has concentrated
on defining penalties and issuing fines to companies and individuals who are not up to
par with the standards issued by OSHA. The respondents were of the opinion that this is a
problem that needs to be addressed by reverting to the fundamentals of what an
organization like OSHA is to accomplish. Some of the opinions collected were as
follows: “Congress did not create OSHA to pursue unsafe practices, but to ensure that
every American on a construction site would not be worried whether or not he or she
would make it home that day. Safety is what they should sought for, and not issuing
fines.” “OSHA might make a regulation that one company might break and instead of
correcting it they are just fined heavily for it. The money that was used to pay off the fine
could have been used to better whatever problem was there in the first place.” “In the
instance that a company is fined for misuse of the way they were handling the equipment
for $500, that money could have easily gone towards something such as training for the
workers on how to properly and safely use the equipment. Instead, OSHA feels that
fining these small companies will teach them a lesson and that if they do not want to get
fined again they will correct it and properly train their employees. In my opinion, this is
an inappropriate approach. Many companies go out of business just because of all the
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fines that they have to pay off. All of the money that goes into paying for these fines can
be used to better the working conditions of the job site and make it safer and easier to
follow the regulations placed by OSHA.” “Monies spent on the process of issuing fines
can be channeled towards improving the safety mindset of contractors. If the contractor is
going to be charged, encourage an improvement in safety, such as investing for
reinforcing safety on the site and/ or investing in additional safety training of the
employees. This would direct the potential fine towards everyone’s benefit. The
contractor will still have to pay, but the benefits would be self-collecting.”
“If a company were to have an incident in which an employee was injured due to the
company’s inability to keep up with OSHA’s standards, the company would most likely
be heavily fined for it. How would that help the company to keep the problem from
occurring again? Say, the incident occurred because the company couldn’t afford proper
safety equipment. OSHA’s standard to add a heavy fine on top of whatever would be
needed to be paid to the employee due to the incident would definitely not help the
company to obtain the proper equipment that they needed in the first place. So, now the
company needs to attempt to recover from the incident for one, pay the fines from OSHA
for two, and endeavor on a mission to come up with the equipment that they were
supposed to have prior to the whole incident for three.”
“Even though OSHA may give an employer a couple of warnings before a fine is
issued, I don't agree with the magnitude of the fines. Most construction companies are
struggling as it is and certainly do not need unexpected fines sealing their doom. I
strongly believe that the penalty mechanism from OSHA is not beneficial in any way and
should be replaced by an alternate system providing incentive as well as support to
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contractors for performing safely. This would not only instill a care and concern of
employers not to their employees but would also develop respect and adherence to OSHA
policies because the contractors would believe that OSHA is an agency working with
them and for them, and not against them.”
In an interview with a senior representative from OSHA wherein the respondent was
asked as to why OSHA chooses to fine companies for breaking an OSHA regulation
instead of making them use that money to better their safety performance, the response
was, “In my opinion, OSHA does not want to complicate things too much by making
these construction companies responsible with using money that would have gone
towards a fine to better the regulation that they should have been followed in the first
place”. A senior project manager from a general contractor made the following assertion
in relation to the agency’s approach too imposing fines: “OSHA has been around for a
long time and they know what to expect from the companies and job sites that they visit.
They know how things are supposed to be and to them there is no other way to do them.
Making a mistake in the workplace or not complying with a safety regulation is out of the
question. Although there might be many requests for making use of a certain amount of
citation money to better their conditions, OSHA will most likely never implement
something like that because it is just easier to fine people and make them pay with cash
for their faults. Many companies deserve it but that money can easily go towards
bettering the workplace and correcting whatever problem they were being fined for in the
first place”. These responses clearly suggest that OSHA is not inclined to work with the
companies to strategically improve their safety performance, but is rather more concerned
about seeking violations and imposing fines. Working with the companies would not
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only make OSHA easier to comply with but would also keep companies from going out
of business by throwing away all of their money in fines because of mistakes.
According to the OSHA compliance guidance center, there are many people that call
in to complain about OSHA’s standards. One of the employees there was asked what he
has to say about OSHA’s fines and the criticism it receives. He answered with this, “I get
many phone calls about people criticizing the fines that they receive and wanting to get
rid of the fines and use that money to correct whatever they did or did not do in
accordance to OSHA standards but the matter of the fact is they did not follow safety
procedure and because of that they were fined. Many people call in and complain about
how some of the OSHA standards are too strict and some people even call in to complain
that the standards are not strict enough, the fact still remains that they need to abide by
these rules despite what they might think and disagree with OSHA”.
Key Conclusions from Interviews
In conclusion, OSHA's mission of assuring, for every working man and woman in the
Nation, a safe and healthy work environment has sunk into the hearts of many as a very
noble idea. It is actually in agreement with most players in the field of public health like
Institute of Medicine (IOM). However, it is the adherence to the stated policies that
players have taken issues with. From the fact that the top management is headed by
politically appointed individuals with little knowledge on safety, to the methodology of
the execution of the laws and enforcement which often are irksome to individuals and
businesses, this exposes loopholes in their operations which makes the construction
organizations to solely concentrate on following the immediate set regulations to avoid
law implications, as opposed to adhering to policies that would avert such occurrences in
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the long term. Disaster avoidance is a major concern to construction organizations. To
reach that level of safety would call for structures to be put in place to investigate the root
cause, eliminate the potential of such in the future, sustain the control of the danger by
keeping a look out on the symptoms of looming illness or injury and carrying out routine
preventive maintenance on the equipment. To ensure that it remains relevant, therefore,
OSHA must review its policies to give allowance to statements that curb long term
dangers so as to place itself as the platform of safety and health protection among
construction organizations. OSHA needs to adopt a no-blame approach in order to
strategically improve safety at the industry level. OSHA was not created to torment
contractors by appearing on jobsites without notice to see how many violations can be
seen on a jobsite, but to ensure safety in the long-term. The argument is not to bash
OSHA or to blatantly state that the organization is not poorly executed, but to merely
suggest improving the methods that should drive construction companies and their
employees to be safer. The goal of a contractor is not to execute a single project
successfully and safely, but to operate as a business successfully and safely. OSHA has
been at the forefront of safety, but change needs to occur to ensure that their methods do
not divert contractors from being a safe operating enterprise.
OSHA is in no way trying to harm companies but without a strategic system of safety
improvement to go along with the fault identification system currently in place,
companies would be paying less attention to set and improve long-term safety objectives,
but rather would be more inclined to hide facts from OSHA’s inspectors so as not to get
fined. Although the fining system OSHA implemented isn’t the worst one, it obviously
fails to strategically improve safety at the industry level. OSHA needs to cooperate with
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companies and replace their fining system with one that makes employers invest in long
term safety objectives by providing incentives as well as support.
4.4.3.4.Structured Survey
On the basis of unstructured interviews as discussed in section 4.4.3.3, three key
constructs (factors) were identified along with a number of associated indicators
(observable items in terms of survey statements) to structurally analyze OSHA’s nonperformance issues with respect to strategically improving safety in the construction
industry. The constructs are discussed below.
4.4.3.4.1. Constructs
The following key constructs (factors) were used to analyze the various facets of
OSHA’s performance as perceived by the construction industry professionals.
4.4.3.4.1.1.Regulations & Standards
The regulations provided by OSHA have been criticized for a number of reasons.
These include, in particular, their lack of clarity, impractical nature, implementation
difficulty, lack of acceptance by employers and employees, infrequent updating, nonconformance with new technology, susceptibility to manipulation, overloaded and overly
strict nature, unreasonable requirement of work hours and capital, high cost-to-benefit
ratio, and negative impact on worker productivity, worker morale, and construction
business in general. This part of the survey collected structured industry opinions on the
above aspects collectively determining the perceived effectiveness of OSHA’s
regulations in the industry.
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4.4.3.4.1.2.Enforcement Methods
OSHA’s safety enforcement methods have been criticized for being ineffective,
reactive, aimed at rectifying single events rather than improve the industry, insensitive to
the needs & limitations of employers, oriented entirely towards inspection and penalties
rather than proactively preventing accidents and identifying problems before they occur,
and not focused towards positive safety reinforcement. This part of the survey collected
structured industry opinions on the above aspects collectively determining the perceived
effectiveness of OSHA’s safety enforcement methods in the industry.
4.4.3.4.1.3.Vision & Approach
OSHA has been criticized for adopting, in general, an inappropriate vision towards
strategic safety improvement in the industry. In this respect, OSHA has been criticized by
the industry, in particular, for lack of active participating in necessary research activities
that would have allowed incorporating safety as an industrial development process, lack
of concentration on positive safety reinforcement, inappropriate focus on the apparent
causes of accident (such as worker behavior) and not on the underlying factors leading to
those accidents (such as organizational leadership, work pressure, communication, etc.),
failure to adopt a proactive approach for developing long term safety measures, failure to
develop standards effective towards developing a total safety culture in a construction
organization, and failure to develop methods that would have allowed organizations to:
invest in strategic safety rather than investing in following day-to-day procedures, invest
in improving processes rather than investing in products, and invest in long term rather
than short term. This part of the survey collected structured industry opinions on the
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above aspects collectively determining the perceived effectiveness of OSHA’s vision for
strategic and continuous safety improvement in the industry.
4.4.3.4.2. Questionnaire
A quantitative research method was chosen to examine the criticism on OSHA, since
it was exploratory in nature. Questionnaire survey was used in order to facilitate the
collection of information from construction organizations. All attributes (factors) were
measured through a five-point Likert-type response format. Items, relating to each of the
attributes, were used in the form of statements to measure individual attributes under
investigation. Participants were asked to endorse the statements using a five-point Likerttype scale (from 1=‘‘strongly disagree’’ to 5=‘‘strongly agree’’). Questionnaire survey is
presented in Appendix D.
To achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity, draft
questionnaires were constructed and pretested via face-to-face meetings with select
professionals including short-listed experts from construction contracting organizations
representing their top management and middle/ project management, all having expertise
in or exposure to safety issues. Their input was used to refine the original questionnaire.
The questionnaire contained, in its final form, a total of 44 statements about OSHA’s
safety performance for the four attributes diagnosed. Most of the statements presented in
the scale were negatively worded, as recommended in the measurement literature
(Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991). The research targeted top management, senior project
managers, safety managers/officers and construction superintendents working for general
contractors and subcontractors as the survey sample.
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Based on all the gathered information, descriptive analysis was performed and the
results are discussed in the following section.
4.4.3.4.3. Data Analysis
The indicators (questionnaire items) in the survey were assumed to reflect the
unobserved, underlying construct, with the construct giving rise to (or ‘‘causing’’) the
observed measures. For example, constructs such as vision and advising support are
typically viewed as underlying factors that give rise to something that is observed.
Accordingly, their indicators tend to be realized as reflective.
4.4.3.4.3.1.Assessment of Data Reliability and Validity
Prior to data analysis, three measurement properties need to be examined to ensure
that the data has a satisfactory level of reliability and validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
The first of these is the individual item reliability, where loadings (or simple correlations)
of the items on their respective constructs are assessed, using 0.70 as a cutoff point
(Fornell and Larcker 1981). Exceeding this value simply implies that less than half of the
item’s variance is due to error. Obtained values for items exceeded this threshold, with all
loadings in the range of 0.80–0.95, demonstrating the satisfactory level of individual item
reliability.
Convergent validity (also referred to as the homogeneity of the construct or
composite reliability) is the second measurement property to be examined, and is
evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for each construct is
listed in Table 4.30. All constructs have acceptable convergent validity, as a value of 0.70
is usually accepted as the minimum desired value of the Cronbach’s alpha (Litwin 1995).
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The third measurement property is the discriminant validity – that is, the extent to
which each construct differs from other constructs in the analysis. It is assessed by using
the average variance extracted (Av), suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) (Table
4.30). This measure should be greater than the variance shared between the construct and
other constructs in the model (i.e., the squared correlation between two constructs). This
can be demonstrated in the correlation matrix, shown in Table 4.31, which includes the
correlations between different constructs in the lower left off-diagonal elements of the
matrix, and the square root of the average variance extracted (Av) calculated for each of
the constructs along the diagonal. Having all of the diagonal elements greater than any
other corresponding row or column implies adequate discriminant validity.
Having satisfied the three measurement properties, it can be concluded that the
constructs are measured with adequate precision.
Table 4.30: Convergent Validity of Independent Constructs
Construct

Cronbach’s
alpha

1. Regulations & Policies
2. Enforcement Methods
3. Advising Support
4. Vision and Approach

0.897
0.818
0.844
0.921

Average
variance
extracted (Av)
0.69
0.65
0.67
0.72

Table 4.31: Discriminant Validity Analysis
Construct
1. Regulations & Policies
2. Enforcement Methods
3. Advising Support
4. Vision and Approach

1
0.83
0.12
0.17
0.13
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Construct
2
3
0.81
0.08 0.82
0.09 0.19

4
0.85

4.4.3.4.3.2.Results
This section presents the results of the survey. OSHA’s performance was determined
by three independent constructs—regulations & policies, enforcement methods, and
vision & approach. Strictly speaking, support was found for the perceived (negative)
impact of OSHA’s regulations & policies, enforcement methods, and vision & approach
on the strategic safety improvement in the construction industry.
Descriptive analysis was performed to analyze the results. To identify the extent of
negative impact of each of the measured indicators (survey items) with respect to
OSHA’s influence on strategic safety improvement in the construction industry, the mean
values of survey responses for each item were used. Since each of the responses were
measured on a five-point Likert-type scale (from 1 to 5), reverse coding was done for
some of the statements which were positively worded. Hence a mean score of 5 in the
final analysis represented worst perceived performance, while a mean score of 1
represented best perceived performance on the measure under consideration. A mean
response score of 1.50 was considered least significant in terms of that particular measure
generating (minimal) negative impact on the related construct. In order to distinguish the
measures with respect to their extent of negative impact, the following indicator
criticality index was used (Table 4.32).
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Table 4.32: Indicator Criticality Indices
Mean Score
Range

Indicator
Criticality Zone

>=4

Indicator
Criticality
Index
6

3.50 – 3.99

5

Major Low

3.00 – 3.49

4

Moderate High

2.50 – 2.99

3

Moderate Low

2.00 – 2.49

2

Minor High

1.50 – 1.99

1

Minor Low

1.00 – 1.49

0

Non-Critical

Major High

Tables 4.33-4.35 show the mean response scores and indicator criticality indices for
all the items measured in the survey, organized as per their respective constructs. The
tables have been sorted in descending order of criticality of the indicators measured
(based on their mean values).

150

Table 4.33: Regulations and Standards Construct
S.
No.

OSHA Performance Statement

I
1

Regulations and Standards
OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver
an overbearing and unwanted presence
that has a negative impact on worker
productivity.

2

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1

4.57

6

Major
High

OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver
an overbearing and unwanted presence
that has a negative impact on worker
acceptance to safety policies and
procedures.

4.44

6

Major
High

3

OSHA takes extraneous amount of
time to actualize new regulations/
standards.

4.26

6

Major
High

4

Existing OSHA procedures are not
updated timely.

4.2

6

Major
High

5

OSHA health and safety procedures/
instructions/ rules are not generally
practicable (implementable).

3.71

5

Major
Low

6

OSHA health and safety procedures/
instructions/ rules generally fail to
reflect how the job is actually done.

3.68

5

Major
Low

7

OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver
an overbearing and unwanted presence
that greatly restricts an organization’s
ability to develop as well as compete

3.67

5

Major
Low

8

OSHA regulations and standards fail to
incorporate current technology.

3.58

5

Major
Low
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Table 4.33: Regulations and Standards Construct (continued)
S.
No.

1

OSHA Performance Statement

9

OSHA regulations/ procedures can be
easily manipulated by some companies.

10

OSHA regulations/ standards/
procedures are generally burdensome
(trying to do too much without any
practical advantage).

11

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)
3.54

Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Zone1
Index1
5

Major
Low

3.32

4

Moderate
High

OSHA regulations are generally overstrict.

3.21

4

Moderate
High

12

OSHA regulations/ standards/
procedures are generally confusing (not
very clear to implement).

3.09

4

Moderate
High

13

Substantial amount of capital has been
needlessly wasted by your organization
for complying with OSHA standards.

2.95

3

Moderate
Low

14

Substantial amount of working hours
have been needlessly lost by your
organization for complying with OSHA
standards.

2.81

3

Moderate
Low

15

The cost of implementing OSHA
regulations is usually unjustified as
against their benefit in achieving
reduced worker injury.

2.81

3

Moderate
Low

based on Table 4.32
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Table 4.34: Enforcement Methods Construct
S.
No.

OSHA Performance Statement

II
16

Enforcement Methods
The priority of OSHA inspections is
mostly centered towards imposing
penalties, rather than preventing accidents
and/ or identifying problems.

17

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
4.54

6

Major
High

OSHA fails to provide adequate reward
mechanisms.

4.43

6

Major
High

18

OSHA performs inadequate number of
inspections.

3.89

5

Major
Low

19

OSHA generally seems more interested in
issuing the fine rather than correcting the
problem.

3.77

5

Major
Low

20

OSHA’s methods are mostly directed
towards correcting only single events, such
as the one your company was fined for.

3.88

5

Major
Low

21

The penalties/ fines imposed by OSHA are
not usually justified in proportion to the
violation.

3.86

5

Major
Low

22

OSHA inspections are unbalanced
distributed among construction firms.

3.65

5

Major
Low

23

OSHA inspections are unbalanced
distributed among different types of
construction expertise.

3.59

5

Major
Low

24

OSHA training programs are generally
ineffective.

3.55

5

Major
Low

25

OSHA inspection procedures are generally
ineffective.

3.53

5

Major
Low
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Table 4.34: Enforcement Methods Construct (continued)
S.
No.

1

OSHA Performance Statement

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Zone1
Index1
(Scale 1-5)
3.19
4
Moderate
High

26

OSHA is an overbearing bureaucracy with
methods bearing little or no sensitivity to
the needs & limitations of employers who
are struggling to survive in a competitive
marketplace.

27

OSHA’s heavy fines restrict an
organization’s ability to develop as well as
compete.

3.12

4

Moderate
High

28

OSHA follow-up inspections (after initial
citations have been issued) are usually
performed at an unreasonably slower rate.

2.98

3

Moderate
Low

29

OSHA deals with workplace accidents
usually at an unreasonably slow rate.

2.84

3

Moderate
Low

based on Table 4.32
Table 4.35: Vision and Approach Construct
S.
No.

OSHA Performance Statement

III
30

Vision and Approach
OSHA has generally failed to take a
proactive approach in developing long
term safety measures.

31

OSHA standards are mostly
ineffective in setting up a Total Safety
Culture on a construction jobsite
(OSHA is the driving force to
implement a total safety culture in a
construction organization).
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Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone
(Scale 1-5)
4.56

6

Major
High

4.44

6

Major
High

Table 4.35: Vision and Approach Construct (continued)
S.
No.

OSHA Performance Statement

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Zone1
Index1
(Scale 1-5)
4.42
6
Major
High

32

OSHA has not been concentrating
enough on positive safety
reinforcement.

33

The expenditures made for
compliance with OSHA regulations
and/ or paying for fines could be spent
in a more strategic way that would
create a safer work environment and a
better understating of safety.

4.4

6

Major
High

34

OSHA does not focus on the strategic
picture by taking into consideration
the underlying factors leading to
accident (such as leadership, work
pressure, communication) but rather
focuses on the apparent causes of
accident (such as lack of PPE).

4.23

6

Major
High

35

OSHA emphasizes more on
appointing supervisors to administer
fines in the workplace, rather than
appointing personnel to act as health
and safety advisors.

3.91

5

Major
Low

36

OSHA, as a safety organization, is not
actively participating in necessary
research activities to view and
incorporate safety as an industrial
development process, which would
have improved ways construction
organizations can incorporate safety
in the industry.

3.85

5

Major
Low
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Table 4.35: Vision and Approach Construct (continued)
S.
No.

OSHA Performance Statement

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Zone1
Index1
(Scale 1-5)
3.79
5
Major
Low

37

OSHA representatives do not usually
provide follow up information
pertaining to the incident such as: how
the accident could be corrected or any
appropriate training that could be
utilized to ensure the incident is not
repeated.

38

OSHA should train their inspectors
better regarding on how to facilitate
developing a strategic safety culture
in a construction organization leading
to total safety.

3.75

5

Major
Low

39

OSHA representatives do not usually
provide information about how to
improve safety strategically in your
organization.

3.73

5

Major
Low

40

OSHA is more devoted to inspections
(monitoring) than to safety as a
strategic concern.

3.71

5

Major
Low

41

OSHA's safety approach restricts your
organization by compelling it to
increase investment in following
procedures rather than investing in
long-term safety objectives.

3.45

4

Moderate
High

42

OSHA focuses more on the employer
actions rather than on the employee
safety, thereby increasing the short
term expenses of the organization
instead of the long term investment.

3.4

4

Moderate
High
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Table 4.35: Vision and Approach Construct (continued)
S.
No.

1

OSHA Performance Statement

43

OSHA places a heavy burden on
organizations by forcing increased
operational fees and the costs
associated to retrofit outdated
equipment rather than investing on
improving the processes for achieving
long-term (strategic) safety objectives.

44

OSHA’s inspection and penalty
approach of enforcement is an
inappropriate and ineffective way to
ensure workplace safety in the longterm.

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Zone1
Index1
(Scale 1-5)
3.24
4
Moderate
High

3.18

4

Moderate
High

based on Table 4.32
After analyzing Tables 4.33-4.35, the key OSHA non-performance indicators (with

criticality indices = 6), ranked in descending order of criticality (based on mean response
score), are shown in Table 4.36. Table 4.36 also provides mean response rate, associated
constructs, and criticality ranking for these key non-performance indicators. The first
column in Table 4.36 provides the serial number of these indicators as given in Tables
4.33-4.35.
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Table 4.36: Key OSHA Non-Performance Indicators – All Constructs
S.
No.
1

30
16

2

31

17
32
33

3

Non-Performance Indicator
OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver
an overbearing and unwanted presence
that has a negative impact on worker
productivity.
OSHA has generally failed to take a
proactive approach in developing long
term safety measures.
The priority of OSHA inspections is
mostly centered towards imposing
penalties, rather than preventing
accidents and/ or identifying problems.
OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver
an overbearing and unwanted presence
that has a negative impact on worker
acceptance to safety policies and
procedures.
OSHA standards are mostly ineffective
in setting up a Total Safety Culture on a
construction jobsite (OSHA is the
driving force to implement a total
safety culture in a construction
organization).
OSHA fails to provide adequate reward
mechanisms.
OSHA has not been concentrating
enough on positive safety
reinforcement.
The expenditures made for compliance
with OSHA regulations and/ or paying
for fines could be spent in a more
strategic way that would create a safer
work environment and a better
understating of safety.
OSHA takes extraneous amount of time
to actualize new regulations/ standards
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Mean
Response
Construct
Score
(Scale 1-5)
4.57
Regulations
and
Standards

Indicator
Criticality
Ranking
1

4.56

Vision and
Approach

2

4.54

Enforcement
Methods

3

4.44

Regulations
and
Standards

4

4.44

Vision and
Approach

5

4.43

Enforcement
Methods
Vision and
Approach

6

4.40

Vision and
Approach

8

4.26

Regulations
and
Standards

9

4.42

7

Table 4.36: Key OSHA Non-Performance Indicators – All Constructs (continued)
S.
No.
34

4

Non-Performance Indicator
OSHA lacks strategic focus on
underlying factors leading to accident
(such as leadership, work pressure,
communication) but rather place
emphasis on the apparent causes of
accident (such as lack of PPE).
OSHA’s safety procedures are not
updated as frequently as needed.

Mean
Response
Construct
Score
(Scale 1-5)
4.23
Vision and
Approach

4.20

Regulations
and
Standards

Indicator
Criticality
Ranking
10

11

Further assessment of Tables 4.33-4.35 – to identify construct criticality ranking
(based on a value of weighted mean response score for each construct) – results in Table
4.37. Table 4.37 has been arranged in descending order of construct criticality and also
provide construct criticality ranking.
Table 4.37: Construct Criticality Ranking
Construct

Weighted Mean
Response Score
(Scale 1-5)

Construct
Criticality
Ranking

3.87
3.63
3.59

1
2
3

Vision and Approach
Enforcement Methods
Regulations and Standards

The major OSHA non-performance indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 5
or 6) constitute 16 out of a total of 44 indicators i.e. 36.36%. The moderate OSHA nonperformance indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 3 or 4) constitute 18 out of a
total of 44 indicators i.e. 40.90%. Minor OSHA non-performance indicators (with an
indicator criticality index = 1 or 2) constitute 6 out of a total of 44 indicators i.e. 13.64%.
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The remaining 4 indicators (9.10%) are not perceived by the industry as negative aspects
of OSHA performance.
The above results indicate that OSHA is not performing at par in terms of achieving
strategic safety improvement in the construction industry. The key OSHA nonperformance construct (Vision and Approach) also reinstate the same conclusion, i.e.
OSHA needs to improve on its vision and approach in order to strategically improve
safety in the industry. The key change in OSHA’s strategic approach, as reflected from
the findings, should be “inculcating total safety and continuous improvement through
teamwork, research and positive reinforcement” as against its current “inspection and
penalty” approach. OSHA needs to work with the companies and not against them in
order to achieve the strategic goal of zero accidents in the industry. This is a problem that
needs to be addressed by reverting to the fundamentals of what an organization like
OSHA is to accomplish.
4.4.4. Survey 4: Investigation of the state of adoption and implementation of safety
as a total management process in a contracting firm’s management system
4.4.4.1.Description
Today’s construction projects are growing in complexity and in order to succeed on
the global level, construction organizations must not approach construction safety and
health as just another step in avoiding unwanted accidents or federal fines, but as a
strategic tool, that if implemented effectively, will have the potential to maximize
competitiveness and profit. This strategic approach to safety can be accomplished via a
Total Safety management (TSM) philosophy which finds its roots from the Total Quality
management (TQM) principles. TSM is a performance oriented safety initiative that
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involves all the members of an organization in establishing and maintaining a work
environment that is safe and conducive to quality and productivity. The primary purpose
of TSM is to provide excellence in safety through continuous improvements of products
and processes by the total involvement and dedication of each individual who is in any
way a part of that product/process. It is a structured approach to improvement. If
correctly applied, it will assist a construction company in improving its performance. It
involves a strong commitment to two guiding principles: customer satisfaction and
continuous improvement. TSM follows the same sets of standards as TQM and provides
a competitive advantage to the companies that implement it, by establishing a safer
working place that leads to a continuous and sustainable improvement in peak
performance, thereby achieving and maintaining the goal of zero accidents.
As found by other surveys in this research, inspection traditionally has been one of
the key attributes of a safety system in the construction industry. In regards to inspection
related to quality, Deming says, “Routine 100% inspection is the same thing as planning
for defects - acknowledgement that the process cannot make the product correctly, or that
the specifications made no sense in the first place. Quality comes not from inspection,
but from improvement of the process. The same philosophy is applicable to safety as
well. In terms of safety, this does not mean that inspection ceases. Instead, it means that
more effort should be put into preventing errors and injuries.
The construction industry has been following a path that has led to lack of trust and
confidence, adversarial relations, unsafe behaviors, and increased arbitration and
litigation. The industry has become increasingly reliant on burdensome specifications
and compliance. This has led the owners and regulatory agencies to shift more of the
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risks to the contractors. The net outcome is that the construction industry has been
bogged down with paperwork, defensive posturing, and generally tends to have a hostile
attitude towards regulatory agencies and other participants. TSM can help reverse this
trend.

Although, not a magic pill or panacea for all illnesses, it will, if properly

implemented, help construction companies improve on a sustainable basis in order to
achieve the goal of zero accidents, as well as help all the parties to come closer.
Although ‘Total Safety Management’ has been a magic word for a while now,
methods and techniques to implement safety as a total management process in
construction Industry are still to be developed. TSM places emphasis on prevention and
not correction. The goal is work that is 100% free of errors and free of accidents. To do
this, it is necessary to focus on “processes” and not “end results”. The primary purpose of
this part of the research was to investigate the adoption and implementation of TSM in
the construction industry. Literature review highlighted that no accurate information
regarding the extent of usage of safety as a total management process in the construction
industry was available. Hence this survey was conducted wherein the contractors and
subcontractors were asked to identify the extent of adoption and implementation of TSM
as a process in their businesses. The results of the survey included measurements on the
extent of knowledge of the industry personnel about TSM, and the use of techniques of
implementing TSM in the construction industry. The survey further reflected industry
opinions as to the benefits and obstacles of the application of TSM techniques to the
construction industry in terms of achieving and sustaining the goal of zero accidents. This
dimension of research is significant not only to understand the role of TSM in
strategically improving safety in the construction industry but also to determine how
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TSM approaches positively impact safety performance and the worker safety behaviors
through an organization’s ability to translate, integrate, and ultimately institutionalize
TSM behaviors into everyday practice on the job.
For the purpose of this study, the evaluation of the current state of safety
improvement strategies in use by the construction organizations and the readiness of the
organizations to adopt and implement safety as a total management process in their
routine works was done by conducting a structured survey in the construction industry.
This survey examined the perception, approaches and practices of construction firms as a
predictive tool to demonstrate how safety is operational as a total management process
within these organizations. A survey was designed and distributed to contractor and
subcontractor managerial staff (including top management and middle/ project
management) for assessing the aforementioned aspects by taking into account the
organizations’ perception towards safety as a total management process, the use of safety
improvement strategies in the companies, the state of employee involvement and
empowerment, the state of safety improvement training, the perceived benefits and
obstacles of TSM, and the readiness of the companies to implement safety as a total
management process in their routine works. Conclusions drawn from this research will
strengthen or weaken the argument that the safety improvement strategies currently
adopted by construction organizations in the U.S. are generally focused towards safety
compliance rather than total safety management.
From the perspective of the overall objective of this dissertation, the underlying
objective of this research study was to collect and analyze data on safety improvement
practices, and TSM adoption and readiness, which would serve as a basis to establish the
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rationale of this research: need for a strategic zero-accident safety improvement
framework in the construction industry to achieve continuous and sustainable safety
improvement. There is no intent on the part of the author to imply that the identified main
and sub causes (factors) of lack of TSM adoption in the construction industry are in any
way statistically significant.
4.4.4.2.Methodology
Structured surveys were conducted to achieve the study objectives. The methodology
of survey development and administration was the same as discussed in section 3.2.2.3.
The following sections illustrate the major findings of the research conducted for the
key question at hand: Are the safety improvement strategies currently adopted by
construction organizations instrumental in nurturing safety as a total management process
in their organizations (in order to strategically improve safety in the construction
industry)?
4.4.4.3.Data Collection
On the basis of literature review, six key constructs (factors) were identified along
with a number of associated indicators (observable items in terms of survey questions) to
analyze the current state of adoption and the state of readiness of construction
organizations in implementing safety as a total management process in their routine
operations. The constructs are described in the following sub-section.
4.4.4.3.1. Constructs
The following five constructs (factors) were used to analyze the various facets of the
state of implementation of safety as a total management process in construction
organizations.
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4.4.4.3.1.1.Knowledge of TSM
This construct consisted of various indicators determining the knowledge of the
industry in relation to safety as a total management process in construction businesses.
Aspects diagnosed included knowledge of existing construction industry programs
implementing TSM, perceived methods of implementing TSM, and perception of the
factors significant in developing and implementing a TSM program.
4.4.4.3.1.2.Strategic Vision of Safety
This construct consisted of various indicators determining the strategic vision of the
industry in regards to appreciating safety as a total management process in construction
businesses. Aspects diagnosed included perceived strategic impacts of poor safety
performance, perceived effectiveness of a TSM program, perceived effectiveness of
OSHA regulations in terms of implementing TSM, company’s view of safety as an
integral business value, company’s view of safety as a strategic tool to achieve zero
accidents and to attain competitive advantage, and the company’s strategic policy
towards safety.
4.4.4.3.1.3.Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature of safety
improvement programs in construction organizations with respect to their strategic focus
towards TSM. Aspects diagnosed included employee awareness of the program, strategic
focus of the program, factors motivating the initiation of the program, key objectives of
the program, steps taken in the program development and implementation, level of
success of the program in terms of improved worker safety behaviors and improved
relationships with customers and suppliers, company strategy to determine the
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effectiveness of the program, personnel support to implement the program, orientation of
safety training towards TSM, provision of formal training in TSM or other safety
improvement philosophies to employees, and emphasis of training on process
improvement; data gathering & analysis; teamwork; communication; and zero accident
strategies.
4.4.4.3.1.4.Employee Involvement and Empowerment
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature and extent
of employee involvement and empowerment in company’s safety improvement program.
Aspects diagnosed included level of empowerment of employees to make significant
safety improvement suggestions and changes to operations, availability of an anonymous
way for employees to make safety improvement suggestions, importance of employee
input in the company’s safety improvement program, extent to which the employees
provide input that is useful in making continual safety improvements to the organization,
inclusion of employee feedback in the safety decision making process, presence of a
mentoring program for new employees to develop safe working habits, presence of
incentive programs to reward workers; supervisors; superintendents; or specific teams for
outstanding safety performance and/or for generating ideas to reduce the number of
accidents, level of feedback collected from employees for various safety related areas,
and methods adopted in the company to encourage employees to fulfill their
responsibilities towards TSM.
4.4.4.3.1.5.Readiness to Embrace TSM
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the readiness of
construction organizations to embrace safety as a total management process in their
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businesses. Aspects diagnosed included characteristics of company’s culture promoting
safety conscience, involvement of various organizational levels in safety efforts,
company support to implement safety as a total management process, desirable worker
behaviors under work pressure, company strengths in safety, significance of safety in
company’s strategic plan and mission statement, knowledge and understanding by all
members of the organization of the following: company’s safety mission, team’s safety
goal; team’s success definition; how team decisions are made; responsibilities and
authorities of all team members; desirable behaviors in case of unforeseen inhibitors
impeding progress; and how unsafe team members will be guided for improvement,
openness and honesty policy in the organization, decision support by all levels of
employees, involvement of whole organization to accomplish safety and health goals,
involvement of whole organization to assess the safety precautions and rules,
involvement of whole organization in taking the responsibility of the accidents and their
effects, peer pressure among workers to work in a safe and healthy manner, recognition
and reward for safe practices, independent (cold eye) safety reviews and ratings, use of
positive reinforcement for good safety practices, and viewing at the past safety
performance (safety history) of the subcontractors/ suppliers and prospective employees
as an important criterion for selection & hiring.
4.4.4.3.2. Questionnaire
A quantitative research method was chosen to investigate the state of adoption and
implementation of safety as a total management process in the construction industry,
since it was exploratory in nature. Questionnaire survey was used in order to facilitate the
collection of information from construction organizations. All indicators (observed
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variables) were measured through a five-point Likert-type response format. Items,
relating to each of the constructs, were used in the form of statements to measure
individual constructs under investigation. Participants were asked to endorse the
statements using a five-point Likert-type scale (from 1=‘‘strongly disagree’’ to
5=‘‘strongly agree’’). Questionnaire survey is presented in Appendix D.
In addition to the five constructs described above, a number of measures determining
the perceived benefits and obstacles in implementing TSM in the construction industry
were also included in the questionnaire. This last part of the questionnaire was aimed at
collecting industry perceptions in relation to TSM benefits including: increased profits;
improved performance; improved safety records; increased employee morale; provision
of a check-and-balance mechanism at different stages of a project lifecycle; avoidance of
costly redesign or project delay by addressing hazard issues as early as possible; and
provision of traceable and effective hazard management, and industry perceptions in
relation to TSM obstacles including: changing attitudes and behaviors; schedule and cost
pressures; conflicts with short-term targets; lack of education and training to drive the
improvement process; lack of top-management commitment/ understanding; lack of
employee commitment/ understanding; tendency to cure symptom rather than cause; lack
of expertise/ resources in TSM (or continuous safety improvement); and current bidding
climate.
To achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity, draft
questionnaires were constructed and pretested via face-to-face meetings with select
professionals including short-listed experts from construction contracting organizations
representing their top managers and middle/ project managers, all having expertise in or
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exposure to safety issues. Their input was used to refine the original questionnaire. The
questionnaire contained, in its final form, a total of 139 statements (124 statements about
the state of adoption and implementation of safety as a total management process, and 15
statements about the perceived benefits and obstacles towards implementing safety as a
total management process). The research targeted top management and middle/ project
management personnel from general contractor and subcontractor organizations as the
survey sample.
Based on all the gathered information, descriptive analysis was performed and the
results are discussed in the following section.
4.4.4.4.Data Analysis
The indicators (questionnaire items) in the survey were assumed to reflect the
unobserved, underlying construct, with the construct giving rise to (or ‘‘causing’’) the
observed measures. For example, constructs such as strategic approach to safety
improvement, and employee involvement & empowerment are typically viewed as
underlying factors that give rise to something that is observed. Accordingly, their
indicators tend to be realized as reflective.
4.4.4.4.1. Assessment of Data Reliability and Validity
Prior to data analysis, three measurement properties need to be examined to ensure
that the data has a satisfactory level of reliability and validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
The first of these is the individual item reliability, where loadings (or simple correlations)
of the items on their respective constructs are assessed, using 0.70 as a cutoff point
(Fornell and Larcker 1981). Exceeding this value simply implies that less than half of the
item’s variance is due to error. Obtained values for items exceeded this threshold, with all
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loadings in the range of 0.75–0.90, demonstrating the satisfactory level of individual item
reliability.
Convergent validity (also referred to as the homogeneity of the construct or
composite reliability) is the second measurement property to be examined, and is
evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for each construct is
listed in Table 4.38. All constructs have acceptable convergent validity, as a value of 0.70
is usually accepted as the minimum desired value of the Cronbach’s alpha (Litwin 1995).
The third measurement property is the discriminant validity – that is, the extent to
which each construct differs from other constructs in the analysis. It is assessed by using
the average variance extracted (Av), suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) (Table
4.38). This measure should be greater than the variance shared between the construct and
other constructs in the model (i.e., the squared correlation between two constructs). This
can be demonstrated in the correlation matrix, shown in Table 4.39, which includes the
correlations between different constructs in the lower left off-diagonal elements of the
matrix, and the square root of the average variance extracted (Av) calculated for each of
the constructs along the diagonal. Having all of the diagonal elements greater than any
other corresponding row or column implies adequate discriminant validity.
Having satisfied the three measurement properties, it can be concluded that the
constructs are measured with adequate precision.
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Table 4.38: Convergent Validity of Independent Constructs
Cronbach’s
alpha

Construct
1. Knowledge of TSM
2. Strategic Vision of Safety
3. Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement
4. Employee Involvement & Empowerment
5. Readiness to Embrace TSM

0.846
0.875
0.864
0.891
0.821

Average
variance
extracted (Av)
0.72
0.74
0.78
0.67
0.70

Table 4.39: Discriminant Validity Analysis
Construct
1. Knowledge of TSM
2. Strategic Vision of Safety
3. Strategic Approach to Safety
Improvement
4. Employee Involvement &
Empowerment
5. Readiness to Embrace TSM

1
0.85
0.18
0.07

Construct
2
3
0.86
0.14 0.88

0.20

0.09

0.15

0.16

4
-

5
-

0.15

0.82

-

0.17

0.14

0.84

4.4.4.4.2. Results and Conclusion
This section presents the results of the survey. State of adoption and implementation
of safety as a total management process in construction organizations was determined by
five independent constructs— knowledge of TSM, strategic vision of safety, strategic
approach to safety improvement, employee involvement & empowerment, and readiness
to embrace TSM. Strictly speaking, support was found for factors impeding the strategic
adoption and implementation of safety as a total management process in construction
organizations. Additionally, industry perception was collected as for the benefits and
obstacles in TSM implementation in the construction industry.
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Descriptive analysis was performed to analyze the results. To assess the extent of
impact of each of the measured indicators (survey items) with respect to the state of
adoption and implementation of safety as a total management process in construction
organizations, the mean values of survey responses for each item were used. Except for
the TSM benefits and obstacles data collected (the analysis procedure of which will be
described later), a mean score of 5 in the final analysis represented best performance on
the measured indicator, while a mean score of 1 represented worst performance on the
measure under consideration. A mean response score of 4.50 was considered least
significant in terms of that particular measure generating (minimal) negative impact on
the related construct. In order to distinguish the measures with respect to their extent of
impact, an indicator criticality indexing and zoning criteria was used (Table 4.40).
Table 4.40: Indicator Criticality Indices & Zones
Mean Score
Range
<=2
2.01-2.50
2.51 – 3.00

Indicator
Criticality
Index
6
5
4

3.01-3.50

3

3.51 – 4.00
4.01 – 4.50
4.51 – 5.00

2
1
0

Indicator
Criticality
Zone
Major High
Major Low
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Minor High
Minor Low
NonCritical

It is important to note here that that owing to the nature of some of the statements
provided in the questionnaire, a high mean response score for these statements, although
represented better performance on the measure, actually represented poor performance in
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terms of that particular measure affecting the related TSM construct. For instance, the
statement in the questionnaire: My company’s safety policy can be best defined as
“implementation of a set of safety rules by the company with punitive measures for
violators” received a mean response score of 3.56 on a scale of 4. This can be interpreted
as having 3.56 out of every 5 respondents agreed to this statement. However, since this
statement actually interprets that the company’s safety policy is oriented towards safety
compliance only and not strategic safety improvement, a high mean response on this
measure, in fact, indicates a high negative impact on the company’s safety policy being
conducive to TSM. Hence the result of this and such statements needed to be reversed in
order to correctly interpret their level of criticality in terms of positively or negatively
affecting the TSM culture in a construction organization, which was the primary factor to
be assessed. Consequently, the mean response rate of 3.56 was reversed to 1.44
(equivalent to 5-3.56) in order to assess that measure in terms of the overall objective
(TSM performance). This is indicated in brackets under the “Mean” column in the
proceeding tables depicting the results. This is done for all such statements.
Tables 4.41-4.45 show the mean response scores and indicator criticality indices for
all the items measured in the survey, organized under their respective constructs. The
tables have been sorted in descending order of criticality of the indicators measured
(based on their mean values).
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Table 4.41: Knowledge of TSM Construct
S.
No.
I
1

2
3

4

5

6
7

8
9
10
11
12

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)

TSM Statement
Knowledge of TSM
TSM can be achieved by measuring
and keeping records of the number of
accidents and incidents and applying
punitive measures to workers that are
caught violating safety rules.
I am aware of construction industry
programs implementing TSM.
TSM programs should be based on
scientific decision making.
TSM can be achieved by making and
maintaining a safe and healthy
workplace as part of the company’s
strategic plan.
TSM can be achieved by ensuring safe
working through positive
reinforcement and advice and
improving by adopting good practice
that exceeds legislative requirements.
TSM programs should be strategically
focused.
TSM can be achieved by motivating
staff through a measurement and
reward scheme and providing the skills
and information to enable staff to work
safely via training and its intranet.
TSM programs should focus on peak
performance.
TSM programs should have unity of
purpose.
TSM programs should be committed to
employee empowerment.
TSM programs should be committed to
continual improvement.
TSM programs should be performance
and process oriented.
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Indicator Indicator
Criticality Criticality
Index1
Zone1

3.65
(1.35)

6

Major
High

1.44

6

2.54

4

Major
High
Moderate
High

3.08

3

Moderate
Low

3.27

3

Moderate
Low

3.38

3

3.65

2

Moderate
Low
Minor
High

3.65

2

3.96

2

4.04

1

4.08

1

4.15

1

Minor
High
Minor
High
Minor
Low
Minor
Low
Minor
Low

Table 4.41: Knowledge of TSM Construct (continued)
Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
S.
Criticality Criticality
TSM Statement
Score
No.
Zone1
Index1
(Scale 1-5)
13 TSM programs are largely dependent
4.15
1
Minor
on executive-level commitment.
Low
14 TSM programs should contain
4.31
1
Minor
comprehensive, ongoing training.
Low
15 TSM programs should be teamwork
4.38
1
Minor
oriented.
Low
1
based on Table 4.40
Table 4.42: Strategic Vision of Safety Construct

TSM Statement

Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)

Indicator
Criticality
Index1

Indicator
Criticality
Zone1

II
16

Strategic Vision of Safety
My company views safety as a tool to
increase profits.

2.2

5

Major
Low

17

My company views safety as a
competitive advantage.

2.22

5

Major
Low

18

My company’s safety policy can be
best defined as “Implementation of a
set of safety rules by the Company
with punitive measure for violators.”

3.56
(1.44)

6

Major
High

19

My company’s safety policy can be
best defined as “a set of processes
developed to manage safety aspects
of a project including encouraging,
measuring and rewarding behavior
that creates a safe working
environment rather than catching
people who break the rules.”

2.44

5

Major
Low

S.
No.
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Table 4.42: Strategic Vision of Safety Construct (continued)
S.
No.

TSM Statement

20

My company’s safety policy can be
best defined as “a performance-andprocess-control oriented approach to
safety and health management that
gives organization sustainable
competitive advantage in the
marketplace by establishing a safe
and healthy work environment that is
conducive to consistent peak
performance and that is improved
continually.”
21
Poor safety performance decreases
productivity and organizational
performance.
22
The company management strongly
believes that excellence in safety
would positively affect the ability to
achieve excellence in other areas; e.g.
production, etc.
23
My company views safety and health
as an integral part of its business.
24
My company believes that poor
safety performance restricts strategic
organizational growth.
25
OSHA regulations provide a driving
force to implementing TSM.
26
My company views safety as
achieving zero accidents.
27
My company views safety as
elimination of hazards.
28
A TSM program is (will be)
beneficial for my organization.
1
based on Table 4.40
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Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)
2.23

Indicator
Criticality
Index1

Indicator
Criticality
Zone1

5

Major
Low

2.55

4

Moderate
High

2.64

4

Moderate
High

2.83

4

2.86

4

Moderate
High
Moderate
High

2.9

4

2.95

4

3.22

3

4.04

1

Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Minor
Low

Table 4.43: Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement Construct
S.
No.
III
29

30
31
32

33

34

35
36

37
38

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
TSM Statement
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement
Steps taken in implementing my
2.02
5
Major
organization’s safety improvement
Low
program include: “A dollar value has
been assigned to the cost of unsafe
behaviors”.
“Obtaining client satisfaction” is a
2.26
5
Major
major objective of my organization’s
Low
safety improvement program.
Training currently emphasizes: data
2.28
5
Major
gathering & analysis.
Low
“Pressure from competitors” was a
2.33
5
Major
key factor that provided the
Low
motivation to start the safety
improvement program.
Steps taken in implementing my
2.38
5
Major
organization’s safety improvement
Low
program include: “Benchmarks for
improvement have been defined”.
“Environmental
2.49
5
Major
issues/considerations” was a key
Low
factor that provided the motivation to
start the safety improvement program.
“Increasing productivity” is a major
2.51
4
Moderate
objective of my organization’s safety
High
improvement program.
Steps taken in implementing my
2.55
4
Moderate
organization’s safety improvement
High
program include: “Organizing a multidisciplinary team”.
Company’s safety training is oriented
2.59
4
Moderate
towards TSM (or continuous safety
High
improvement).
The company’s safety improvement
2.65
4
Moderate
program is centered on Total Safety
High
Management and/ or zero accident
strategies.
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Table 4.43: Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement Construct (continued)
S.
No.
39
40
41

42
43

44

45

46

47
48
49

TSM Statement
“Safety of processes” was a key factor
that provided the motivation to start
the safety improvement program.
Training currently emphasizes:
process improvement.
Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement
program include: “Data has been
collected to measure the safety
performance”.
“Demanding customers” was a key
factor that provided the motivation to
start the safety improvement program.
“Need to reduce costs and improve
performance” was a key factor that
provided the motivation to start the
safety improvement program.
Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement
program include: “An educational
program has been implemented”.
“My company’s chief executive” was
a key factor that provided the
motivation to start the safety
improvement program.
Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement
program include: “Safety problems
have been identified”.
Training currently emphasizes:
teamwork.
Training currently emphasizes:
communication.
“Achieving zero accidents” was a key
factor that provided the motivation to
start the safety improvement program.
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Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
2.67
4
Moderate
High
2.69

4

Moderate
High
Moderate
High

2.72

4

2.78

4

Moderate
High

2.82

4

Moderate
High

2.84

4

Moderate
High

2.88

4

Moderate
High

2.88

4

Moderate
High

2.9

4

2.92

4

2.94

4

Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High

Table 4.43: Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement Construct (continued)
S.
No.

TSM Statement

50

“Ensuring involvement of employees
in the safety building effort” is a
major objective of my organization’s
safety improvement program.
51 Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement
program include: “An internal
awareness program is underway”.
52 Training currently emphasizes: zero
accident strategies.
53 Formal training in TSM or other
safety improvement philosophies is
given to employees.
54 After the implementation of my safety
improvement program, the
relationship with my customers and
suppliers has improved.
55 My organization’s safety
improvement program can be
described as formal with widespread
employee awareness.
56 As part of the management team, we
have a TSM Steering Committee/ a
TSM Facilitator/ a safety
improvement project team.
57 The company provides feedback loops
to determine if the safety
improvement practices are working.
58 After the implementation of my safety
improvement program, worker
behaviors have improved.
59 “Employee safety” was a key factor
that provided the motivation to start
the safety improvement program.
60 “Health and Safety agencies (like
OSHA)” was a key factor that
provided the motivation to start the
safety improvement program.
1
based on Table 4.40
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Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
2.96
4
Moderate
High
2.98

4

Moderate
High

2.98

4

3.11

3

Moderate
High
Moderate
Low

3.13

3

Moderate
Low

3.14

3

Moderate
Low

3.16

3

Moderate
Low

3.23

3

Moderate
Low

3.29

3

Moderate
Low

3.42

3

Moderate
Low

3.89

2

Minor
High

Table 4.44: Employee Involvement & Empowerment Construct
S.
No.
IV
61

62

63
64

65

66
67
68

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
TSM Statement
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
Employee Involvement & Empowerment
Methods adopted in the company to
2.05
5
Major
encourage employees to fulfill their
Low
responsibilities towards TSM (or
continuous safety improvement)
include: serving effectively on
improvement teams”.
There is an anonymous way for
2.34
5
Major
employees to make safety
Low
improvement suggestions. e.g. drop
box.
The company has a mentoring
2.56
4
Moderate
program for all new employees to
High
develop safe working habits.
The company has incentive programs
2.68
4
Moderate
to reward workers, supervisors,
High
superintendents, or specific teams for
outstanding safety performance and/or
for generating ideas to reduce the
number of accidents.
Methods adopted in the company to
2.71
4
Moderate
encourage employees to fulfill their
High
responsibilities towards TSM (or
continuous safety improvement)
include: “practicing hazard
identification techniques constantly”.
The level of feedback collected from
2.76
4
Moderate
employees is very significant for
High
setting safety goals.
The level of feedback collected from
2.79
4
Moderate
employees is very significant for
High
selecting safe projects.
Methods adopted in the company to
2.89
4
Moderate
encourage employees to fulfill their
High
responsibilities towards TSM (or
continuous safety improvement)
include: “encouraging fellow
employees to work safely”.
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Table 4.44: Employee Involvement & Empowerment Construct (continued)
S.
No.
69

70
71

TSM Statement
The extent to which the employees
provide input that is useful in making
continual safety improvements to the
organization is very significant.
The level of feedback collected from
employees is very significant for
measuring safety improvement.
The level of feedback collected from
employees is very significant for
identifying solutions.

72

Methods adopted in the company to
encourage employees to fulfill their
responsibilities towards TSM (or
continuous safety improvement)
include: “setting positive examples of
working safely”.
73
Methods adopted in the company to
encourage employees to fulfill their
responsibilities towards TSM (or
continuous safety improvement)
include: “recommending accident
prevention strategies”.
74
Employee feedback is almost always
included in the safety decision making
process.
75
Employees are empowered to make
significant safety improvement
suggestions and changes to operations.
76
The level of feedback collected from
employees is very significant for
identifying safety issues.
77
The importance of employee input in
my company’s safety improvement
program is very high.
1
based on Table 4.40
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Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
2.94
4
Moderate
High
2.94

4

Moderate
High

2.96

4

Moderate
High

3.16

3

Moderate
Low

3.16

3

Moderate
Low

3.28

3

Moderate
Low

3.42

3

Moderate
Low

3.44

3

Moderate
Low

3.54

2

Minor
High

Table 4.45: Readiness to Embrace TSM Construct
S.
No.
V
78
79
80
81
82
83

84
85

86
87
88
89

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)

TSM Statement
Readiness to Embrace TSM
All team members understand how
unsafe team members will be guided
for improvement.
Decisions are supported by all in my
organization.
All team members understand how
team decisions are made.
“Company executives/ managing
directors” are involved in safety
management efforts/ activities.
“Appropriate storage practices” are
my company’s strength in terms of
safety.
Company looks at the past safety
performance (safety portfolio) of a
prospective employee as an important
criterion for selection.
“Consistent commitment to
improvement” promotes safety
conscience in my company.
The organization has a mission
statement with specific
responsibilities for approval of
recommendations for improvement of
the work environment.
My company provides (or strives to
provide): safety information.
In my company, we would never
compromise safety to meet deadlines.
“Employee participation” promotes
safety conscience in my company.
The organization has a mission
statement with specific
responsibilities for building safety
and health concerns into the strategic
plan.
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2.12

5

Major
Low

2.42

5

2.54

4

2.54

4

Major
Low
Moderate
High
Moderate
High

2.58

4

Moderate
High

2.72

4

Moderate
High

2.74

4

Moderate
High

2.82

4

Moderate
High

2.82

4

2.86

4

2.86

4

2.88

4

Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High

Table 4.45: Readiness to Embrace TSM Construct (continued)
S.
No.
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

100
101
102
103

TSM Statement
The responsibility of the accidents
and their effects belongs to the whole
organization.
“Management leadership” promotes
safety conscience in my company.
Team’s success is understood by all
team members in my organization.
Team’s goal is understood by all team
members in my organization.
“An active TSM steering committee/
safety improvement team” is my
company’s strength in terms of safety.
All team members understand their
authority within the team and that of
all other team members.
All team members know the
responsibilities of all other team
members.
“A capable and committed safety
director” is my company’s strength in
terms of safety.
When unforeseen inhibitors impede
progress all members know what to
do.
The whole organization is responsible
to follow and get involved in the
safety & health mission
accomplishment.
My company provides (or strives to
provide): management
encouragement towards safety.
Company uses the method of positive
reinforcement for good safety
practices.
Safety practices are recognized and
rewarded.
The whole organization is responsible
to assess the safety precautions and
rules.
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Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone
(Scale 1-5)
2.88
4
Moderate
High
2.88

4

Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High

2.88

4

2.92

4

2.96

4

2.96

4

Moderate
High

3.02

3

Moderate
Low

3.12

3

Moderate
Low

3.12

3

Moderate
Low

3.12

3

Moderate
Low

3.12

3

Moderate
Low

3.14

3

Moderate
Low

3.17

3

3.17

3

Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low

Table 4.45: Readiness to Embrace TSM Construct (continued)
S.
No.
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

115

116

TSM Statement
Company follows independent (cold
eye) safety reviews and ratings.
My company provides (or strives to
provide): safe working environment.
“Company administration and
support” are involved in safety
management efforts/ activities.
“Self accountability” promotes safety
conscience in my company.
My company provides (or strives to
provide): clearly defined mission
statement.
“Commitment by senior
management” is my company’s
strength in terms of safety.
“Individual employees” are involved
in safety management efforts/
activities.
Peer pressure exists among workers
to work in a safe and healthy manner.
Everyone is open and honest with
each other in my organization.
Safety mission is understood by all
team members in my organization.
Company looks at the past safety
performance (safety history) of the
subcontractors/ suppliers as an
important criterion for selection.
The organization has a mission
statement with specific
responsibilities for regular review of
the safety and health program in order
to keep up with the safety best
practices.
“A comprehensive safety and health
plan” is my company’s strength in
terms of safety.
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Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
3.19
3
Moderate
Low
3.23
3
Moderate
Low
3.24
3
Moderate
Low
3.25

3

Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low

3.25

3

3.27

3

Moderate
Low

3.28

3

Moderate
Low

3.28

3

3.32

3

3.32

3

3.36

3

Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low

3.43

3

Moderate
Low

3.48

3

Moderate
Low

Table 4.45: Readiness to Embrace TSM Construct (continued)
S.
No.
117
118
119

TSM Statement
My company provides (or strives to
provide): safety manager or safety
committee.
“Safe facilities” are my company’s
strength in terms of safety.
“Up-to-date safety procedures” is my
company’s strength in terms of safety.

120

My company provides (or strives to
provide): formal, written statement of
corporate safety policies and
objectives.
121 “Safe equipment” is my company’s
strength in terms of safety.
122 “Project managers” are involved in
safety management efforts/ activities.
123 “Site managers” are involved in
safety management efforts/ activities.
124 My company provides (or strives to
provide): personal protective
equipment.
1
based on Table 4.40

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)
3.54
2
Minor
High
3.54

2

Minor
High
Minor
High

3.55

2

3.85

2

Minor
High

4.28

1

4.3

1

4.42

1

4.52

0

Minor
Low
Minor
Low
Minor
Low
NonCritical

For the TSM benefits and obstacles data collected, a mean score of 5 in the final
analysis represented maximum perceived impact by the measured indicator, while a mean
score of 1 represented minimum perceived impact by the measured indicator. Note that a
mean score of 5 represents maximum perceived benefit by a benefit measure while the
same mean score of 5 represents maximum barrier to TSM implementation by an
obstacle measure. A mean response score of 3.01 or above (3 represents a neutral
response) was considered significant in terms of that particular measure being considered
as a benefit or obstacle to TSM implementation. In order to distinguish the measures with
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respect to their extent of impact, the following measure impact index was used (Table
4.46). The results are depicted in Tables 4.47-4.48.
Table 4.46: Measure Impact Indices and Zones
Mean Score
Range
<=2

Impact
Index
0

2.01-2.50
2.51 – 3.00
3.01-3.50

1
2
3

3.51 – 4.00

4

4.01 – 4.50
4.51 – 5.00

5
6

Impact Zone
No
Significant
Impact
Minor Low
Minor High
Moderate
Low
Moderate
High
Major Low
Major High

Table 4.47: TSM Benefits
S.
No.

TSM Statement

VI
125
126
127
128

TSM Benefits
TSM improves performance.
TSM increases employee morale.
TSM increases profits.
TSM provides the opportunity to avoid
costly redesign or project delay by
addressing hazard issues as early as
possible.
129 TSM provides traceable and effective
hazard management system.
130 TSM provides a check-and-balance
mechanism at different stages of a
project lifecycle.
1
based on Table 4.46
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Mean
Response
Score
(Scale 1-5)

Measure
Impact
Index1

Measure
Impact
Zone1

4.36
4.28
4.15
3.98

3
2
2
2

Major
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate

3.91

2

Moderate

3.79

2

Moderate

Table 4.48: TSM Obstacles
S.
No.

Mean
Indicator Indicator
Response
Criticality Criticality
Score
Index1
Zone1
(Scale 1-5)

TSM Statement

VI
131

TSM Obstacles
“Changing attitudes and behaviors” is an
obstacle in TSM implementation.
132 “Emphasis on short-term objects” is an
obstacle in TSM implementation.
133 “Lack of top-management commitment/
understanding” is an obstacle in TSM
implementation.
134 “Lack of education and training to drive
the improvement process” is an obstacle
in TSM implementation.
135 “Schedule and cost treated as the main
priorities” is an obstacle in TSM
implementation.
136 “Current bidding climate” is an obstacle
in TSM implementation.
137 “Lack of employee commitment/
understanding” is an obstacle in TSM
implementation.
138 “Lack of expertise/resources in TSM” is
an obstacle in TSM implementation.
139 “Tendency to cure symptom rather than
eradicate the root cause” is an obstacle in
TSM implementation.
1
based on Table 4.46

4.47

3

Major

4.42

3

Major

4.37

3

Major

4.12

2

Moderate

4.11

2

Moderate

4.05

2

Moderate

3.79

2

Moderate

3.64

1

Minor

3.53

1

Minor

After analyzing Tables 4.41-4.45, the major critical indicators reflecting lack of
adoption and implementation of TSM in construction contracting organizations (with
criticality indices = 5 or 6), ranked in descending order of criticality (based on mean
response score), are shown in Table 4.49. Table 4.49 also provides mean response rate,
associated constructs, and indicator criticality ranking for these key TSM impeding
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indicators. The first column in Table 4.49 provides the serial number of these indicators
as given in Tables 4.41-4.45.
Table 4.49: Key TSM Impeding Indicators – All Constructs
S.
No.
1

2
18

29

61

78
16
17

TSM Performance Indicator
TSM can be achieved by measuring
and keeping records of the number of
accidents and incidents and applying
punitive measures to workers that are
caught violating safety rules.
I am aware of construction industry
programs implementing TSM.
My company’s safety policy can be
best defined as “Implementation of a
set of safety rules by the Company
with punitive measure for violators.”
Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement
program include: “A dollar value has
been assigned to the cost of unsafe
behaviors”.
Methods adopted in the company to
encourage employees to fulfill their
responsibilities towards TSM (or
continuous safety improvement)
include: serving effectively on
improvement teams”.
All team members understand how
unsafe team members will be guided
for improvement.
My company views safety as a tool to
increase profits.
My company views safety as a
competitive advantage.
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Mean
Response
Score
3.65
(1.35)

1.44

Construct
Knowledge of
TSM

Indicator
Criticality
Ranking
1

Knowledge of
TSM
Strategic Vision
of Safety

2

2.02

Strategic
Approach to
Safety
Improvement

4

2.05

Employee
Involvement and
Empowerment

5

2.12

Readiness to
Embrace TSM

6

2.2

Strategic Vision
of Safety
Strategic Vision
of Safety

7

3.56
(1.44)

2.22

3

8

Table 4.49: Key TSM Impeding Indicators – All Constructs (continued)
S.
No.
20

30

31

32

62

33

79

TSM Performance Indicator
My company’s safety policy can be
best defined as “a performance-andprocess-control oriented approach to
safety and health management that
gives organization sustainable
competitive advantage in the
marketplace by establishing a safe
and healthy work environment that is
conducive to consistent peak
performance and that is improved
continually.”
“Obtaining customer/ client
satisfaction” is a major objective of
my organization’s safety
improvement program.
Training currently emphasizes: data
gathering & analysis.
“Pressure from competitors” was a
key factor that provided the
motivation to start the safety
improvement program.
There is an anonymous way for
employees to make safety
improvement suggestions. e.g. drop
box
Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement
program include: “Benchmarks for
improvement have been defined”.
Decisions are supported by all in my
organization.
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Mean
Response
Score
2.23

2.26

2.28

2.33

2.34

2.38

2.42

Construct
Strategic Vision
of Safety

Indicator
Criticality
Ranking
9

Strategic
Approach to
Safety
Improvement
Strategic
Approach to
Safety
Improvement
Strategic
Approach to
Safety
Improvement
Employee
Involvement and
Empowerment

10

Strategic
Approach to
Safety
Improvement
Readiness to
Embrace TSM

14

11

12

13

15

Table 4.49: Key TSM Impeding Indicators – All Constructs (continued)
S.
No.
19

34

TSM Performance Indicator
My company’s safety policy can be
best defined as “a set of processes
developed to manage safety aspects of
a project including encouraging,
measuring and rewarding behavior
that creates a safe working
environment rather than catching
people who break the rules.”
“Environmental
issues/considerations” was a key
factor that provided the motivation to
start the safety improvement program.

Mean
Response
Score
2.44

2.49

Construct
Strategic Vision
of Safety

Strategic
Approach to
Safety
Improvement

Indicator
Criticality
Ranking
16

17

Further assessment of Tables 4.41-4.45 – to identify construct criticality ranking
(based on a value of weighted mean response score for each construct) – results in Table
4.50. Table 4.50 has been arranged in descending order of construct criticality, and also
provide construct criticality ranking and criticality zone.
Table 4.50: Construct Criticality Ranking & Zone
Weighted Mean
Response Score
(Scale 1-5)

Criticality
Ranking

2.66

1

2.82

2

2.92

3

Readiness to Embrace TSM

3.18

4

Knowledge of TSM

3.43

5

Construct
Strategic Vision of Safety
Strategic Approach to Safety
Improvement
Employee Involvement &
Empowerment
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Criticality
Zone
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low

The major TSM impeding indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 5 or 6)
constitute 17 out of a total of 124 indicators i.e. 13.71%. The moderate TSM impeding
indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 3 or 4) constitute 87 out of a total of 124
indicators i.e. 70.16%. Minor TSM impeding indicators (with an indicator criticality
index = 1 or 2) constitute 19 out of a total of 124 indicators i.e. 15.32%. The remaining 1
indicator (0.09%) is not perceived by the industry as an inhibiting measure towards TSM
adoption and implementation.
Strategic vision of safety, strategic approach to safety improvement, employee
involvement and empowerment, and organizations’ readiness to embrace TSM are all
important components of a strategic total safety environment. Lack of performance of
organizations in these areas undoubtedly indicates that contracting firms are not
performing well in terms of achieving strategic safety improvement in the construction
industry. Hence it can be concluded that the strategies currently adopted by construction
organizations are not generally instrumental in nurturing safety as a total management
process in their organizations (in order to strategically improve safety in the construction
industry).
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter discussed phase I of the data analysis, which was undertaken to achieve
objective 1 of the study, i.e. to establish the need for addressing safety as a total
management process in construction contracting organizations in order to achieve the
goal of zero accidents. Four (4) safety key areas of concern were identified and
researched as part of data collection process. Descriptive analysis was performed to reach
key conclusions. It was found that construction organizations generally lack in the
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following areas of safety performance at the various levels of the organization (Table
4.51):
Table 4.51: Ares of Safety Performance at the various Levels of the Organization
Organizational/
Performance Level
Strategic

Management

Supervisory

Key Non-Performance Areas
1. Strategic vision of safety
2. Strategic approach to safety improvement
3. Employee involvement and
empowerment
4. Readiness to embrace Total Safety
Management
1. Safety communication and decision
making
2. Management commitment and support
3. Accident investigation and reporting
4. Safety training and orientation
1. Worker motivation
2. Safety commitment and support
3. Safety communication
4. Maintaining a positive attitude towards
safety
5. Safety training and orientation

In addition, it is also concluded that OSHA is not performing at par in terms of
achieving strategic safety improvement in the construction industry and needs to improve
on its vision and approach in order to strategically improve safety in the industry.
OSHA’s strategic approach, as reflected from the findings, should be “continuous
improvement through positive reinforcement” as against “inspection and penalty”
approach. OSHA needs to work with the companies and not against them in order to
achieve the strategic goal of zero accidents in the industry.
Based on the above findings, it can be concluded that construction industry
(construction organizations and enforcement agencies) is not performing well in terms of

192

strategically approaching safety. Hence there is a dire need for a framework that would
allow the industry to strategically and continuously improve safety so as to attain and
sustain the goal of zero accidents. Such a framework would be instrumental in generating
a total safety environment in the industry, which would promote safety for the sake of
safety and not for the safe of “compliance” or “penalty avoidance”. This framework
would require an integral approach to safety with commitment and participation from all
levels as well as sectors of the industry. The next chapter discusses the development of
such a strategic framework for continuous safety improvement in the industry.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA ANALYSIS PHASE II
5.1 Introduction
Phase I of the data analysis process (discussed in chapter 4) concluded that the
construction industry lacks a strategic focus towards safety and hence established the
need of a strategic safety improvement framework for the construction industry. As
discussed later in this chapter, it is hypothesized that this strategic safety improvement
framework should be based on an integral approach to safety that allows approaching
safety as a total organizational process. This chapter discusses phase II of the data
analysis process, which was undertaken to achieve objective 2 of the study, i.e. to identify
the factors (latent variables/ constructs) determining the total safety environment of a
construction contracting organization, which are most suitable and appropriate for
measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role in achieving and sustaining
the goal of zero accidents.
This phase of data analysis begins by presenting and critically discussing the integral
approach to safety as adopted by this research. This discussion highlights the highest
level of the hierarchy that decomposes total safety into four principal dimensions, viz.,
person, culture, behavior and process. Section 5.3 provides this discussion.
Defining the interior as well as exterior pursuits to safety is a complex task. The study
endeavors to decompose safety dimensions into measurable attributes using a
multiattribute analysis technique pioneered by Miller (1970) and used by researchers in
similar research (e.g. Molenaar et al., 2009) The study briefly describes the multiattribute

194

hierarchy used to measure total safety, which was defined through exhaustive literature
review and expert interviews on the basis of which the four principal dimensions of total
safety (safety categories) were divided into 22 subcategories, and were finally
decomposed into 83 measurable safety characteristics that formed the basis of a
questionnaire to measure total safety. This multiattribute analysis is discussed in sec. 5.4.
Following this, the study attempts to reach a consensus as to the selection of safe
work behavior, which will be utilized as a measure of a company’s safety performance
for the study. This is done in section 5.5.
Using 686 questionnaire responses from construction companies with above average
safety records, statistical relationships between total safety dimensions and safety
performance (measured by safe work behavior) are revealed through a series of six latent
variables (factors) that describe the total safety environment of a construction
organization. This was achieved using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) which reduced
the attribute space from a larger number of sub-categories (22) to a smaller number of
underlying dimensions/ factors (6). This combination of variables, in this case, aspects of
safety dimensions, provided a way to simplify subsequent analysis (Hamilton 1992; SPSS
2001). A principal factor analysis (PFA) using the varimax rotation method with Kaiser
normalization was utilized for the same. The survey development, administration and
validation process is discussed in detail in the sections 5.6 - 5.8. The confirmatory factor
analysis is detailed in section 5.9.
The data collected from this phase of the research forms the basis of a strategic safety
improvement model for the construction industry, the development and utility of which is
discussed in the next chapter.
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5.2 Research Hypothesis Revisited
As mentioned earlier, it is the premise of this research that individual intentions,
commitments, group culture, and work behaviors have as much, or more, to do with the
safety performance than the safety management system. Based on the findings of phase I
of the data analysis process (chapter 4) and extensive literature review, this research
develops itself on an integral approach to safety (as explained in section 5.3) that
collectively define the interior and exterior pursuits necessary to determine the true total
safety environment of a construction organization. It is hypothesized that all safety
dimensions offer complementary, rather than contradictory, perspectives. Hence an
integral view of construction safety can only be achieved if integration is made of these
areas of knowledge through an acknowledgement of them as the fundamental dimensions
of safety. It is further hypothesized that all four pursuits by their very nature cultivate
successful safety performance. While these hypotheses seem intuitive, little research has
been conducted to specifically identify and measure critical characteristics as related to
all the dimensions that, in integration, define as well as influence total safety. This is the
core objective of this research.
5.3 An Integral Model for Safety
Ken Wilber (Wikipedia, 2011) defines four dimensions for every entity. Each entity
or unit of reality that is both a whole and a part of a larger whole, has an interior and an
exterior. It also exists as an individual and (assuming more than one of these entities
exists) as a collective. Observing the entity from the outside constitutes an exterior
(objective) perspective on that entity. Observing it from the inside is the interior
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(subjective) perspective, and so forth. If these four perspectives are mapped into
quadrants, these constitute four quadrants, or dimensions.
The above concept leads to defining four dimensions of construction safety with
respect to a construction worker as an entity (Figure 5.1): 1) Behavioral i.e. exterior
individual (or, in the diagram, the upper-right) quadrant; 2) Intentional i.e. interior
individual (upper-left) perspective; 3) Cultural i.e. interior collective (lower-left)
dimension; and 4) Process i.e. exterior collective (lower-right) quadrant.
Interior (Subjective)

Exterior (Objective)

Individual

Person

Behavior

•

Intentions

•

Behavior

•

Commitments

•

Action

•

Interpretations

•

Facts

•

Values

•

Spending

•

Emotions

•

Body Language

•

Culture

•

Social Systems

•

Norms

•

Policies & Procedures

•

Shared Values

•

Resource Allocation

•

Collective Beliefs

•

Collective Action

•

Shared Understanding

•

Contracts

Group

Culture

Process

Figure 5.1: Integral Model for Safety (adapted from the work of Ken Wilber)
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All four pursuits – intentional, cultural, behavioral and process – offer
complementary, rather than contradictory, perspectives. It is possible for all to be correct
and necessary for a complete account of human existence. Also, each by itself offers only
a partial view of reality. Further, according to Wilber, these four perspectives are equally
valid at all levels of existence. Hence an integral view of construction safety can be
achieved if integration is made of these four areas of knowledge through an
acknowledgement of them as the four fundamental dimensions of safety.
Note that the right sides of the quadrants are concerned with empirical observation—
what does it do? The left sides of the quadrants focus on interpretation—what does it
mean?
This integral approach to safety provides a more complete view of reality. It allows a
study of what drives safety performance, highlights the importance of the human side of
safety and hence provides a mechanism to achieve incident and injury free environment.
A major intent of viewing safety from the integral perspective is that it provides the
capability with intentionally viewing from all aspects so that a complete and
comprehensive view of safety can be achieved that enables quality decision making and
actions. This integral approach to safety forms the basis of this research.
Traditionally, organizations tend to implement change through systems – a process
approach to safety, or by improving workers’ behaviors – a behavior based approach to
safety. They focus on measures to control hazards (via systems), and means to control
workers’ behaviors so that they comply with prescribed safe practices. This approach
emphasizes (1) organizational policies, systems and procedures to prevent unsafe
conditions and (2) workers’ training and motivation to prevent unsafe behaviors. Safety
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programs – such as subcontractor selection, training, inspections, motivation,
enforcement, etc., as well as efforts towards behavior-based safety aim at increasing the
workers’ compliance with prescribed ‘safety rules’ and ‘safe behaviors.’ This approach
has resulted in significant improvements, but has still not succeeded in achieving the
zero-accident goal. The reasons are intuitive as identified below.
While the traditional application of this “exterior” approach to safety aims at creating
safe work behaviors, it ignores how the interior characteristics of the individual and the
organizations influence the work behaviors and affect the possibility of errors and
accidents. On one hand, it does not account for the personal factors that collectively
define a worker’s intention for safety such as, level of self-commitment, interpretation of
being safe, the perceived value of safety, the natural tendency for least effort, and the
individual response under production and economic pressures for efficiency. On the other
hand, the approach does not account for the cultural factors that shape the work
environment such as, the team values, beliefs, norms, practices, and collective response
under production and economic pressures for efficiency. These factors generate the
situations the workers face, and the individual as well as crew’s ability to cope with these
situations (Mitropoulos et al., 2009).
From a practical perspective, a key concern is that at the work level, there is a
continuous tension between safety and production or costs; in the short term, such
conflicts are usually resolved in favor of production, because production efforts have
relatively certain outcomes and receive rapid and rewarding feedback (Reason 1990). A
recent study of safety on international projects (Mahalingam and Levitt 2007) also
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illustrated that economic pressures were stronger determinants of work behavior than the
safety systems.
As a result of these “interior” characteristics, efforts to improve safety through
objective assessments and advancements (new methods/ improved safety features and
controlled behaviors) tend to be ineffective because the behavior change is only
temporary and is not usually sustainable (Mitropoulos et al., 2009). The current safety
strategies in construction, which are largely oriented towards systems advancements and
behavior control, hence prove to be inadequate to achieve the zero-accident goal because
of this fundamental flaw in their approach.
The key challenge for researchers and practitioners is to develop total safety systems
that are simultaneously highly productive and highly reliable and can function effectively
in the dynamic, complex, and competitive conditions that construction projects face. This
requires a treatment of safety from an integral perspective taking into consideration all
four dimensions of safety and their inter-dependence. This treatment will allow a
fundamental understanding of the individual and organizational characteristics that
govern both the safe behaviors of workers and the effectiveness of safety systems, and
will aid in determining the underlying factors that control the true total safety
performance of a company.
5.4 Multiattribute Heirarchy
Employing multiattribute analysis, the problem of approaching safety as an integral
perspective can be decomposed into three interdependent sets of factors – person, culture
and process, defining total safety and one set of factor – behavior, defining safety
performance. Person is integral to defining, for a worker, the interior characteristics such
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as intentions, commitments, interpretations, values and emotions, as well as the exterior
characteristics such as actions, behaviors, body language and the like. The second
category, culture, is integral to defining, for an organization, the interior characteristics of
a corporation such as norms, shared values, collective beliefs, and shared understanding.
The third category, process, is integral to defining the exterior organizational (group)
characteristics such as collective actions, social interactions, safety systems and the like.
A good safety process is necessary for a company to properly communicate its safety
goals. The major subcategories for each of these three categories are defined in the
following sub-sections. Note that the fourth principal safety dimension – behavior, which
has been selected as the safety performance measure for this study, is discussed in section
5.5.
5.4.1. Person
5.4.1.1. Intention
A person’s intention in performing an action is his or her specific purpose in doing so,
the end or goal that is aimed at, or intended to accomplish. By setting an intention, one
makes it clear to oneself and others, just what one plans to do. Lacking intention, one
sometimes strays without meaning or direction. When one sets a positive intention and
then acts on it to demonstrate commitment (such as before entering the workplace, one
can intend to learn something new or be helpful), this has a positive impact not only one
one’s own behavior but also on the behavior of surrounding team members. Intention can
also give fortitude for dealing with tough times. For instance, with all the challenges
construction sites generally offer, if one’s intention is to live through this process each
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day with health and safety, this intention would help maintain composure, sanity, and on
a good day, a sense of humor.
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.1.2. Commitment
Worker commitment to safety is a central element of incident and injury free
environment. This commitment reflects the interactions of a worker with people and
environment dominated by one’s obligations. Individual commitment includes personal
commitment, which is often a pledge or promise to ones' self for personal growth and
preferences, and commitment as a member of an organization, which is often a reflection
of the expectations of top management as communicated to and perceived by the worker.
This commitment may or may not be explicitly stated, although an explicit statement of
individual commitment to safety brings its own advantages. Explicit commitment has the
obvious advantage of accountability. Making a voluntary public commitment to safety
not only increases the likelihood of the person making the commitment to follow through
with it but also gives the right to fellow team members to explicitly remind to that person
at some point in time if the person is not fulfilling what he/ she committed. Strategically,
this would help generate an environment where commitment would not be something
temporary but would rather be everlasting in that everyone would want (and not required)
to live up to their voluntary commitment. It is also important to note here that periodic
renewal of commitment is also important to sustain an environment fostering
commitment. When people genuinely make a commitment and mean it when they make

202

it, they continue to live up to that commitment. What happens usually is that over the
years, people do not renew their commitments and hence may need to be reminded again.
The importance of obtaining worker commitment to safety for achieving and
consistently

maintaining

incidence

and

injury

free

environment

cannot

be

overemphasized. When employees are personally committed to safety, they are more
willing to cooperate among each other as well as with the management to continuously
improve the safety performance. Although 100% commitment from all employees is not
a must to reach the goal of incident and injury free, it would be a lot easier if this could
be achieved. The minimum needed is a level of commitment from the workers that when
they see a fellow worker putting himself/ herself at risk, they would go and talk to that
person to make sure that the person gets the appropriate help and does not get injured.
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.1.3. Value
A personal value is an absolute or relative ethical value, the assumption of which can
be the basis for ethical action. Value is the foundation upon which measures of integrity
are based. Values tell people what is good, beneficial, important, useful, beautiful,
desirable, constructive, etc. They answer the question of why people do what they do. A
value is not something one merely knows about or has observed in others that lacks
guiding influence in one’s life. Values are those principles that are so ingrained in one’s
personality that they become the determinants of how one thinks, acts, and finally what
one says and how one says it.
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Values can be defined as broad preferences concerning appropriate courses of action
or outcomes. As such, values reflect a person’s sense of right and wrong or what “ought”
to be. Values tend to influence attitudes and behavior. For example, if a person values
safety and goes to work for an organization that demonstrates evident lack of
commitment to workers’ safety, that very person may form the attitude that the company
is an insecure place to work; consequently, he or she may not produce well or may
perhaps leave the company. It is likely that if the company had had a stronger
demonstrated commitment to safety, the attitude and behaviors would have been more
positive.
Everyone develops a set of values, as they become adults. These values are what
everyone looks to for guidance in the decisions they make in life – decisions in the home,
in the family, in relationships, in friendships, and in our occupations and business.
Values in the human personality have basically one of three aspects: moral values,
neutral values, and immoral values. A moral value is a principle that one lives by. A
moral value is an absolute. It is not negotiable. Other values, such a neutral values, are
less important, like obtaining a good product when one purchases something. The realm
of immoral values is that need to be examined, such as common temptations to a person.
Immoral values are not always based on ethical standards, but may be of a questionable
source or may not be concerned with fairness, honesty, or integrity.
The key question is: In which realm are one’s safety values? Safety values in the
neutral realm include a situation where one knows about safety and can work safe if one
wants to, but for some reason (e.g. production pressures) one chooses to ignore safe work
procedures because they are not convenient. If one is lucky, one may not be injured in
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this realm. But in thinking about noncompliant safety practices one has to recognize that
taking unnecessary risks is a poor example to others, especially when a less experienced
individual copies your work approach and is injured. In this way, as far as safety is
concerned, operating in a neutral realm is borderline immoral because one at least
contributes to an Injury of another person if not of oneself.
Safety values in the immoral realm are seen in those who purposely work recklessly
and give no regard to safe work procedures and resist good safety practices. It is both the
neutral and the immoral safety values that need to be eliminated.
If one takes a moral approach to managing safety, it then becomes one’s personal
value. In such a case, one’s safety values provide guidance in one’s actions so that the
person and those around him or her are safer by the very influence of one’s personal
safety values. If this is true then one’s safety values are in the moral realm.
The researcher would like to take the position that although the value system for a
person might fall in the neutral or immoral realm, there is still a common denominator for
all: nobody would want to get hurt; everyone would like to go home each and every night
with no injury.
For achieving incident and injury free environment, safety cannot be a priority; it
must be a value. The reason is simple: priorities change, while values don’t. For instance,
on a project with safety as a top priority, production pressures might lead to tighter
schedules and suddenly safety may no longer be at the top of priority list. In order to
increase productivity, unsafe acts and behaviors may become suddenly acceptable (rather
desirable) and since increased productivity would most probably lead to increased cost
while the pressure of maintaining a minimum quality is still on, safety suddenly drops to
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the very bottom of the priority list. This is why safety must be a personal value if incident
and injury free environment is to be achieved as well as sustained. In fact, safety needs to
be such a highly held personal value that one doesn’t even think about it while one is
prioritizing one’s activities.
Two (2) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.1.4. Attitudes
Attitudes are a direct reflection of a person’s character traits. These may be attributed
to intentions (the specific purpose of doing what the person is doing) and emotions (the
state of mind). Cox and Cox (1991) argue that employees’ attitudes toward safety are one
of the most important indices of safety performance. These attitudes may be positive,
negative or often in between, depending on the situation. Positive attitudes lead to safe
behaviors, while negative attitudes can lead to unsafe behaviors or risk exposure. Most of
these attitudes are established through training, while others are gained from peer groups.
Individuals differ in their attitudes and hence their behaviors.
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.1.5. Perception
Perception is the process of attaining awareness or understanding. Perceptions vary
from person to person. Different people perceive different things about the same
situation. But more than that, they assign different meanings (interpretations) to what
they perceive. Perceptions (and their interpretations) may change over time. Perceptions
may be positive, negative or often in between, depending on the situation. Positive
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perceptions lead to positive interpretations and hence safe and healthy behaviors, while
negative perceptions can lead to misinterpretations and hence unhealthy and unsafe
behaviors and/ or risk exposures. Perceptions are usually driven by personal experience
and training. Individuals differ in their perceptions and hence their behaviors.
Personal risk perception has been found to be closely associated with attitudes toward
safety (Rundmo 1997). Individuals, however, differ in their perception of risk and
willingness to take risks, as demonstrated by March and Shapira (1992). Also,
perceptions inherently lead to interpretations or misinterpretations. Interpretation refers to
a particular view or explanation, as of the environment, procedures, performance, events,
etc., provided by the use of personal experience, etc. It also refers to the conception of
another person's behavior. Results of interpretations lead to specific emotions (such as
happiness, anger, anxiety, etc.) and hence behaviors. Misinterpretation usually leads to
unhealthy and unsafe (negative) emotions and hence behaviors. That is, when one has a
positive perception and then acts on it to demonstrate the same (such as one can have a
better perception of risk in terms of low willingness to take risk), this has a positive
impact not only one one’s own behavior but also on the behavior of surrounding team
members because it is interpreted as such.
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.1.6. Interpretation
Interpretation refers to a particular view or explanation, as of the environment,
procedures, performance, events, etc., provided by the use of personal experience, etc. It
also refers to the conception of another person's behavior.
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Results of interpretations lead to specific emotions (such as happiness, anger, anxiety,
etc.). Misinterpretation usually leads to unhealthy (negative) emotions.
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.1.7. Emotion
Emotion is the complex psycho-physiological experience of an individual's state of
mind as interacting with biochemical (internal) and environmental (external) influences.
Emotion is associated with mood, temperament, personality and disposition, and
motivation.
Results of emotions are principally behaviors and emotional expressions. People
often behave in certain ways as a direct result of their emotional state. For instance, in
case of a safety emergency (such as fire), the emotional expressions and behaviors of
people might be anxiety, anger, fear, loneliness, sadness, disappointment, or depression.
Emergency emotions are typically negative responses. Unless adequately regulated,
emergency emotions are often a source of suffering.
Right or wrong, one’s mind automatically attaches emotional meaning to events. If
the level of emotions “fit” the situation, a proportionate response will likely follow and
things will run smoothly. However, over or under responses usually lead to some form of
negative impact on overall levels of happiness and relationships with others.
For example, if a supervisor happens to mention safety as a major concern repeatedly
in his or her conversation with a worker, the worker will react according to his or her own
interpretation. The interpretation that the supervisor “cares about my safety” may cause a
feeling of security, while an interpretation that the supervisor is “over-emphasizing
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safety” may cause anxiety or anger. If feeling secured, the worker may continue with the
conversation while actively participating. If anxious, the worker may stop talking and
search for a quick exit. If angry, the worker might criticize the supervisor and/or wait to
point out a flaw of his/ her. In reality, the supervisor might actually care about safety of
workers.
As workers pass through various stages of their work lives, they are exposed to many
experiences:

some

are

positive

(e.g.,

awards,

appreciations,

recognitions,

accomplishments) and others are negative (e.g., injuries, illnesses, accidents).
Organizations are one of the best sources of support during stressful times. A major way
that organization members support each other is through the appropriate expression of
emotions.
In order for organization members to respond to one another with appropriate
emotions, it is very important to be involved in each other's work lives (and personal
lives to some extent). This requires an effort on the part of each team member to be
concerned with how the others are doing, whether physically, emotionally, or spiritually.
For example, members should be observant to how their fellow workers are approaching
safety in terms of their actions and behaviors, and when they see a fellow worker putting
himself/ herself at risk, they would go and talk to that person to make sure that the person
gets the appropriate help and does not get injured. Members who are tuned in to what is
going on in each other’s work lives will be able to respond more quickly and more
appropriately.
In healthy organizations, members make a special point of listening to what others in
the team have to say, whether they be subordinates or supervisors. Sometimes one may
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not be able to fully understand why another person is experiencing a certain emotion,
such as anger or sadness. However, by asking questions and carefully listening, one can
gain a better understanding of the other person's feelings, and can thus respond in a more
helpful way.
Empathy, which is the ability to experience as one's own the feelings of another, is a
major asset in being able to respond with appropriate emotions for a given situation. For
example, a supervisor who is able to take the perspective of a worker who has just been
injured will be better equipped to respond emotionally to him or her than someone who is
very disconnected. By putting oneself in another member's shoes, one will be a better
source of strength and encouragement in both positive and negative situations.
While anger is a common emotion, if not kept under control it can lead to many
problems, including conflict, and other serious issues. When one becomes angry over a
particular incident, it is very important that the person takes some time to think about the
situation before acting. In healthy organizations, individual members express their anger
in a calm, constructive, and assertive manner.
Being able to respond to other team members with a wide range of emotions,
appropriate for each situation, is a key to successful organizational functioning. Persons
who become proficient in this area are better equipped to build strong relationships and to
deal with stressful work events as they occur.
Two (2) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
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5.4.1.8. Proficiency
Proficiency is the ability of an individual to perform a job properly. Proficiency can
be seen as a combination of knowledge, qualifications, skills and behavior used to
improve performance; or as the state or quality of being adequately or well qualified,
having the ability to perform a specific role. Proficiency is sometimes thought of as being
shown in action in a situation and context that might be different the next time a person
has to act. In emergencies, competent people may react to a situation following behaviors
they have previously found to succeed. To be competent a person would need to be able
to interpret the situation in the context and to have a repertoire of possible actions to take
and have trained in the possible actions in the repertoire. Regardless of training,
proficiency would grow through experience and the extent of an individual to learn and
adapt.
Proficiency is a major factor influencing safety levels (Simon and Piquard 1991;
Jaselskis et al., 1996; Mohamed, 2002). For achieving incident and injury free
environment, workers must have the confidence that they have the necessary knowledge,
skills and experience to perform a particular job safely. When employees have
confidence in their proficiency, they have more positive attitudes towards safety and are
more willing to cooperate among each other as well as with the management to
continuously improve the safety performance.
Seven (7) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
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5.4.2. Culture
It is easy to recognize that there are intrinsic differences among organizations in how
people interact and the values that are reflected in their work. In every organization, there
are "right ways" to do things – organizational norms. Because these characteristics
influence the way things get done in an organization, it is reasonable to assume they have
an impact on safety.
Corporate culture is instrumental in an organization’s success. It provides the
workplace environment for the employees of an organization. When people work in an
environment that they perceive as rewarding, they are more likely to perform more safely
and more productively.
The definition of corporate culture is complex when all of the facets above are
considered. For purposes of this study, corporate culture is defined as the norms, shared
values, collective beliefs, and shared understandings that are consistent throughout all
members of the corporation. These norms, values, beliefs and understandings must be
consistent throughout upper management, middle management, and field employees.
5.4.2.1. Management Commitment & Involvement
This section measures the level to which management acknowledges the significance
of safety and becomes involved in it. The role management plays in promoting safety
cannot be overemphasized. Management both creates and controls the environment in
which construction accidents occur (Smallwood 1996). Management’s commitment is a
central element of the safety environment (Zohar 1980). Management’s role has to go
beyond organizing and providing safety policies and working instructions. Several
studies show that the management’s commitment and involvement in safety is the factor
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of most importance for a satisfactory safety level (Jaselskis et al. 1996). Langford et al.
(2000) found that when employees believe that the management cares about their
personal safety, they are more willing to cooperate to improve safety performance.
Management safety commitment and involvement provide the strategic environment
conducive to achieving and sustaining incident and injury free.
Seven (7) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.2.2. Workers’ Commitment & Involvement
Workers in field operations can benefit the most from safe conditions. This section
measures workers’ commitment to safety and involvement in it. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that it is not just management participation and involvement in safety activities
that is important, but the extent to which management encourages the involvement of the
workforce (Niskanen 1994). Moreover, management must be willing to devolve some
decision-making power to the workforce by allowing them to become actively involved
in developing safety policies, rather than simply playing the more passive role of the
recipient (Williamson et al. 1997). Workers’ involvement includes such issues as
procedures for reporting injuries and potentially hazardous situations. Workers’ safety
commitment and involvement provide the work environment conducive to achieving and
sustaining incident and injury free.
Five (5) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
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5.4.2.3. Supervisory Commitment and Involvement
A successful safety management system is based on the premise that safety is both a
management responsibility and a line function. While managers help develop and
implement the program, its actual success depends upon the ability of supervisory
personnel to ensure that the program is carried out during daily operations (Agrilla 1999).
Langford et al. (2000) indicate that the more relationship-oriented supervisors are, the
more likely it is that operatives will perform safely. This section measures supervisory
commitment to safety and their involvement in it. Supervisory support in terms of
coaching, mentoring and training workers, providing them with the right equipment at the
right time, caring for their personal safety, demonstrated commitment to safety,
empowering workers to actively participate in highlighting unsafe conditions and
proposing solutions, motivating workers, etc., is a key element in developing a safe work
environment conducive to incident and injury free.
Seven (7) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.2.4. Subcontractor Commitment & Involvement
Subcontractors are often an integral part of construction projects and can have a direct
bearing on company safety. This section measures subcontractors’ involvement in the
process and their commitment to safety. Subcontractor involvement in terms of attending
safety meetings, orienting and training their employees for safety, providing their
employees with the right equipment at the right time, caring for their employees’ personal
safety, encouraging their workers to actively participate in highlighting unsafe conditions

214

and proposing solutions, etc. is a key element in developing a safe work environment
conducive to incident and injury free.
Seven (7) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.2.5. Communication
Management is expected to use a variety of formal and informal means of
communication to promote and communicate its commitment to safety (Baxendale and
Jones 2000). Simon and Piquard (1991) suggests that both management communication
and employee feedback are critical for suggesting safety improvements and reporting
near misses as well as unsafe conditions and practices.
Four (4) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.2.6. Work Environment
Work environment refers to the degree of trust and support within a group of workers,
confidence that people have in working relationships with coworkers, and the general
morale. Having a supportive work environment demonstrates workers’ concern for safety
and fosters closer ties between them. Coworkers’ attitude toward safety has been widely
included in safety climate studies (Goldberg et al. 1991). These attitudes include helping
team members stay safe and keep away from unsafe acts, etc.
Five (5) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
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5.4.2.7. Production Pressure
This section deals with the degree to which employees feel under pressure to
complete work, and the amount of time to plan and carry out work (Glendon et al. 1994).
Ahmed et al. (1999) identify the tight construction schedule as the most serious factor
that adversely affects the implementation of construction site safety in Hong Kong. This
is supported by another study (Sawacha et al. 1999), which found that productivity bonus
pay could lead workers to achieve higher production through performing unsafely.
Langford et al. (2000) state that supervisors are likely to turn a blind eye to unsafe
practices on a site due to the pressure to achieve targets set by agreed-upon programs.
They also argue that such ingrained practices of the industry (i.e., valuing expediency
over safety) have to be overcome in order for safety management to be effective.
Seven (7) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.3. Process
5.4.3.1. Safety Rules and Procedures
Management commitment to safe and healthy job sites is critical. The most
significant evidence of management commitment towards safety is a written
comprehensive safety and health program. Rules and procedures are the core component
of safety management programs. Several studies show that presence of a comprehensive
safety program is the most important factor for a satisfactory safety level (Jaselskis et al.
1996; Langford et al. 2000). A good health and safety program that is effectively
implanted can save money in a number of different ways including, holding down
insurance costs, reducing costly litigation, reducing disability claims, increasing
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productivity of employees, leading to more contracts (good reputation), reducing the
number of compliance inspections and associated penalties. The program forces the
construction companies to put their commitment to safety and health in writing; to
establish policies and set goals for safety and health; and to communicate effectively the
safety policies, procedures, and goals. Companies without a safety and health program
experience 30% more accidents than those with the programs (Goetsch, 2011). A major
factor influencing the safety level is the extent to which workers perceive safety rules and
procedures as promoted and implemented by the organization (Cox and Cheyne 2000).
Hood (1994) states that problems related to safety can frequently be traced to
inconsistently applied or nonexistent operating procedures.
Five (5) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.3.2. Site Layout Planning
The aim in site layout planning and facilities is to produce a working environment
that will maximize efficiency and minimize risks (Gibb and Knobbs 1995). Aspects of
site layout planning that need to be addressed include access and traffic routes, material
and storage handling, site offices and amenities, the construction plant, fabrication
workshops, services and facilities, and the site enclosure (Anumba and Bishop 1997).
Previous research shows that tidy and well planned (layout) sites are more likely to
provide a high level of safety performance (Sawacha et al. 1999). For the purpose of this
study, workplace hazards were defined as tangible factors that may pose risks for possible
injuries or ailments. Within this definition, hazards do not always result in accidents, but
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they lurk in work environments, waiting for the right combination of circumstances to
come together.
Four (4) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.3.3. Safety Training and Education
Safety training and education are integral to teaching safe attitudes and to providing
feedback on the effectiveness of current safety procedures. This section measures the
level and effectiveness of the safety training in terms of developing and sustaining a work
environment conducive to incident and injury free. Safety training is a major component
of jobsite safety. Safety in essence is a team process and continuous teaching and
learning at all levels is of utmost importance in order to not only keep oneself on track on
safety but also to sustain a collaborative safe environment on all job sites. As is true in
most settings, the learning process is never completed. As time goes by and as jobsite
conditions change, it is necessary to provide additional training to workers. This training
tends to be focused on the needs of individual field workers. On site specific training can
provide positive reinforcement; the workers can be informed what deficiency of safety
practices require improving and rectifying immediately. Prior research indicates that
safety training can modify worker safe behavior; the workers can understand the work
potential hazard such that they can prevent it (Hallowell and Gambatese, 2009).
Four (4) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
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5.4.3.4. Accident Investigation and Reporting
This section measures the level of effectiveness of the accident investigation and
reporting system in terms of developing a work environment conducive to incident and
injury free. The approach to accident investigation can be the difference between safe and
unsafe behaviors. A no-blame approach to accident investigation (investigating the cause
of the accident and not the person responsible) would facilitate in instilling positive
safety behaviors in workers. This approach further helps in isolating and pinpointing the
cause of the accident. This information can then be used to prevent future accidents,
which should be the primary purpose of accident investigation. This approach and
importance of accident investigation has been attested by the following from the Society
of Manufacturing Engineers: The primary reason for investigating an accident is not to
identify a scapegoat, but to determine the cause of the accident. The investigation
concentrates on gathering factual information about the details that led to the accident. If
investigations are conducted properly, there is the added benefit of uncovering problems
that did not directly lead to the accident. This information benefits the ongoing effort of
reducing the likelihood of accidents. As problems are revealed during investigation,
action items and improvements that can prevent similar accidents from happening in the
future will be easier to identify than at any (other) time. Hence an effective accident
investigation and reporting system can provide continuous and sustainable improvement
in safety.
Four (4) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
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5.4.3.5. Safety Incentive Mechanisms
Safety incentives are defined as any gifts or rewards that are given out on a regular
basis. This can be a variety of rewards from points to earn company merchandise to
actual cash or cash equivalents. This section measures the company’s use of incentives to
improve safety performance.
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
5.4.3.6. Safety Disincentive Mechanisms
A disincentive is any form of punishment. It can be anything from an oral reprimand,
to a written reprimand, to garnishment of wages or termination of employment. This
section measures the company’s use of disincentives for unsafe behaviors to improve
safety performance.
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization.
The three major categories defined above with their corresponding subcategories
were altogether broken down into 83 measurable characteristics (questionnaire items)
defining total safety. This is depicted in Table 5.1.
The next section (section 5.5) provides justification for the selection of safe work
behavior as the safety performance indicator for the study.
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Table 5.1: Number of Survey Items Pertaining to Safety Dimension Subcategories
Safety Dimension Subcategory

Survey
Item(s)

Personal Intention & Commitment
Personal Value System
Personal Attitude & Perception
Personal Interpretation & Emotion
Personal Proficiency
Management Commitment &
Involvement
Workers’ Commitment & Involvement
Supervisory Commitment and
Involvement
Subcontractor Commitment &
Involvement
Communication
Work Environment
Safety Accountability
Production Pressure
Cultural Norms
Shared Values
Collective Beliefs/ Shared
Understanding
Safety Rules and Procedures
Site Layout Planning
Safety Training and Education
Accident Investigation and Reporting
Safety Incentive Mechanisms
Safety Disincentive Mechanisms

2
2
2
3
7
7

5
4
4
4
1
1

Total

83

5
7
3
4
5
2
7
3
3
2

5.5. Safe Work Behavior as Safety Performance Indicator
This study adopts safe work behaviors (observable actions) as the safety performance
indicator. The justification for the selection of safe work behaviors as the variable
measuring safety performance for construction organizations follows. This justification is
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based on the premise that leading indicators are better measures of safety performance
than lagging indicators.
Traditionally, safety performance has been measured by such metrics as the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recordable injury rate (RIR); or
the experience modification rating (EMR) on workers’ compensation. These have served
the purpose of providing information by which contractors could assess their safety
performance in terms of construction industry averages on those metrics or to make
comparisons with other firms. These have also been used widely by OSHA, insurance
companies, facility owners, and other parties involved in the construction industry.
These traditional measures if safety are after-the-fact measures; namely, that safety is
measured after injuries have already occurred. These metrics provide historical
information about some aspect of the safety performance that has occurred and rely
primarily on some form of accident or injury data. These measures are labeled reactive,
trailing, downstream, or lagging indicators because they rely on retrospective data.
Focusing on these measures (e.g., accident rates and compensation costs) often means
that the success of safety is measured by the levels of system failure (Cohen 2002). While
lagging measurements can provide data about incidents after-the-fact, the question
remains regarding the value of these metrics as a means of predicting workplace safety
performance. Grabowski et al. (2007) note that a growing number of safety professionals
question the value of lagging indicators and argue that lagging indicators do not provide
sufficient information or insight to effectively avoid future accidents. Mengolini &
Debarberis (2008) support this position stating that past performance is a poor predictor
of future results. Glendon and Mckenna (1995) identify a number of reasons why
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accident data, or similar outcome data, are poor safety indicators. The main problems are
that such data are insufficiently sensitive, of dubious accuracy, retrospective, and they
ignore risk exposure. Although accident statistics are widely used throughout the
construction industry, Laitinen et al. (1999) state that it is almost impossible to use
accidents as a safety indicator for a single construction site. This is because of random
variation, where many sites will have no accidents, and it is not possible to determine
whether these sites with zero accidents are safer than sites with four or five accidents.
Recognizing such shortcomings, many advocate a shift to using proactive, upstream,
or leading indicators (Flin et al., 2000; Cooper, 2000; Mohamed, 2002; Choudhry and
Fang, 2005; Hinze, 2005). In contrast, leading indicators are measures which are not
necessarily historical in nature but rather can be used as predictors of future safety
performance. Toellner (2001) characterized leading indicators as measurements linked to
actions taken to prevent accidents. Grabowski et al. (2007) described leading indicators
as conditions, events, or measures that precede an incident and has a predictive value in
regards to an accident/incident/unsafe conditions. Hinze et al. (2010) characterize leading
indicators of safety performance as consisting of a set of selected measures that describe
the level of effectiveness of the safety process. Leading indicators measure the building
blocks of the safety culture of a project or company. When one or more of these
measures suggest that some aspect of the safety process is weak or weakening,
interventions can be implemented to improve the safety process and, thereby positively
impact the safety process before any negative occurrences (injuries) are sustained.
In view of the above reasons, this study adopts safe work behaviors (observable
actions) as a leading indicator to measure safety performance. This is based on the
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premise that unsafe behavior is intrinsically linked to workplace accidents (Thompson et
al. 1998). It is also supported by findings from studies and models developed based on
the unsafe behavior concept (Smith and Arnold, 1991; Staley, 1996; Krause, 1997). It is
noteworthy that more than 80% of all workplace accidents and incidents are attributed to
unsafe behaviors (HSE, 2005).
Two (2) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this
subcategory as a measure of safety performance in a construction organization. These
have been adopted from previous research (Mohamed, 2002).
The survey development, administration and validation process is discussed in detail
in the next three sections (sections 5.6 - 5.8).
5.6 Survey Development
A comprehensive literature review was performed to discover interior and exterior
characteristics that influence safety. These characteristics were then organized into a
hierarchical structure and decomposed into measurable charedacteristics using rigorous
multiattribute techniques (Miller 1970), as previously discussed. A questionnaire was
then developed from the multiattribute hierarchy through tested survey and attitude
measurement procedures (Oppenheim 2001). All safety characteristics were measured
through a five-point Likert-type response format. Items, relating to each of the
dimensions, were used in the form of statements to measure individual dimensions under
investigation. To the extent possible, the different statements used in developing the
questionnaires were drawn upon scales that had been previously used by researchers (Cox
and Cox 1991; Tomas and Oliver 1995; Glazner et al. 1999; Cox and Cheyne 2000; Lee
and Harrison 2000, Mohamed, 2002). A limited number of statements, however, were
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slightly modified to reflect the nature of the construction industry. Participants were
asked to endorse the statements using a five-point Likert-type scale (from 1=‘‘strongly
disagree’’ to 5=‘‘strongly agree’’).
Subsequent to the development of the survey instrument, pilot surveys were
conducted via face-to-face meetings with select professionals including short-listed
experts from construction contracting organizations representing their top management,
middle/ project management, supervisors, foremen and workers, all having expertise in or
exposure to safety issues. The intent of these pilot surveys was to pretest the
questionnaire on select professionals so as to obtain such version of the survey (after
appropriate modification as and if needed) that would achieve acceptable levels of
measurement reliability and validity. With input from these local industry professionals,
the questionnaires were appropriately modified to best capture the information specific to
research needs. The questionnaire contained, in its final form, a total of 85 statements (83
statements listed in Part I to measure safety and 2 statements listed in Part II to measure
safety performance). A number of negatively worded statements were presented in the
scale, as recommended in the measurement literature (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991).
5.7 Survey Administration
5.7.1. Method
A quantitative research method was chosen for the study, since it was exploratory in
nature. A survey methodology was selected to collect data regarding the four dimensions
of safety because it offered the best opportunity to capture a cross section of the beliefs,
values, systems and behaviors in multiple companies in a timely and efficient manner.
Data gathering is complex. So, the decision on which survey method to use depends on
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the particular research topic, characteristics of the sample, and availability of staff and
resource (Fowler 1993). Assessing the methodologies for data collection against the
objective of this phase of the research led to the determination that questionnaires send by
electronic mail and postal mail with as-necessary follow-up telephone calls were the most
suitable for this phase of research work. Because of the nature of structured interviews, it
was determined that these would best be achieved by in-person interviews, However,
because of geographic constraints many were done by telephone. For data gathering,
telephone or facsimile correspondence were used only when the response to the
questionnaire was behind scheduled due dates, or when the respondents contacted the
researcher with questions or requests for further information.
An exhaustive list of industry contractors was prepared as a first step of survey
administration. Various published and unpublished sources were used to develop a list of
commercial construction contractors in the U.S. construction industry. This identification
was done, in particular, from the following sources:
1. Engineering News Record (ENR) publications, including the list of Top 500 U.S.
Contractors;
2. The general contractors list published by the Associated General Contractors
(AGC) of America; and
3. A customized list of general contractors and subcontractors prepared from the
yellow pages, trade magazines and other published and unpublished sources.
5.7.2. Data Sample
The theoretical population of this phase of research was the top management, senior
project managers, safety managers/officers, supervisors, foremen, and construction
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workers of all general contracting firms as well as subcontracting firms in the United
States. No limits on the size of construction firms or annual turnover of the construction
firm were established. There were not a minimum number of years of experience an
individual should have to qualify to be a participant. This population description is in line
with the major objective of the research – developing a strategic safety improvement
model for construction contracting (and subcontracting) firms in the United States based
on an integral approach to safety.
The final data sample was selected by a combination of sampling methods. The
researcher first used purposive sampling. In purposive sampling “the participants are
hand-picked from the accessible population” (Gliner & Morgan, 2000). The participants
were selected because of their experience as senior corporate and project managers for
commercial construction firms. Firstly, the liaison of Florida International University
(FIU) with the local construction industry was utilized for selecting appropriate
construction companies. Secondly, since many of the government organization (counties
and cities) employees are students at FIU Construction Management (CM), Civil and
Environmental Engineering (CEE) and other engineering departments, these employees
were approached first hand for their voluntary contribution in the research. Thirdly, the
CM department at FIU also has an advisory committee made up of a number of large
commercial construction contractors in the South Florida region. These advisory
committee members were also approached first hand with the request to voluntarily
contribute to the research.
Convenience sampling was also used to solicit participants for this phase of the
research. In convenience sampling, “the participants are selected on the basis of
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convenience rather than chosen in a serious attempt to select participants who are
representative of the theoretical population” (Gliner & Morgan, 2000). Senior managers
working for companies in Florida to which the researcher had access were given the
opportunity to volunteer for participation. In some cases the companies were known to
the researcher and in other cases the companies were randomly selected from the three
sources identified above.
Snowball sampling was also used. “Snowball sampling is a modification of
convenience or accidental sampling …. People are asked for additional references”
(Gliner & Morgan, 2000).
The major chunk of data was collected using random sampling. According to good
survey practice (Tull and Hawkins, 1990), a letter was sent to the Chief
Executive/Managing Director of companies randomly selected from the three sources of
identification indicated above. This letter was sent to introduce the research and request
voluntary input. Referred to in the letter was a request for names of the key personnel
associated with safety management processes and safety decision making in the
companies, who would subsequently be canvassed for opinions.
5.7.3. Delimitations
The focus was delimited to general contractors and specialty contractors with major
experience in commercial building construction. In future studies, research may be
expanded to other types of construction such as residential, heavy-civil, or industrial.
5.7.4. Survey Distribution and Response
The surveys were carried out over the period extending from August 2009 to March
2010. The questionnaires were posted to named individuals in the months of August-
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December 2009, with a suggested date for return at the end of October 2009-February
2009. Questionnaire returns were received over the next few months, in some cases after
a phone call reminder.
The final data sample included general contractors, structural steel contractors,
poured concrete contractors, precast concrete contractors, masonry contractors, electrical
contractors, mechanical and HVAC contractors, etc. representing 97 different companies
(31 general contractors and 66 specialty contractors) working in the building construction
sector (commercial and institutional). These 97 companies selected shared many common
traits. They were mostly medium to large size firms on the basis of their employee counts
and annual turnovers; they all performed all or some of their own work (such as
carpentry, concrete placement, masonry work, etc.); they all primarily concentrate on
large commercial buildings; and all were willing to actively take part in data collection.
It is worth mentioning here that 69 of the 97 (71%) companies which responded to
the survey were the same as for surveys conducted in phase I of the research (chapter 5).
Thus good consistency of data was maintained through the two phases of the research.
Over 2200 questionnaires were distributed to the companies. A total of 723
questionnaires were returned. However, 37 questionnaires were either determined to be
outliers or were discarded owing to possibility of bias. A total of 686 questionnaires were
input into a database to be modeled for analysis. Overall survey response rate is depicted
in Table 5.2. Table 5.3 provides a breakdown of responses in terms of organizational
participation.
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Table 5.2: Breakdown of Responses
Total
questionnaires
distributed
2200

Questionnaires
returned
723

Total number
of potential
responses
723

Total valid
responses
received
686

Percentage
of valid
responses
33.53%

Table 5.3: Breakdown of responses with respect to type of organization
Type of Organization
General Contractor
Subcontractor
Total

Approached

Responded

147
195
311

31
66
102

Response
%
28.91%
35.52%
32.80%

The survey response rates depicted in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (34.81% for individual
participation and 32.80% for organizational participation) are very good for a
construction industry questionnaire survey and should not be considered as biased
(Akintoye and Macleod). In similar type of surveys, Panthi et al. (2007) received a
response rate of 19.4%, Ahmed and Azhar (2004) received 30.4% and Wang et al. (2004)
received a very low response rate of 7.75%. Baker (1998) reported that statistically
reliable conclusions can be obtained from a sample size of 20 or more. Moreover, the
conclusions drawn on the basis of the responses were further verified through interviews
with experts, and hence can be considered as unbiased.
Figure 5.2 depicts information about distribution of respondent organizations in terms
of their nature of work.
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Figure 5.2: Type of Respondent Organizations
Figure 5.3 depicts information about the size of respondent organizations. The
organization size is decided on the basis of number of employees as follows: 050small; 51-250medium; and >250large. The results indicate that the majority of
respondents are medium and large size companies. The annual turnover of these
companies varies from $5 million to over $500 million.
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Small Companies
13%

Medium
Companies
35%

Large
Companies
52%

Figure 5.3: Size of Respondent Organizations

Field personal (supervisors, foremen, front line workers and helpers), middle
management, and upper management all completed the questionnaire. Table 5.4 provides
a share of respondents with respect to their work positions and organization type.
Table 5.4: Share of respondents with respect to their work positions and organization type

Type of
Organization
General
Contractor
Subcontractor
Total
(%)

Respondent Share (No. of respondents)
Upper
Middle
Field
Total (%)
Management
Management Personnel
44

67

126

237 (34.5%)

93

117

239

449 (65.5%)

137
(20.0%)

184
(26.8%)

365
(53.2%)

Demographic information for the survey respondents is presented in Tables 5.5(a) –
5.5(d).
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Table 5.5(a): Participants’ Construction Experience (Upper Management)

Years in Construction
Years as Executives

Average
Years
27.13
18.24

Most
Experience
36
28

Least
Experience
14
6

Table 5.5(b): Participants’ Construction Experience (Middle Management)

Years in Construction
Years as Managers

Average
Years
24.67
15.49

Most
Experience
32
24

Least
Experience
12
5

Table 5.5(c): Participants’ Construction Experience (Supervisors/ Foremen)

Years in Construction
Years as Supervisor/
Foremen

Average
Years
20.42
14.68

Most
Experience
37
30

Least
Experience
11
7

Table 5.5(d): Participants’ Construction Experience (Workers)

Years in Construction
Years in Current Position

Average
Years
14.78
13.59

Most
Experience
23
20

Least
Experience
7
4

Table 5.6 presents the educational qualification of the participants. This wide range of
formal education among the participants did not produce a wide range of differences in
the data.
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Table 5.6: Participants’ Education
PostNumber of
Master’s
Participants
Degree
Upper
Management
Middle
Management
Field
Personnel
Total
(%)

Master’s
Degree

Bachelor’s Associate’s
Degree
Degree

Some
College
(No
Degree)

High
School
Degree

137

9

33

69

14

8

4

184

12

48

79

22

14

9

365

0

22

55

188

68

32

686

21
(3.06%)

103
(15.01%)

203
(29.59%)

224
(32.65%)

90
45
(13.12%) (6.56%)

Table 5.6 shows that almost 80% of the participants had postsecondary degrees. A
further diagnosis of the major concentrations for the postsecondary degrees held by these
participants indicated that, including Civil Engineering and Architecture, 64% of the
participants with a postsecondary degree had that degree in a construction related
concentration (such as construction management, construction engineering and the like),
19% of the participants had that degree in business concentration (such as business
administration and the like), while the remaining had diverse academic backgrounds
ranging from majors in English, Psychology, Education, etc.
Overall, the data set (Table 5.6) accounts for a reasonable representation of the
companies participating in this study, and produces statistically significant results as
described later in this study.
It is worth mentioning that although safety perceptions are inherently individual, the
safety dimensions questionnaire was developed to operate at both the individual and the
group level. Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) argue that over time and through social
information processing influences, individual perceptions can become shared and, as a
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result, can be aggregated and used to describe a group as a whole. In other words, this
study expects that perceptions of safety and its determinants would be relatively
homogeneous within the groups, constituting shared perceptions, and therefore could be
aggregated to the group level of analysis. Therefore, the research model was tested using
the total sample (combining all responses solicited from all organizations). This same
approach has been used by previous researchers as well (such as Mohamed, 2002).
In accordance with established survey procedures and in recognition of the sensitive
nature of the data collected, strict confidentiality was maintained during this survey
research and no identities have been divulged.
5.8. Survey Validation
Research validation was done in three steps.
Firstly, it was confirmed that the survey was filled by personnel with appropriate
profile and experience. Construction industry experience of respondents (Table 5.5)
ranged from 4 to over 37 years. On the basis of their position and work experience, it was
inferred that the respondents had adequate knowledge of safety related activities in their
organizations as well as in the industry and their responses were a reasonable
representation of required data.
Secondly, to avoid the problem of bias, it was decided not to use data provided by an
organization with less than 5 responses survey. Based on this decision, data from nine (9)
companies was discarded for survey (a total of 23 responses were received from these
companies).
Moreover, 14 questionnaires were determined to be outliers and were also decided to
be discarded. Hence a total of 37 questionnaires were discarded from the analysis.
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Thirdly, the conclusions drawn on the basis of the responses were further verified
through interviews with experts to ascertain that they were unbiased. Fourteen (14) faceto-face unstructured interviews were conducted in the vicinity of Miami, Florida from a
selected cross-section of local construction industry experts to discuss the results and
validate the findings. The targeted audience included top management, middle
management and field personnel representing leading contractors and subcontractors
working in the commercial building construction sector in the South Florida region.
The next section (section 5.9) details the employment of confirmatory factor analysis
technique on the 83 measureable total safety characteristics to uncover the latent structure
(underlying factors).
5.9 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
As identified in section 5.4, the three major safety dimensions along with their
corresponding subcategories were broken down into 83 measurable indicators (survey
items) defining total safety. The analysis technique used on the data set was structural
equation modeling (SEM). This is explained in detail in chapter 6 Before the SEM
analysis began, a rough estimate of the latent variables (constructs) was derived from a
confirmatory factor analysis. Factor analysis is a tool used to uncover the latent structure
(underlying dimensions) of a set of variables. It reduces attribute space from a larger
number of variables to a smaller number of factors. Confirmatory factor analysis seeks to
determine if the number of factors and the loadings of measured (indicator) variables on
them conform to what is expected on the basis of pre-established theory. Indicator
variables are selected on the basis of prior theory and factor analysis is used to see if they
load as predicted on the expected number of factors. Underlying dimensions (constructs)
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imply ways to combine variables, in this case, aspects of safety dimensions, thereby
simplifying subsequent analysis (Hamilton 1992; SPSS 2001). A principal factor analysis
(PFA) using the varimax rotation method with Kaiser normalization was utilized. The
rotation converged in 13 iterations. PFA works as follows.
PFA is used when the research purpose is theory confirmation and causal modeling. It
analyzes a correlation matrix in which the diagonal contains the communalities. PFA
accounts for the covariation among variables. Factors reflect the common variance of the
variables, excluding unique (variable-specific) variance. That is, manifest variables may
be conceptualized as reflecting a combination of common variance explained by the
factors, plus unique variance not explained by the factors. Factors seek to reproduce the
correlations of the variables. That is, PFA accounts for the covariation among the
variables. PFA seeks the least number of factors which can account for the covariance
shared by a set of variables. For the first factor, PFA creates a linear equation which
extracts the maximum covariance from the variables; for the second component PFA
removes the covariance explained by the first component and creates a second linear
equation which extracts the maximum remaining covariance; etc., continuing until the
factors can explain all the covariance in a set of variables.
In confirmatory factor analysis, loadings should be 0.7 or higher to confirm that
independent variables identified a priori are represented by a particular factor, on the
rationale that the 0.7 level corresponds to about half of the variance in the indicator being
explained by the factor (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
Based on the factor analysis results, the 83 measureable characteristics defined in the
22 subcategories of the 3 principal categories of factor sets were reduced into 6 constructs
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(latent variables/ factors/ underlying dimensions), viz., (1) Safety commitment (C); (2)
Personal safety character and competence (I); (3) Supportive work environment (E); (4)
Work pressure (P); (5) Safety program (R); and (6) Safety strategic concern (S).
Obtained values for the measured items in these 6 constructs exceeded the threshold
of 0.7, with majority of loadings in the range of 0.75–0.85. Note that the 83 indicators
(survey items) constituting the six constructs span across multiple branches of the
multiattribute hierarchy as shown in Table 5.7. The number in each cell of Table 5.7
indicates the number of responses (indicators/ items in questionnaire) influenced by a
particular construct. This is established by sound theoretical basis (Molenaar et al., 2009;
Lo 1996; Groover and Krause 1993; Preston and Topf, 1994; Hodson and Graham, 1998;
Mohamed, 2002) and confirmed by principal factor analysis.
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Table 5.7: Safety Dimension Subcategories Constituting the Model Constructs
Model
Constructs
Safety
Dimension
Subcategories

C

I

Personal Intention & Commitment
Personal Value System
Personal Attitude & Perception
Personal Interpretation & Emotion
Personal Proficiency
Management Commitment &
Involvement
Workers’ Commitment &
Involvement
Supervisory Commitment and
Involvement
Subcontractor Commitment &
Involvement
Communication
Work Environment
Safety Accountability
Production Pressure
Cultural Norms
Shared Values
Collective Beliefs/ Shared
Understanding
Safety Rules and Procedures
Site Layout Planning
Safety Training and Education
Accident Investigation and
Reporting
Safety Incentive Mechanisms
Safety Disincentive Mechanisms

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
7

Total
(Items in each construct)

E

P

R

S

Total
(Items in each
subcategory)
2
2
2
3
7

1

3

2

2

7

2

2

1

5

2

3

1

7

2

1

3

2
5
1

2

1

4
5
2
7
3
3

1

1

1

5
1
2

1
1

5
4
4

1

2

1

4

1

1
1

13 13 22 10 11 14

83

1
1

1
1

1

1
7
1

1
2

1

*C=safety commitment; I=personal safety character and competence; E=supportive work
environment; P=work pressure; R=safety program; and S = safety strategic concern
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5.10 Conclusion
This research has adopted an integral approach to safety as a means of measuring and
improving total safety in a construction organization. This approach decomposed total
safety into four principal dimensions, viz., person, culture, behavior and process.
Extensive literature review and expert input provided the basis to further decompose the
four safety dimensions into 83 measurable attributes using a multiattribute analysis
technique, which formed the basis of a questionnaire to measure total safety. Safe work
behavior was selected as a measure of a company’s safety performance for the study.
Based on the survey responses, statistical relationships between total safety dimensions
and safety performance (measured by safe work behavior) were revealed through a series
of six latent variables (factors) that describe the total safety environment of a construction
organization. This was achieved using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) which reduced
the attribute space from a larger number of safety sub-categories to a smaller number of
underlying factors. These factors (6) have been concluded to be most suitable and
appropriate for measurement and continuous improvement of total safety in a
construction organization and hence play a pivotal role in achieving and sustaining the
goal of zero accidents. These factors (and their corresponding indicators) form the basis
of a strategic safety improvement model for the construction industry, the development
and discussion of which is discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter established the factors (latent variables/ constructs) determining
the total safety environment of a construction contracting organization, which are most
suitable and appropriate for measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role
in achieving the goal of zero accidents. This chapter discusses the development of a
strategic safety improvement model based on the identified factors and their associated
indicators. This constitutes achieving objectives 3 of the study, i.e. to develop a strategic
model to measure the effect of the key determinants of total safety (the critical factors) on
a construction organization’s safety performance.
From data collected in phase II of the research (chapter 5), a research base model was
developed. Following this, a structural equation model (SEM) was estimated to identify
latent constructs that describe total safety and to quantify relationships among them and
between these total safety determinants and safety performance of a construction
organization. A detailed description of the modeling process is presented as a basis for
the presentation of the SEM findings. Latent variables that describe total safety are
discussed and so is the correlation between total safety dimensions and the safety
performance of a company.
Finally, the strategic framework is presented along with a discussion of the key
components of the framework and their utility towards strategically improving safety in
the construction industry for achieving and sustaining the goal of zero accidents.
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6.2 Model Constructs and Hypotheses
The research base model follows the broad hypothesis that safe work behaviors (and,
thus, their reciprocal, unsafe behaviors) are consequences of the existing safety
dimensions in a construction organization, which is determined by the three interdependent sets of factors identified earlier — i.e., person, culture and process. Therefore,
the model has two distinct components – (1) determinants of safety (person, culture, and
process sets of factors); and (2) measurement of safety (safe work behaviors). Although a
number of recent studies have investigated the impact of one or more elements of the
above factors on construction safety levels (Rowlinson 1997; Lingard and Rowlinson
1998; Sawacha et al. 1999; Mohamed, 2002; Molenaaar, 2009), their integral relationship
with safe work behaviors, specifically, has not been measured before. Also, the
interrelationships among these factors defining total safety, in an integrative or sequential
fashion, have not been analyzed before. Description of these constructs and the
hypotheses associated with each path of the model are discussed in the following subsections.
6.2.1. Safety Commitment (C)
The construct safety commitment influenced the responses to 9 questions on the
survey questionnaire. These variables span across 8 branches of the multiattribute
hierarchy, including: personal intention & commitment (1), personal value system (1),
personal attitude & perception (1), management commitment & involvement (2),
workers’ commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (1),
cultural norms (1), and shared values (1) All 9 variables share the common thread of the
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company’s commitment to safety. Thus, hypothesis 1 – The greater the level of
company’s commitment toward safety, the more positive the safe work behaviors.
6.2.2. Personal Safety Character and Competence (I)
The construct personal safety character and competence influenced the responses to
7 questions on the survey questionnaire. These variables span across 5 branches of the
multiattribute hierarchy, including: personal intention & commitment (1), personal value
system (1), personal interpretation & emotion (1), personal proficiency (3), and safety
training & education (1). All 7 variables share the common thread of a person’s safety
character and competence. Thus, hypothesis 2 – The better one’s safety character and
competence, the more positive the safe work behaviors.
6.2.3. Supportive Work Environment (E)
The construct supportive work environment influenced the responses to 10 questions
on the survey questionnaire. These variables span across 8 branches of the multiattribute
hierarchy, including: management

commitment

&

involvement

(1),

workers’

commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (2),
subcontractor

commitment

and

involvement

(1),

communication

(2),

safety

accountability (1), collective beliefs/ shared understanding (1), and site layout planning
(1). All 10 variables share the common thread of a supportive work environment. Thus,
hypothesis 3 – The higher the level of support provided by the constituent members of the
work environment, the more positive the safe work behaviors.
6.2.4. Work Pressure (P)
The construct work pressure influenced the responses to 6 questions on the survey
questionnaire. These variables span across 4 branches of the multiattribute hierarchy,
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including: personal interpretation & emotion (1), supervisory commitment &
involvement (1), production pressure (3), and cultural norms (1). All 6 variables share the
common thread of work pressure. Thus, hypothesis 4 – The higher the perception of
valuing expediency over safety, the less positive the safe work behaviors.
6.2.5. Safety Program (R)
The construct safety program influenced the responses to 8 questions on the survey
questionnaire. These variables span across 5 branches of the multiattribute hierarchy,
including: safety rules and procedures (3), site layout planning (1), safety training and
education (2), accident investigation and reporting (1), and safety disincentive
mechanisms (1). All 8 variables share the common thread of safety program. Thus,
hypothesis 5 – The better the implementation of safety program, the more positive the
safe work behaviors.
6.2.6. Safety Strategic Concern
The construct safety strategic concern influenced the responses to 10 questions on the
survey questionnaire. These variables span across 9 branches of the multiattribute
hierarchy, including: management

commitment

&

involvement

(2),

workers’

commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (1),
subcontractor commitment & involvement (1), communication (1), safety accountability
(1), safety training and education (1), accident investigation and reporting (1), and safety
incentive mechanisms. All 10 variables share the common thread of strategic concern to
safety. Thus, hypothesis 6 – The higher the safety strategic concern, the more positive the
safe work behaviors.
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6.2.7. Safe Work Behaviors
The last construct relates to safe work behavior. The model hypothesizes that total
safety dimensions affect safe work behavior. Grubb and Swanson (1999) report that
construction workers acknowledge the difference between unsafe behaviors that might
result in injury to the individual (who is engaged in the action) and those that might lead
to others being injured. They conclude that workers are more willing to confront someone
whose behavior is posing a threat to coworkers’ safety. As a result, two items (Brown et
al., 2000; Mohamed, 2002) were selected to assess the dependent construct of safe work
behavior. Respondents were asked to indicate, on average, the percentage of time
workers and their coworkers follow all of the safety procedures for the jobs that they
perform. Thus, hypothesis 7 – High level of total safety is positively associated with
higher level of safe work behavior.
6.3 Data Modeling
The research hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling (SEM). The
SEM is a statistical analysis tool used largely by sociologists and psychologists. It is,
however, underutilized in construction engineering and management research despite its
distinct advantages (Molenaar et al. 2009). SEM is a multivariate methodology that
allows the simultaneous examination of the relationships among independent and
dependent constructs within a theoretical model (Kilne 1998). The following sub-section
provides a brief background of the SEM analysis technique.
6.3.1. SEM Analysis Technique
Many of the problems, or research issues, in construction engineering and
management involve the measurement of concepts that are not easily quantified. For
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instance, personal appreciation of risk, top management commitment, teamwork,
personal competence, and supervisory support are concepts that previous research has
proven to be critical to developing a total safety culture in an organization but difficult
for researchers to measure. There has been a trend toward the use of multivariate
regression techniques to measure such concepts (Russell and Jaselskis 1992; Sanders and
Thomas 1993; Diekmann and Girard 1995; and Molenaar and Songer 1998). Although
standardized multivariate regression analysis techniques have proven successful, there is
a fundamental flaw with their use. A basic premise of standard regression techniques is
that independent variables used to build the regression models are measured without
error. This is often not the case. For instance, top management commitment is not
directly measurable and is typically measured through ‘‘surrogate’’ variables that make
up management commitment (i.e., management’s expression of concern to safety issues,
its decisive actions when a safety concern is raised, its quick response to correct safety
problems, etc.). Because many of these surrogate variables do not perfectly measure the
prime variable of interest, technical problems in model estimation arise, resulting in
diminished ability to conduct statistical inference with a standard regression model.
Structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis can be thought of as an extension of
standardized regression modeling that deals explicitly with poorly measured independent
variables. Structural equation models are ideally suited for many of the research issues
dealt with in construction engineering and management.
This research specifically utilizes the application of SEM to construction safety. The
causes of worker safe (and their reciprocal unsafe) behaviors stem from multiple factors,
which are not all directly measurable (termed latent variables). The SEM analysis offers a
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method for modeling latent variables by explicitly including errors of measurement
brought about by surrogate variables, thus providing insight into the factors that can be
used to understand the susceptibility of a worker to unsafe behaviors and hence accidents.
The use of SEM allows for a richer analysis of the causes of worker unsafe behaviors.
The SEM analysis of the data set helps identify new relationships among project
variables that lend new insight into the measurement of construction safety.
Structural equation modeling (SEM) encompasses such diverse statistical techniques
as path analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, causal modeling with latent variables, and
even analysis of variance and multiple linear regression. The following sub-sections
feature an introduction to the logic of SEM, the assumptions and required input for SEM
analysis, and the procedure to perform SEM analyses using the AMOS (Analysis of
Moment Structures) software, which has been utilized for this study.
6.3.1.1. SEM Analysis Overview
The basic approach to performing a SEM analysis is as given in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Basic Approach to Performing a SEM Analysis
The researcher first specifies a model based on theory, then determines how to
measure constructs, collects data, and then inputs the data into the SEM software
package. The package fits the data to the specified model and produces the results, which
include overall model fit statistics and parameter estimates. Note that the same approach
has been used for the research in hand.
The SEM process can be schematically shown as Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: SEM Process Schematic
The input to the analysis is usually a covariance matrix of measured variables such as
survey item scores in case of this research. In practice, the data analyst usually supplies
SEM program with raw data (survey item scores), and the program converts these data
into covariances and means for its own use.
The model consists of a set of relationships among the measured variables. These
relationships are then expressed as restrictions on the total set of possible relationships.
The results feature overall indexes of model fit as well as parameter estimates,
standard errors, and test statistics for each free parameter in the model.
6.3.1.2 SEM Nomenclature
SEM has a language all its own.
Indicators are observed variables, sometimes called manifest variables or reference
variables. These variables are directly measured by researchers. In case of this research,
indicators are items in the survey instrument.
Four or more indicators are recommended and three are acceptable and common
practice. The prime consideration in selecting indicators is whether they are theoretically
sound and reliably measured. By convention, indicators should have pattern coefficients
(factor loadings) of .7 or higher on their latent factors. In case of research in hand, there
are a minimum of 6 indicators per factor, and all factor loadings are .7 or higher.
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Latent variables are the unobserved variables or constructs or factors which are not
directly measured but are inferred by the relationships or correlations among their
respective indicators in the analysis. This statistical estimation is accomplished in much
the same way that an exploratory factor analysis infers the presence of latent factors from
shared variance among observed variables. Latent variables include independent,
mediating, as well as dependent variables. The representation of latent variables based on
their relation to observed indicators is one of the defining characteristics of SEM. In case
of research in hand, the latent variables defining total safety are: safety commitment,
personal safety character and competence, supportive work environment, work pressure,
safety program, safety strategic concern, and safe work behavior.
It is important to note here that indicators cannot be combined arbitrarily to form
latent variables. For instance, combining gender, race, or other demographic variables to
form a latent variable called "background factors" would be improper because it would
not represent any single underlying continuum of meaning. The confirmatory factor
analysis step in SEM is a test of the meaningfulness of latent variables and their
indicators. In case of research in hand, confirmatory factor analysis was done (as given in
section 5.9) to combine indicators to form latent factors.
Exogenous or upstream variables are independent variables with no prior causal
variable (though they may be correlated with other exogenous variables, depicted by a
double-headed arrow). In fact it is customary to assume that exogenous variables are
correlated (connected by a double-headed covariance arrow) unless there is theoretical
reason not to. If two exogenous variables are connected by a covariance arrow, there
cannot also be a straight (regression path) arrow between them.
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Endogenous or downstream variables are dependent variables and can be either
ultimate dependent variables (variables which are effects of other exogenous or
mediating variables, and are not causes of other endogenous variables), or mediating
variables (variables which are effects of other exogenous or mediating variables, and are
also causes of other mediating or ultimate dependent variables). Endogenous variables
are on the receiving end of single-headed straight arrows indicating a regression path and
implying a causal relationship. The path to the endogenous variable may come from an
exogenous variable or another endogenous variable.
The key distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables comes from the
fact that whether the variable regresses on another variable or not. As in regression the
dependent variable (DV) regresses on the independent variable (IV), meaning that the
DV is being predicted by the IV. In SEM terminology, other variables regress on
exogenous variables. Exogenous variables can be recognized in a graphical version of the
model, as the variables sending out arrowheads, denoting which variable it is predicting.
A variable that regresses on a variable (compare with a DV in regression analysis) is
always an endogenous variable, even if this same variable is also used as a variable to be
regressed on (now it can be more appropriately called a mediating endogenous variable).
Endogenous variables are recognized as the receivers of a single-headed arrow in the
model.
In case of research in hand, the exogenous variables defining total safety are: safety
commitment, personal safety character and competence, supportive work environment,
work pressure, safety program, and safety strategic concern, and the endogenous variable
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defining safety performance (in fact an ultimate dependent variable) is safe work
behavior.
It is important to note here that SEM is more general than regression. In particular a
variable can act as both independent and dependent variable.
6.3.1.3 SEM Modeling Approaches
SEM is usually viewed as a confirmatory rather than exploratory procedure, using one of
three approaches:
1. Strictly confirmatory approach: A model is tested using SEM goodness-of-fit tests
to determine if the pattern of variances and covariances in the data is consistent
with a structural (path) model specified by the researcher. However as other
unexamined models may fit the data as well or better, an accepted model is only a
not-disconfirmed model.
2. Alternative models approach: One may test two or more causal models to
determine which has the best fit. There are many goodness-of-fit measures,
reflecting different considerations, and usually three or four are reported by the
researcher. Although desirable in principle, this AM approach runs into the realworld problem that in most specific research topic areas, the researcher does not
find in the literature two well-developed alternative models to test.
3. Model development approach: In practice, much SEM research combines
confirmatory and exploratory purposes: a model is tested using SEM procedures,
found to be deficient, and an alternative model is then tested based on changes
suggested by SEM modification indexes. This is the most common approach
found in the literature.
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Regardless of approach, SEM cannot itself draw causal arrows in models or resolve
causal ambiguities. Theoretical insight and judgment by the researcher is still of utmost
importance.
In case of research in hand, model development approach to SEM has been utilized
because it provides a way to confirmatory and exploratory purposes.
6.3.1.4 SEM Modeling Process
The structural equation modeling process centers around two steps: validating the
measurement model and fitting the structural model. The former is accomplished
primarily through confirmatory factor analysis, while the latter is accomplished primarily
through path analysis with latent variables.
6.3.1.5. The Measurement Model
The measurement model (Figure 6.3) is that part (possibly all) of a SEM model which
deals with the latent variables and their indicators. One starts by specifying a model on
the basis of theory. Each variable in the model is conceptualized as a latent one,
measured by multiple indicators. Several indicators are developed for each variable, with
a view to winding up with at least two and preferably three per latent variable after
confirmatory factor analysis. Based on a large (n>100) representative sample, factor
analysis (common factor analysis or principal axis factoring, not principle components
analysis) is used to establish that indicators seem to measure the corresponding latent
variables, represented by the factors. A pure measurement model is a confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) model in which there is unmeasured covariance between each possible
pair of latent variables, there are straight arrows from the latent variables to their
respective indicators, there are straight arrows from the error terms to their respective
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variables, but there are no direct effects (straight arrows) connecting the latent variables.
Note that "unmeasured covariance" means one almost always draws two-headed
covariance arrows connecting all pairs of exogenous variables (both latent and simple, if
any), unless there is strong theoretical reason not to do so. The measurement model is
evaluated like any other SEM model, using goodness of fit measures. There is no point in
proceeding to the structural model until one is satisfied that the measurement model is
valid.
6.3.1.6. The Structural Model
The structural model (Figure 6.4) may be contrasted with the measurement model. It
is the set of exogenous and endogenous variables in the model, together with the direct
effects (straight arrows) connecting them, and any correlations among the exogenous
variable or indicators. Two or more alternative models are compared in terms of "model
fit," which measures the extent to which the covariances predicted by the model
correspond to the observed covariances in the data. "Modification indexes" and other
coefficients may be used by the researcher to alter one or more models to improve fit.

254

eS1

eS2

eS3

eS4

eS5

eS6

eS7

S1

S2

S3

S4

S5

S6

S7

eS8

S8

eS9

S9

eS1

S10

Safety Strategic
Concern

B1

B2

Safe Work
Behavior

eB1

eB2

Supportive
Work
Environment

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

eE1

eE2

eE3

eE4

eE5

eE6

eE7

eE8

eE9

Figure 6.3: SEM Measurement Model
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Figure 6.4: SEM Structural Model
6.3.1.7. Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is used to confirm that the indicators sort
themselves into factors corresponding to how the researcher has linked the indicators to
the latent variables in the measurement model. Confirmatory factor analysis plays an
important role in structural equation modeling. CFA models in SEM are used to assess
the role of measurement error in the model, to validate a multifactorial model, and to
determine group effects on the factors. CFA has been utilized in the research in hand and
the results have been given in section 5.9.
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6.3.1.8. Reliability
Cronbach's alpha is a commonly used measure testing the extent to which multiple
indicators for a latent variable belong together. It varies from 0 to 1.0. A common rule of
thumb is that the indicators should have a Cronbach's alpha of .7 to judge the set reliable.
Reliability analysis has been performed for the research in hand and the results have been
given in section 6.3.2.1.
6.3.1.9. Measurement Error Terms
A measurement error term refers to the measurement error factor associated with a
given indicator. Whereas regression models implicitly assume zero measurement error
(that is, to the extent such error exists, regression coefficients are attenuated), error terms
are explicitly modeled in SEM and as a result path coefficients modeled in SEM are
unbiased by error terms, whereas regression coefficients are not. Though unbiased
statistically, SEM path coefficients will be less reliable when measurement error is high.
Figure 6.3 shows the measurement error terms in SEM model developed for this research.
Note that Figure 6.3 is only a partial measurement model developed in this research.
6.3.1.10. Correlated Error Terms
Correlated error terms refer to situations in which knowing the residual of one
indicator helps in knowing the residual associated with another indicator. For instance, in
survey research many people tend to give the response which is socially acceptable.
Knowing that a respondent gave the socially acceptable response to one item increases
the probability that a socially acceptable response will be given to another item. Such an
example exhibits correlated error terms. Uncorrelated error terms are an assumption of
regression, whereas the correlation of error terms may and should be explicitly modeled
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in SEM. That is, in regression the researcher models variables, whereas in SEM the
researcher must model error as well as the variables (see Figure 6.3).
6.3.1.11. Structural Error Terms
The measurement error terms discussed above are not to be confused with structural
error terms, also called residual error terms or disturbance terms, which reflect the
unexplained variance in the latent endogenous variable(s) due to all unmeasured causes.
In Figure 6.4, the "Dist" term is a disturbance term/structural error term.
6.3.1.12. Metric
In SEM, each unobserved latent variable must be assigned explicitly a metric, which
is a measurement range. This is normally done by constraining one of the paths from the
latent variable to one of its indicator (reference) variables, as by assigning the value of
1.0 to this path. Given this constraint, the remaining paths can then be estimated. The
indicator selected to be constrained to 1.0 is the reference item. Typically one selects as
the reference item the one which in factor analysis loads most heavily on the dimension
represented by the latent variable, thereby allowing it to anchor the meaning of that
dimension. Note that if multiple samples are being analyzed, the researcher should use
the same indicator variable in each sample to assign the metric.
Alternatively, one may set the factor variances to 1, thereby effectively obtaining a
standardized solution. This approach of obtaining a standardized SEM solution has been
employed in the research in hand.
6.3.1.13. SEM Software Packages
ISREL, AMOS, and EQS are three popular statistical packages for doing SEM.
AMOS (Analysis of MOment Structures) is a more recent package which, because of its
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user-friendly graphical interface, has become popular as an easier way of specifying
structural models and is the software used in the research in hand.
6.3.1.14. Sample SEM Model
As discussed earlier, two main components of models are distinguished in SEM: the
structural model showing potential causal dependencies between endogenous and
exogenous variables, and the measurement model showing the relations between latent
variables and their indicators. Exploratory and Confirmatory factor analysis models, for
example, contain only the measurement part, while path diagrams can be viewed as an
SEM that only has the structural part.
Figure 6.5 shows a partial SEM model (part of the full model) taken from the current
research in hand.
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Figure 6.5: Example SEM Model
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In Figure 6.5, note the following model components:
a. The exogenous latent variables Safety Strategic Concern and Supportive Work
Environment, measured by the indicator variables S1-S10 and E1-E10
respectively.
b. The endogenous latent variable Safe Work Behavior is measured by indicator
variables B1-B2 and regressed by the exogenous variables Safety Strategic
Concern and Supportive Work Environment.
c. Indicator and other measured variables are depicted as rectangles by convention.
d. Latent variables are depicted as ovals by convention.
e. Causal effects are represented by single-headed arrows in the path diagram.
f. Safety Strategic Concern causes the scores observed on the indicator variables S1S10, and Supportive Work Environment causes the scores observed on the
indicator variables E1-E10, and Safe Work Behavior causes the scores observed
on the indicator variables B1-B2. Safety Strategic Concern can be conceptualized
as the variance its 10 indicators S1-S10 share i.e., what the 10 indicators have in
common.
g. The single-headed arrows from Safety Strategic Concern to Safe Work Behavior
and from Supportive Work Environment to Safe Work Behavior hypothesize that
Safe Work Behavior is caused by Safety Strategic Concern and Supportive Work
Environment.
h. eS1 to eS10, eE1 to eE10 and eB1 to eB2 are the error or residual terms
associated with each indicator variable that also cause response variation in the
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indicator variables. Since residuals are always unobserved, they are represented
by ovals.
i. The two-headed (bidirectional) arrow between Safety Strategic Concern and
Supportive Work Environment indicates that Supportive Work Environment is
thought to have a correlation or covariance with Safety Strategic Concern. Note
that bidirectional arrows represent relationships without an explicitly defined
causal direction. For instance, Safety Strategic Concern Perform and Supportive
Work Environment are related or associated, but no claim is made about one
causing the other.
j. As is usual, there is a disturbance or error term, Dist, associated with the
endogenous latent variable, Safe Work Behavior.
The model in Figure 6.5 depicts that scores or responses on survey items one through
twenty (S1-S10 & E1-E10) are caused by two correlated factors, along with variance that
is unique to each item. Some of that unique variance might be due to measurement error.
6.3.1.15. SEM Advantages
The following are the specific advantages of SEM that led the researcher to select this
method as the preferred method of analysis.
•

Assumptions underlying the statistical analyses are clear and testable, giving the
investigator full control and potentially furthering understanding of the analyses.

•

Use of confirmatory factor analysis to reduce measurement error by having
multiple indicators per latent variable.

•

Graphical interface software boosts creativity and facilitates rapid model
debugging.
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•

SEM programs provide overall tests of model fit and individual parameter
estimate tests simultaneously.

•

SEM models can be used to purge errors, making estimated relationships among
latent variables less contaminated by measurement error.

Although multiple regression analysis has most commonly been used to find
indicators of safety performance (Jaselskis et al. 1996), SEM was selected as the
analytical tool to measure the effect of safety dimensions on safety performance. In this
case, regression analysis will have two significant problems. First, safety dimensions
constitute many unobserved, or latent variables and these variables are likely to be
interrelated. A fundamental premise of multiple regression analysis is that all variables
are assumed to be independent. In the case of modeling safety dimensions, there will
likely be problems of multi-collinearity caused by the interdependency between
independent variables. The second problem is that standard multiple regression
techniques ignore measurement error. There is inherent measurement error in survey data
of this type, stemming from inaccurate ratings on a Likert scale. When measurement
errors in independent variables are incorporated into a regression equation (via a poorly
measured variable) in standard fashion, the variances of the measurement errors in the
regressors are transmitted to the model error, thereby inflating the model error variance
(Myers 1990). In other words, measurement errors will result in greater estimated model
variances and measurement errors in independent variables can cause irreconcilable
technical problems.
The standardized coefficients in a SEM can possess more reliable estimates of how an
exogenous variable affects an endogenous variable than what is produced with multiple
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regression analysis. There are two basic premises in SEM to overcome these problems of
multiple regression analysis. First, SEM typically incorporates the covariance matrix of
the independent and dependent variables. It uses a maximum likelihood estimation
procedure to derive the “most likely” coefficient values, given the actual covariance
matrix. The second premise is that SEM establishes the relationships between
unobservable—termed latent variables and attempts to account for random measurement
error that cannot be employed by multiple regression analysis.
6.3.1.16. SEM Model Specification
Model Specification is the process by which the researcher asserts which effects are
null, which are fixed to a constant (usually 1.0), and which vary. Variable effects
correspond to arrows in the model, while null effects correspond to an absence of an
arrow. Fixed effects usually reflect either effects whose parameter has been established in
the literature (rare) or more commonly, effects set to 1.0 to establish the metric for a
latent variable.
6.3.1.17. Model Parsimony
A model in which no effect is constrained to 0 (hence there is an arrow from every
variable to every other variable) is one which will always fit the data, even when the
model makes no sense. The closer one is to this most-complex model, the better will be
one's fit. That is, adding paths will tend to increase fit. This is why a number of fit
measures (discussed below) penalize for lack of parsimony. Note lack of parsimony may
be a particular problem for models with few variables. Ways to decrease model
complexity are erasing direct effects (straight arrows) from one latent variable to another;
erasing direct effects from multiple latent variables to the same indicator variable; and
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erasing unanalyzed correlations (curved double-headed arrows) between measurement
error terms and between the disturbance terms of the endogenous variables. In each case,
arrows should be erased from the model only if there is no theoretical reason to suspect
that the effect or correlation exists.
The most parsimonious model is the one with the fewest arrows, which means the
fewest coefficients. However, much more weight should be given to parsimony with
regard to structural arrows connecting the latent variables than to measurement arrows
from the latent variables to their respective indicators. Also, if there are fewer variables in
the model and yet the dependent is equally well explained, that is parsimony also; it will
almost always mean fewer arrows due to fewer variables. (In a regression context,
parsimony refers to having the fewest terms (and hence fewest coefficients) in the model,
for a given level of explanation of the dependent variable.)
6.3.1.18. Model Comparisons
Model-building and model-trimming involve comparing a model which is a subset of
another. Chi-square difference can be used directly for hierarchical models. This is
because model fit by chi-square is partly a function of model complexity, with more
complex models fitting better. For non-hierarchical model comparisons, the researcher
needs to use a fit index which penalizes for complexity (rewards parsimony), such as
Akaiki information criterion (AIC).
6.3.1.18.1. Modification Indices
Modification indices (MI) are related to the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test or index
because MI is a univariate form of LM. MI is often used to alter models to achieve better
fit, but this needs to be done carefully and with theoretical justification. In MI,
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improvement in fit is measured by a reduction in chi-square. In AMOS, the modification
indexes have to do with adding arrows: high MI's flag missing arrows which might be
added to a model.
6.3.1.18.2. Par Change
Par change is an effect size measure. AMOS output will list the parameter (which
arrow to add or to subtract), the chi-square value (the estimated chi-square value for this
path, labeled "M.I."), the probability of this chi-square (significant ones are candidates
for change), and the "parameter change," which is the estimated change in the new path
coefficient when the model is altered (labeled "Par Change"). 'Par change" is the
estimated coefficient change when adding arrows. The MI and the parameter change
should be looked at jointly. The researcher may decide not to add an arrow indicated by
MI if the parameter change is trivial. Likewise, the researcher may wish to add an arrow
where the parameter change is large in absolute size even if the corresponding MI is not
the largest one.
6.3.1.18.3. Covariances
In the case of modification indexes for covariances, the MI has to do with the
decrease in chi-square if the two error term variables are allowed to correlate. For
instance, in AMOS, if the MI for a covariance is 24 and the "Par Change" is .8, this
means that if the model is respecified to allow the two error terms to covary their
covariance would be expected to change by .8, leading to a reduction of model chi-square
by 24 (lower is better fit). If there is correlated error, as shown by high MI's on error
covariances, causes may include redundant content of the two items, methods bias (for
example, common social desirability of both items), or omission of an exogenous factor
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(the two indicators share a common cause not in the model). If MI and Par Change
indicate that model fit will increase if a covariance arrow is added between indicator error
terms, this should only be done if strong theoretical evidence suggests as such.
6.3.1.18.4. Structural (Regression) Weights
In the case of MI for estimated regression weights, the MI has to do with the change
in chi-square if the path between the two variables is restored (adding an arrow).
6.3.1.18.5. Rules of Thumb for MIs
One arbitrary rule of thumb is to consider adding paths associated with parameters
whose modification index exceeds 100. However, another common strategy is simply to
add the parameter with the largest MI (even if considerably less than 100), then see the
effect as measured by the chi-square fit index. The latter approach is adopted by the
research in hand for model fit improvement.
6.3.1.18.6. Chi-Square Difference Test
Chi-square difference test, also called the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is computed as
the difference of model chi-square for the larger model (usually the initial default model)
and a nested model (usually the result of model trimming), for one degree of freedom. LR
measures the significance of the difference between two SEM models for the same data,
in which one model is a nested subset of the other. Specifically, chi-square difference is
the standard test statistic for comparing a modified model with the original one. If chisquare difference shows no significant difference between the unconstrained original
model and the nested, constrained modified model, then the modification is accepted on
parsimony grounds.
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6.3.1.19. Output
6.3.1.19.1. Structural or Path Coefficients
Structural or Path Coefficients are the effect sizes calculated by the model estimation
program. Often these values are displayed above their respective arrows on the arrow
diagram specifying a model. In AMOS, these are labeled "regression weights," which is
what they are, except that in the structural equation there will be no intercept term.
6.3.1.19.2. Standardized Structural (Path) Coefficients
When researchers speak of structural or path coefficients in SEM, they often mean
standardized ones. Standardized structural coefficient estimates are based on standardized
data, including correlation matrixes. Standardized estimates are used, for instance, when
comparing direct effects on a given endogenous variable in a single-group study. That is,
as in regression, the standardized weights are used to compare the relative importance of
the independent variables. The interpretation is similar to regression: if a standardized
structural coefficient is 2.0, then the latent dependent will increase by 2.0 standard units
for each unit increase in the latent independent. In AMOS, the standardized structural
coefficients are labeled "standardized regression weights," which is what they are. In
comparing models across samples, however, unstandardized coefficients are used.
6.3.1.19.3. The Critical Ratio and Significance of Path Coefficients
When the Critical Ratio (CR) is > 1.96 for a regression weight, that path is significant
at the .05 level (that is, its estimated path parameter is significant).
6.3.1.19.4. Goodness of Fit Tests
Goodness of fit tests determine if the model being tested should be accepted or
rejected. These overall fit tests do not establish that particular paths within the model are
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significant. If the model is accepted, the researcher will then go on to interpret the path
coefficients in the model ("significant" path coefficients in poor fit models are not
meaningful).
6.3.1.20. Summary
This research employs Structural equation modeling (SEM) as the major analysis
technique. Since SEM is a relatively new analysis technique in construction, an elaborate
treatment of the mechanics of the SEM analysis technique was given in this section.
SEM grows out of and serves purposes similar to multiple regression, but in a more
powerful way which takes into account the modeling of interactions, nonlinearities,
correlated independents, measurement error, correlated error terms, multiple latent
independents each measured by multiple indicators, and one or more latent dependents
also each with multiple indicators.
Advantages of SEM compared to multiple regression that compelled the use of the
former technique for this research include more flexible assumptions (particularly
allowing interpretation even in the face of multicollinearity), use of confirmatory factor
analysis to reduce measurement error by having multiple indicators per latent variable,
the attraction of SEM's graphical modeling interface, the desirability of testing models
overall rather than coefficients individually, the ability to model error terms, and ability
to handle difficult data (non-normal data). Moreover, where regression is highly
susceptible to error of interpretation by misspecification, the SEM strategy of comparing
alternative models to assess relative model fit makes it more robust.
The following section describes and discusses the model developed in this research.
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6.3.2. Model Description
As described earlier, SEM has two main components, a measurement component and
a structural component. The measurement model describes how well various exogenous
variables measure latent variables, i.e. it determines the relation between indicators and
constructs, and enables the researcher to evaluate whether the constructs are measured
with satisfactory accuracy. A confirmatory factor analysis is a measurement model, and
determines how well various variables describe a factor or factors, or latent variables.
The measurement models within a SEM incorporate estimates of errors of measurement
of exogenous variables and their intended latent variable.
The second component of a SEM is the structural component. The structural model
describes the relationships between latent variables (i.e. constructs), and is used to test
and analyze the hypothesized relationships. SEM allows for direct, indirect, and
correlative effects to be explicitly modeled, unlike standard regression models, which
allow only for explicit modeling of direct effects. It is the structural component of SEM
that enables the analyst to make substantive statements about the relationships between
latent variables, and the mechanisms underlying a process or phenomenon. The structural
component of SEM is akin to a system of simultaneous regression models.
SEM estimates parameters for both the links between measures (indicators) with their
respective constructs (i.e., loadings) and the links between different constructs (i.e., path
coefficients). The loadings can be interpreted as factor loadings, while the path
coefficients are standardized regression coefficients. The explanatory power of the model
can be tested by examining the sign, size, and statistical significance of the path
coefficients between constructs in the model.
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The nature of the links between constructs and measures (indicators) is referred to as
an epistemic relationship. Two basic types of epistemic relationships are relevant to
SEM—reflective indicators and formative indicators (Hulland, 1999; Mohamed, 2002).
The indicators (questionnaire items) in the model were treated as reflective, as they were
expected to covary. They were assumed to reflect the unobserved, underlying construct,
with the construct giving rise to (or ‘‘causing’’) the observed measures. For example,
constructs such as safety commitment and safety strategic concern are typically viewed as
underlying factors that give rise to something that is observed. Accordingly, their
indicators tend to be realized as reflective.
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and Mohamed (2002) suggest that both the
measurement model and the structural model should be assessed sequentially, as this twostage approach reduces the likelihood of interpretational confounds because the validity
of the constructs is established prior to investigating the hypothesized relationships. This
is the approach followed in this research and is explained in the following sub-sections.
6.3.2.1. Assessment of Measurement Model
Prior to structural modeling, two measurement properties were examined to ensure
that the data has a satisfactory level of reliability and validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
The first of these is the individual item reliability, where loadings (or simple correlations)
of the items on their respective constructs are assessed, using 0.70 as a cutoff point
(Fornell and Larcker 1981). Exceeding this value simply implies that less than half of the
item’s variance is due to error. Obtained values for items exceeded this threshold, with
majority of loadings in the range of 0.75–0.90, demonstrating the satisfactory level of
individual item reliability.
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Convergent validity (also referred to as the homogeneity of the construct or
composite reliability) is the second measurement property to be examined, and is
evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for each construct is
listed in Table 6.1. All constructs have acceptable convergent validity, as a value of 0.70
is usually accepted as the minimum desired value of the Cronbach’s alpha (Litwin 1995).
Having satisfied the two measurement properties, it can be concluded that the
constructs are measured with adequate precision.
Table 6.1: Convergent Validity of Independent Constructs
Construct

Cronbach’s
alpha

1. Safety commitment
2. Personal safety character and competence
3. Supportive work environment
4. Work pressure
5. Safety program
6. Safety strategic concern

0.923
0.865
0.853
0.872
0.891
0.897

6.3.2.2. SEM Specification
Numerous iterations were performed to arrive at a final SEM specification shown in
Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.6: SEM of Total Safety
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The observed or measured exogenous variables—responses to survey questions—are
shown in the rectangular boxes in Figure 6.6. The unobserved constructs (latent
variables) are shown in ellipses and represent the critical factors of safety dimensions,
which cannot be directly observed. The arrows shown in Figure 6.6 represent the
direction of hypothesized influence. For example, the straight single arrows connecting
safety commitment to the nine exogenous variables (C1 to C9) are presumed to be the
underlying mechanism that produced the outcomes of the observed variables (please note
that the survey questions have been renumbered to correspond with the constructs for
clarity as described below). Similarly, the other sets of questions are thought to reflect the
influence of safety strategic concern, personal safety character and competence,
supportive work environment, safety program, work pressure, and safe work behavior
constructs on survey responses. The curved double-headed arrows linking the exogenous
variables to each other represent the fact that these variables are correlated. The straight
single arrows connecting the exogenous variables (safety commitment, safety strategic
concern, personal safety character and competence, supportive work environment, safety
program, and work pressure) to the endogenous variable safe work behavior imply causal
relationship between the exogenous variables and the endogenous (dependent) variable.
For simplicity, the standardized correlation coefficients are not shown on the figure.
These are discussed later in this chapter.
The resultant six latent variables account for about 78% of the variability in safe work
behavior (mean estimate of 0.78 and standard error =0.005). The overall SEM model
results are given in Table 6.2 and the goodness of fit measures are given in Table 6.3.
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Table 6.2: Overall SEM Model Results
Description

Result

Number of parameters estimated
Degrees of Freedom
Chi square at model convergence

126
1254
26.54, probability <0.10

Table 6.3: Overall SEM Model Results: Goodness-of-Fit Measures
Goodness-of-fit
measure

Description of
test

Number of
parameters
Tucker-Lewis
index (TLI)
Normed fit index
(NFI)
Root mean
squared error of
approximation
(RMSEA)
Akaiki
information
criterion (AIC)
Browne-Cudeck
criterion (BCC)

Parameters
estimated
0 (no fit) to 1
(perfect fit)
0 (no fit) to 1
(perfect fit)
<0.05 indicates
very good fit
0 (perfect fit) to
higher positive
value (poor fit)
imposes a larger
penalty than AIC
for complex
models:
lower numbers
means better fit

Saturated
Model
(Best case)
192

Final Model
126

Independence
Model
(Worst Case)
60

1.000

0.990

0.000

1.000

0.982

0.000

N/A

0.042

0.735

375

233

11,235

412

270

11,985

The model presented was the best-fitting model selected from many competing
models that were fit to the data, all of which had solid theoretical support for their
estimation. The chi-square value at model convergence indicates a good model fit.
Associated with the chi square is the probability that the data were observed if the model
were indeed well fitting, a probability of <10%. By taking into account the numerous
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other GOF measures for the SEM model, the model depicted in Figure 6.5 is a wellfitting model of safe work behavior and safety determinants. The equivalent of the Rsquare for the overall model ranges from 0.98 to 0.99, depending on the GOF criteria, the
root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) is 0.042, where 0.05 cannot be
rejected at a high level of confidence, and all other GOF measures are encouraging. The
SEM appears to be a theoretically and statistically defensible model.
The initial SEM was constructed using various combinations of the factor analysis
results and then model improvements were performed using a combination of
modification indices (Hoyle, 1995; Molenaar et al., 2009) and solid theoretical support
until a final satisfactory model was identified. In essence, asymptotic t-statistics and Rsquare goodness of fit (GOF) measures were employed to assess the regression equations
in the model. The model development process is discussed in the section 6.3.2.4.
Both the measurement and structural components of the SEM provide insight into the
influence of “total” safety determinants on safety performance. The measurement portion
of the constructs and structural portion of the SEM are discussed in sections 6.3.2.5 &
6.3.2.6.
The next section validates that the model developed in the research was valid in terms
of meeting the SEM assumptions. The section states the SEM assumptions and then the
current research data/ model is analyzed to validate that the assumptions have been met.
6.3.2.3. Assessing the Validity of SEM Assumptions
6.3.2.3.1. A Reasonable Sample Size
According to James Stevens’ Applied Multivariate Statistics for the Social Sciences, a
good general rule for sample size is 15 cases per predictor in a standard ordinary least
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squares multiple regression analysis. Since SEM is closely related to multiple regression
in some respects, 15 cases per measured variable in SEM is not unreasonable.
When data are not normally distributed or are otherwise flawed in some way (almost
always the case), larger samples are required. It is difficult to make absolute
recommendations as to what sample sizes are required when data are skewed, kurtotic,
incomplete, or otherwise less than perfect. The general requirement is thus to obtain as
much data as possible.
The sample size for the research in hand was 668, which is reasonable in view of the
above discussion.
6.3.2.3.2. Continuously and Normally Distributed Endogenous Variables
SEM programs assume that dependent and mediating variables (Safe Work Behavior
in case of the research in hand) are continuously distributed, with normally distributed
residuals. However, this assumption is never completely met in practice.
SEM specialists have developed a number of methods (now inherently built into SEM
software such as AMOS) to deal with non-normally distributed variables. These methods
are designed for variables that are assumed to have an underlying continuous distribution;
for instance, administering a Likert scale of items to research participants. The scale
points tap into points along a continuum of scale, and even though the item data are not
continuously distributed, the underlying distribution is continuous.
This research employed Likert scale of items and hence, in view of above discussion,
trustworthy results are ensured.
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6.3.2.3.3. Complete Data or Appropriate Handling of Incomplete Data
This assumption requires that the data set used as input for SEM analysis should not have
any missing data value or, if so, the incomplete data must be appropriately handled (such
as by using listwise deletion). In case of the research in hand, only complete data was
utilized for the study.
6.3.2.3.4. Theoretical Basis for Model Specification and Causality
SEM models can never be accepted; they can only fail to be rejected. In most instances
there are equivalent models that fit equally as well as the provisionally accepted model.
Any of these models may be “correct” because they fit the data as well as the preferred
model. The use of SEM thus entails some uncertainty, particularly with cross-sectional
data that are not collected under controlled conditions. (This is also true of other
commonly used models such as ANOVA and multiple regression techniques.) While
models that fit the data well can only be provisionally accepted, models that do not fit the
data well can be absolutely rejected.
In order to reach the “correct” model, the research employed evaluating competing
models by using likelihood ratio chi-square tests to compare models, in addition to
evaluating the absolute goodness of fit of single models.
The next section discusses the model development process.
6.3.2.4. Model Development Process
The model development process is illustrated in the schematic shown in Figure 6.7
and discussed below.
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Figure 6.7: Model Development Process Flowchart
To arrive at the final SEM specification, model building strategy was employed
starting with a simple model and adding paths one at a time, followed by modeltrimming. As paths were added to the model, chi-square tended to decrease, indicating a
better fit and also increasing the chi-square difference. That is, a significant chi-square
difference indicated the fit of the more complex model was significantly better than for
the simpler one. Adding paths was done only if consistent with theory and face validity.
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Modification indexes (MIs) indicated when adding a path was improving the model. The
strategy to use MIs was to add the parameter with the largest MI, then see the effect as
measured by the chi-square fit index.
Using model building strategy, the model was first over-fit. Then one parameter was
deleted at a time. That is, the researcher first added paths one at a time based on the
modification indexes, then dropped paths one at a time based on the chi-square difference
test. Modifying one step at a time was important because the MIs were estimates changed
each step, as did the structural coefficients and their significance. In the overfit state, the
model consisted of 85 indicators and 7 latent variables. The researcher then erased one
arrow at a time based on non-significant structural paths, again taking theory into account
in the trimming process. One focus of model trimming was to delete arrows which were
not significant. The researcher looked at the critical ratios (CR's) for structural
(regression) weights. Those below 1.96 were non-significant at the .05 level and the
corresponding arrows were deleted.
Model trimming was continued until a significant chi-square difference indicated that
trimming had gone too far. Note that a non-significant chi-square difference means that
the researcher should choose the more parsimonious model (the one in which the arrow
has been dropped). The goal was to find the most parsimonious model which was wellfitting by a selection of goodness of fit tests (Table 6.3), many of them based on the given
model's model-implied covariance matrix not be significantly different from the observed
covariance matrix. This is tantamount to saying the goal was to find the most
parsimonious model which was not significantly different from the saturated model,
which fully but trivially explained the data. After dropping a path, a significant chi-
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square difference indicated the fit of the simpler model was significantly worse than for
the more complex model and the complex model was retained. Dropping paths was done
only if consistent with theory and face validity. The final model consisted of 52
indicators and 7 latent variables. The six latent variables defining total safety constituted
50 indicators coming from various safety dimension subcategories (as shown in Table
6.4) and two indicators from the safe work behavior construct.
The model building and model trimming process involved comparing a model which
was a subset of another. Chi-square difference was used because it was a hierarchical
model. This is because model fit by chi-square is partly a function of model complexity,
with more complex models fitting better.
In the case of modification indexes for covariances, two error term variables were
allowed to correlate if the MI indicated substantial decrease in chi-square and the model
was respecified to allow the error terms to covary. If there was correlated error, as shown
by high MI's on error covariances, causes might include redundant content of the two
items, methods bias (for example, common social desirability of both items) However,
this was only done if strong theoretical evidence suggested as such.
The final model specification is as shown in Figure 6.6.
6.3.2.5. SEM Measurement Component
The measurement component of the SEM describes how accurately the various
exogenous variables measure latent variables. The measurement models within a SEM
incorporate measurements of exogenous variables with their associated errors to their
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Table 6.4: Safety Dimension Subcategories Constituting the Model Constructs (Final
Indicators)
Model
Constructs
Safety
Dimension
Subcategories

C

I

Personal Intention & Commitment
Personal Value System
Personal Attitude & Perception
Personal Interpretation & Emotion
Personal Proficiency
Management Commitment &
Involvement
Workers’ Commitment &
Involvement
Supervisory Commitment and
Involvement
Subcontractor Commitment &
Involvement
Communication
Safety Accountability
Production Pressure
Cultural Norms
Shared Values
Collective Beliefs/ Shared
Understanding
Safety Rules and Procedures
Site Layout Planning
Safety Training and Education
Accident Investigation and
Reporting
Safety Incentive Mechanisms
Safety Disincentive Mechanisms
Total
(Items in each construct)

1
1
1

1
1

E

1
3

P

R

S

Total
(Items in each
subcategory)
2
2
1
2
3

1

2

1

2

5

1

1

1

3

1

2

1

5

1

1

2

2
1

1
1

3
2
3
2
1

1

3
1

1
1
1

1

1
1

3
1
2

1

3
2
4

1

1

2

1

1
1

10

50

1
9

7

10

6

8

*C=safety commitment; I=personal safety character and competence; E=supportive work
environment; P=work pressure; R=safety program; and S = safety strategic concern
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corresponding latent variable. The final six latent variables discovered to directly
influence total safety are presented below. The latent variables are discussed in their
order of influence on the endogenous latent variable safe work behavior. A more detailed
interpretation of the latent variable effects on safe work behavior and their correlation
among each other is presented in the following section describing the structural
component of the SEM.
6.3.2.5.1. Safety Commitment
A company’s safety commitment influenced the responses to 9 questions on the
survey questionnaire. These variables span across 8 branches of the multiattribute
hierarchy, including: personal intention & commitment (1), personal value system (1),
personal attitude & perception (1), management commitment & involvement (2),
workers’ commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (1),
cultural norms (1), and shared values (1). All 9 variables share the common thread of the
company’s commitment to safety. The indicator “management acts decisively when a
safety concern is raised” has highest squared multiple correlation (0.81). This can be
interpreted as meaning that 81% of the variability in the observed variable can be
explained by the latent variable, safety commitment, and the remaining 19% of the
variability is unaccounted for and included in the error term. The indicators “management
clearly considers safety to be more important than production” (0.78) and “workers play
an active role in identifying site hazards” (0.77) are the next two most highly correlated
variables.
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in
Figure 6.8. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations. As
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previously described, safety commitment explains about 81% of the variability in C2, and
eC2 explains other portions.
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Figure 6.8: Safety Commitment
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eC8

eC9

6.3.2.5.2. Personal Safety Character and Competence
The construct personal safety character and competence influenced the responses to
7 questions on the survey questionnaire. These variables span across 5 branches of the
multiattribute hierarchy, including: personal intention & commitment (1), personal value
system (1), personal interpretation & emotion (1), personal proficiency (3), and safety
training & education (1). All 7 variables share the common thread of a person’s safety
character and competence. The indicator “I am capable of identifying potentially
hazardous situations” has highest squared multiple correlation (0.84). This can be
interpreted as meaning that 84% of the variability in the observed variable can be
explained by the latent variable, personal safety character and competence, and the
remaining 16% of the variability is unaccounted for and included in the error term. The
indicators “I am positive that I can influence the level of safety performance” (0.80), “I
believe safety is an integral value of my work performance” (0.78), and “I feel happy to
behave safely” (0.77) are the next three most highly correlated variables.
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in
Figure 6.9. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.
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Figure 6.9: Personal Safety Character and Competence
6.3.2.5.3. Supportive Work Environment
A company’s supportive work environment influenced the responses to 10 questions
on the survey questionnaire. These variables span across 8 branches of the multiattribute
hierarchy, including: management

commitment

&

involvement

(1),

workers’

commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (2),
subcontractor

commitment

and

involvement

(1),

communication

(2),

safety

accountability (1), collective beliefs/ shared understanding (1), and site layout planning
(1). All 10 variables share the common thread of a supportive work environment. The
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indicator “my supervisor/safety manager has positive safety attitude” has highest squared
multiple correlation (0.83). This can be interpreted as meaning that 83% of the variability
in the observed variable can be explained by the latent variable, supportive work
environment, and the remaining 17% of the variability is unaccounted for and included in
the error term. The indicators “as a group, we endeavor to ensure that individuals are not
working by themselves under risky or hazardous conditions” (0.79), “subcontractors
proactively participate in site safety and hazard analysis” (0.77), and “suggestions to
improve health and safety are acted upon” (0.75) are the next three most highly correlated
variables.
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in
Figure 6.10. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.
6.3.2.5.4. Work Pressure
The construct work pressure influenced the responses to 6 questions on the survey
questionnaire. These variables span across 4 branches of the multiattribute hierarchy,
including: personal interpretation & emotion (1), supervisory commitment &
involvement (1), production pressure (3), and cultural norms (1). All 6 variables share the
common thread of work pressure. The indicator “under pressure safety rules should not
be broken, even when worker believes it affects the production” has highest squared
multiple correlation (0.82). This can be interpreted as meaning that 82% of the variability
in the observed variable can be explained by the latent variable, work pressure, and the
remaining 18% of the variability is unaccounted for and included in the error term. The
indicators “under pressure I am not given enough time by my supervisor to get the job
done safely” (0.80) and “under pressure it is an acceptable practice here to delay periodic
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inspection of plant and equipment” (0.78) are the next two most highly correlated
variables.
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Figure 6.10: Supportive Work Environment
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The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in
Figure 6.11. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.
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Figure 6.11: Work Pressure
6.3.2.5.5. Safety Program
A company’s safety program influenced the responses to 8 questions on the survey
questionnaire. These variables span across 5 branches of the multiattribute hierarchy,
including: safety rules and procedures (3), site layout planning (1), safety training and
education (2), accident investigation and reporting (1), and safety disincentive
mechanisms (1). All 8 variables share the common thread of safety program. The
indicator “Safety is a primary consideration when determining site layout” has highest
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squared multiple correlation (0.79). This can be interpreted as meaning that 79% of the
variability in the observed variable can be explained by the latent variable, safety
program, and the remaining 21% of the variability is unaccounted for and included in the
error term. The indicators “current safety rules and procedures enforce the use of personal
protective equipment whenever necessary” (0.78) and “accidents, incidents and near
misses are required to be reported and investigated using a no-blame approach.” (0.76)
are the next two most highly correlated variables.
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in
Figure 6.12. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.
6.3.2.5.6. Safety Strategic Concern
A company’s safety strategic concern influenced the responses to 10 questions on the
survey questionnaire. These variables span across 9 branches of the multiattribute
hierarchy, including: management

commitment

&

involvement

(2),

workers’

commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (1),
subcontractor commitment & involvement (1), communication (1), safety accountability
(1), safety training and education (1), accident investigation and reporting (1), and safety
incentive mechanisms. All 10 variables share the common thread of strategic concern to
safety. The indicator “management operates an open-door policy on safety issues” has
highest squared multiple correlation (0.84). This can be interpreted as meaning that 84%
of the variability in the observed variable can be explained by the latent variable, safety
strategic concern, and the remaining 16% of the variability is unaccounted for and
included in the error term. The indicators “safe behaviors are rewarded” (0.81) and
“workers are held accountable if safety procedures are not adhered to” (0.78), and

290

“lessons from accidents are communicated to workers to improve safety performance”
(0.77) are the next three most highly correlated variables.
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Figure 6.12: Safety Program
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in
Figure 6.13. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.
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Figure 6.13: Safety Strategic Concern
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eS9

eS10

6.3.2.5.7. Safe Work Behavior
The construct safe work behavior was used to measure safety performance. This
construct influenced the responses to 2 questions on the survey questionnaire. These
variables came from the behavior branch of the multiattribute hierarchy.
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in
Figure 6.14. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.
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Figure 6.14: Safe Work Behavior
6.3.2.6. SEM Structural Component
This section presents the results of testing the research hypotheses. The structural
component of the SEM explains the relationships between latent variables. SEM allows
for direct, indirect, and correlative effects to be explicitly modeled, unlike standard
regression models, which allow for explicit modeling of direct effects only. Figure 6.15
displays the structural component of the SEM. In this model, all latent variables are found
to be correlated with safe work behavior, as well as all being correlated with each other.
The numbers near the straight arrows are the standardized correlation coefficients
obtained when an endogenous variable is regressed on the set of exogenous variables to
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which it is functionally related and the numbers by the curved arrows are the standardized
correlation coefficients between each of the variables. A larger number can be considered
a better indicator of the construct. Table 6.5 contains a summary of the hypotheses and
the path coefficients obtained from the analysis.
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Figure 6.15: Structural component of SEM with correlation among variables shown
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Table 6.5: Summary of Path Coefficients
Hypothesis and corresponding path
H1: Greater company commitment = safe work behaviors
H2: Better safety character & competence = safe work
behaviors
H3: More supportive work environment = safe work
behaviors
H4: Higher perception of work pressure = unsafe work
behaviors
H5: Better safety program = safe work behaviors
H6: Higher safety strategic concern = safe work behaviors
H7: Higher level of total safety = safe work behaviors

Expected
Path
sign
coefficient
+
0.74
+
0.62
+

0.68

-

-0.66

+
+
+

0.43
0.72
0.78

As can be seen, all of the paths were in the direction hypothesized. The regression of
the exogenous latent variables on the safe work behavior construct is a relatively high
value of R-square of 0.98, or 98%. R-square can be interpreted in the same manner as that
obtained for the multiple regression analysis. Thus, the model explains about 98% of the
variance in the dependent construct safe work behavior for the sampled data. All of the
path coefficients were statistically significant in the predicted direction, providing strong
overall support for the hypothesized model. The majority of the total safety constructs
affect safe work behavior. Safety commitment and safety strategic concern constructs
have the strongest influence on safe work behaviors. Safety program has the least
influence on safe work behaviors.
6.3.2.7. Discussion of Results
The structural component of SEM describes how the exogenous variables (the six
total safety constructs) are correlated. This is discussed in the following subsection.
Discussion of the hypotheses results is given in the next sub-section.
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6.3.2.7.1. Correlation
Table 6.6 provides the standardized correlation coefficients between the dependent
constructs. The interpretation of the highly correlated constructs is given in the following
sub-sections.
Table 6.6: Standardized Correlation Coefficients
Construct
Construct

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Safety commitment

-

-

-

-

-

-

2. Personal safety character and
competence

0.45

-

-

-

-

-

3. Supportive work
environment

0.64

0.65

-

-

-

-

4. Work pressure

-0.42

-0.38

-0.62

-

-

-

5. Safety program

0.31

0.27

0.55

-0.21

-

-

6. Safety strategic concern

0.72

0.52

0.7

-0.33

0.41

-

6.3.2.7.1.1. Safety Commitment
In this study, the safety commitment variable is highly correlated with the safety
strategic concern (0.72) and supportive work environment (0.64), which can be
interpreted as meaning that a company’s commitment is shown through safety strategic
concern and provision of a supportive work environment.
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6.3.2.7.1.2. Personal Safety Character and Competence
Personal safety character and competence is highly correlated with supportive work
environment (0.65), which can be interpreted as meaning that personal safety character
competence leads to a supportive work environment.
6.3.2.7.1.3. Supportive Work Environment
Supportive work environment is highly correlated with the safety strategic concern
(0.70), safety commitment (0.64), personal safety character and competence (0.65), and
work pressure (-0.62). The correlation of supportive work environment with safety
commitment and personal safety character and competence has been previously
described. The other two correlations can be interpreted as meaning that a company’s
supportive work environment is a reflection of its strategic concern and leads to improved
perception of valuing expediency over safety.
6.3.2.7.1.4. Work Pressure
Work pressure is highly correlated with the supportive work environment (-0.62) as
has been previously described.
6.3.2.7.1.5. Safety Program
Safety program is significantly correlated only with supportive work environment
(0.55), which can be interpreted as meaning that a company’s implementation of a safety
program is positively reflected through a supportive work environment.
6.3.2.7.1.6. Safety Strategic Concern
Safety strategic concern is highly correlated only with safety commitment (0.72),
supportive work environment (0.70), as has been previously described.
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6.3.2.7.2. Hypothesis
The broad hypothesis is that safe work behaviors are consequences of the existing
total safety environment, which, in turn, is determined by the six inter-dependent
constructs—safety commitment, personal safety character & competence, supportive
work environment, work pressure, safety program, and safety strategic concern. Strictly
speaking, support was found for the influence of these six variables on safe work
behaviors.
Hypotheses 1 dealt with company’s safety commitment. The path from the
commitment construct to safe work behaviors is the most significant. This implies that a
company’s safety commitment has the greatest influence on safety performance. This
finding verifies previous research (Zohar, 1980; Mohamed, 2002; Molenaar et al., 2009)
and further emphasizes the importance of company being committed to and involved in
safety activities to emphasize safety issues within the organization. Hypothesis 6 dealt
with safety as a strategic concern. The path from the safety strategic concern construct to
safe work behaviors is also highly significant. This infers that companies where safety is
part of their strategic policy and is treated as a strategic concern at all levels will inculcate
safer work behaviors. Therefore, one can conclude that both commitment and strategic
concern are prerequisites to achieving and sustaining zero accidents in construction site
environments.
The result for hypothesis 3 suggests that supportive work environment has a
significant positive impact on safe work behaviors. This is not very surprising, as a
construction worker who continually interacts with coworkers and supervisors also relies
on them to a greater extent to provide a safer work environment. These findings suggest
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that workers in more positive work environments are more likely to have above-average
working relationships with managers, supervisors, and coworkers, and hence will have
safer behaviors.
The structural model provides support for hypothesis 2 that personal safety character
and competence are positively associated with safe work behaviors. This infers that
personal commitment and proficiency are significant contributors to instilling safe work
behaviors. Laukkanen (1999) reports that skilled and experienced construction workers
have fewer stress symptoms and are less prone to hazards than the inexperienced ones.
The expected influence of work pressure on safe work behaviors (hypothesis 4) was
supported, as the work pressure construct was significantly related to safe work
behaviors. The negative correlation can be interpreted as meaning that an improvement in
the perception of valuing expediency over safety correlates to an increase in company’s
safety performance as measured through a reduction in unsafe behaviors.
Safety program (hypothesis 5) has the least significant influence on safe work
behaviors. This finding implies that the interior individual and collective pursuits of total
safety (person and culture) have a significantly higher impact on safety performance
(measured by safe work behaviors) as compared to the exterior pursuit of total safety
(process). This result also strengthens the basic premise of this research, i.e. a systems
approach to safety, by itself, is not enough to achieve the goal of zero accidents.
Although this finding does not imply that safety program has no positive impact on safety
performance, it does indicate that safety rules and procedures should play a
complementary role and more safety improvement focus should be oriented towards
improving the interior individual and collective pursuits leading to safe behaviors.
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6.4 Comparison and Key Model Features
This section provides a brief description of safety models as reported in the literature
in an attempt to highlight key features of the proposed model.
Grote and Kunzler (2000) presented a sociotechnical model of safety culture that
links the safety management system and safety culture to the general organizational
design. However, the model is more schematic and lacks any mechanism to improve and
assess safety culture.
Geller (1994) provided a model distinguishing three dynamic and interactive factors,
namely, person, behavior, and environment. Three years later, a total safety culture
model, which included this safety triad and recognized the dynamic and interactive
relationship between them, was proposed (Geller 1997). However, the model did not
consider the process and system aspects of total safety. In addition, the model was based
on lagging indicators for measuring safety performance.
Cooper (2000) argued that organizational culture is the product of multiple goaldirected interactions between people, jobs, and the organization, and presented a model
recognizing the presence of an interactive or reciprocal relationship between
psychological, situational, and behavioral factors. Again, the model did not consider the
process and system aspects of total safety.
Building upon Geller’s model, Cooper’s argument, and broadening the organization
construct into an environmental/situational construct to incorporate the safety system
concept, the model presented by Choudhry et al. (2007) integrated three related concepts,
namely, safety climate, behavior-based safety, and safety system, thus allowing different
dimensions of construction safety culture to be measured individually or in combination.
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This model provided allowance for a multilevel analysis of construction safety culture.
However, the model did not examine the degree to which safety management systems
actually influence people’s behaviors. Furthermore, the study did not delve into the
interaction between safety climate, safety management systems and safety-related
behaviors.
Molenaar et al. (2009) developed a structural equation model of corporate culture as it
affects safety performance. This research was based on the hypothesis that construction
safety performance (measured by EMR – Experience Modication Rating) is predictable
on the basis of corporate safety culture. The research proposed that construction
organizations can have inherent characteristics that predispose them to be susceptible to
accidents. The characteristics that influence corporate safety culture were classified into
three main categories: (1) people; (2) process; and (3) value. The primary results of the
study can be summarized by stating that corporate safety culture is significantly related to
safety performance. From an integral strategic perspective of safety, the limitations of
this research study were: 1) the study only looked at the “culture” domain of the
fundamental domains defining total safety; 2) the study used a lagging indicator (EMR)
to measure safety performance; and 3) the data collected to develop the model was
limited. The research in hand attempts to overcome these limitations and builds upon a
large data set, considers an integral view of all fundamental total safety dimensions
(person, culture, behavior and process), and uses a leading indicator (safe work behavior)
to measure safety performance.
Mohamed (2002) examined the relationship between the safety climate and safe work
behavior in construction site environments. This study also utilized the technique of
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structural equation modeling to come up with a relationship model between safety
climate determinants and safety performance (as measured by safe work behaviors).
From an integral strategic perspective of safety, the limitations of this research study
were: 1) the study looked at the “culture” (in fact climate) and the “behavior” domains of
the fundamental total safety dimensions; 2) the study ignored interaction effects between
the factors determining the safety climate; and 3) the study was only based on data
collected from construction workers and did not take into account the perspectives of top
management and supervisors. The research in hand attempts to overcome these
limitations and builds upon an integral view of all fundamental total safety dimensions
(person, culture, behavior and process), considers the interaction effects between the
factors determining total safety, and basis itself on a large data set with data collected
from top management, supervisors, foremen, and construction workers.
While all above models were intuitive and addressed safety from a cultural, climate or
behavior-based perspective, they still lacked a total approach to safety i.e. an approach
that would take into consideration the entire personal, group, behavioral, process and
production system factors as an integrated model determining the true total safety
performance of a construction organization. Secondly, objective measurement and
improvement of total safety (as identified by all dimensions defining and determining
total safety) remained a concern to be addressed. Thirdly, most of these models were
based on lagging safety performance indicators (such as EMR) and were also limited in
terms of data utilized for the studies.
Building upon previous models (specifically, Molenaar et al., 2009 and Mohamed,
2002), the model presented in this research has the following key features:
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1. It integrates all the fundamental dimensions of total safety, namely, person,
culture, behavior, and process, thus allowing different dimensions of
construction total safety to be measured individually as well as in
combination.
2. The four constructs complement each other in a way that offers an integral
measurement model, thus allowing for a multiattribute hierarchy analysis of
construction total safety determinants.
3. The measurement model considers the interaction effects between the
constructs determining total safety as well as the integral effect of all the total
safety dimensions on construction safety performance.
4. The model incorporates a leading indicator of safety performance, viz. safe
work behavior, which allows measurement of true safety performance of a
construction organization because it does not base itself on retrospective
accident statistics.
5. The model is build upon data collected from various tiers of a construction
organization, including workers, foremen, supervisors, project managers and
corporate managers, and hence provides a more comprehensive and realistic
measurement mechanism of total safety.
6. The model is fundamental and very simple in nature and allows a selfevaluation and self-improvement mechanism based on fundamental total
safety determinants.
7. Since the model is based on the statistical tool of structural equation
modeling, it caters for the interaction between independent variables as well
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as takes into account the measurement and model errors, and hence provides a
more realistic assessment of total safety.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the development of a strategic safety improvement model
based on SEM analysis on the underlying total safety determinants. The model provided
the correlation between the factors determining total safety and their influence on a
company’s safety performance as measured by a leading indicator of safe work behavior.
This constituted achieving objectives 3 of the study.
From data collected in phase II of the research (chapter 6), a research base model was
first developed. Following this, a structural equation model (SEM) was estimated to
identify latent constructs that describe total safety and to quantify relationships among
them and between these total safety determinants and safety performance of a
construction organization. Finally, the strategic framework was presented along with a
discussion of the key components of the framework and their utility towards strategically
improving safety in the construction industry.
The total safety model presented in this chapter provides a framework for continuous
measurement and improvement of safety. From a practical perspective, this model
approaches safety as a total process taking into consideration the interior and exterior
individual and organizational characteristics that determine the true safety environment of
a company and provide a quantitative framework to better understand and evaluate total
safety performance of construction industry. Since this model is fundamental in nature
and addresses safety from an integral perspective taking into account the personal,
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organizational, behavioral and process perspectives collectively, it has the potential to
strategically achieve and sustain the goal of zero accidents.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Research Summary, Conclusions and Contributions
The research in hand had three key objectives: 1) to assess the current state of safety
in the construction industry and establish the need for addressing safety as a total process
in construction contracting organizations; 2) to identify the factors determining the total
safety environment of a construction contracting organization, which are most suitable
and appropriate for measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role in
strategic safety improvement; and 3) to develop a strategic framework for defining,
measuring, and improving total safety in the construction industry in order to achieve and
sustain the goal of zero accidents. To achieve the above objectives, the research endeavor
was undertaken in two distinct phases. Phase I of the research, which was consistent to
achieving objective of the study, concluded that the present safety management practices
in the construction industry have failed to deliver well on the following areas of safety
performance:
1. Strategic vision of safety,
2. Strategic approach to safety improvement,
3. Employee involvement and empowerment,
4. Organizational readiness to embrace Total Safety Management,
5. Safety communication and decision making,
6. Safety commitment and support,
7. Maintaining a positive attitude towards safety,
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8. Worker motivation,
9. Accident investigation and reporting, and
10. Safety training and orientation
In addition, it was also concluded that OSHA, the lead regulatory agency driving
safety, is not performing at par in terms of achieving strategic safety improvement in the
construction industry and needs to improve on its vision and approach towards safety.
OSHA’s strategic approach, as reflected from the findings, should be “continuous
improvement through positive reinforcement” as against “inspection and penalty”
approach. Moreover, it was concluded that OSHA would need to work with the
companies and not against them in order to achieve the strategic goal of zero accidents in
the industry.
Based on the findings of Phase I of the research endeavor, the major conclusion
drawn was a dire need of a framework that would allow the industry to strategically and
continuously improve safety in order to attain and sustain the goal of zero accidents. Such
a framework would be particularly instrumental in generating a total safety environment
in the industry, which would promote safety for the sake of safety and not for the safe of
“compliance” or “penalty avoidance”. This framework would require an integral
approach to safety with commitment and participation from all levels as well as sectors of
the industry.
Following phase I of the research study, an integral model of total safety was adapted
from literature, which formed the basis of phase II of the research undertaken to achieve
objective 2 of the study. The integral model allowed decomposition of total safety into
four principal dimensions, viz., person, culture, behavior and process, which were further
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decomposed into 83 measurable attributes using a multiattribute analysis technique.
These formed the basis of a questionnaire to measure total safety. Safe work behavior
was selected as a measure of a company’s safety performance for the study. Based on the
survey responses, statistical relationships between total safety dimensions and safety
performance (measured by safe work behavior) were revealed through a series of six
latent variables (factors) that describe the total safety environment of a construction
organization.
These six factors (and their corresponding indicators) formed the basis of developing
a strategic safety improvement model for the construction industry consistent to
achieving objective 3 of the study. The research base model followed the broad
hypothesis that safe work behaviors (and, thus, their reciprocal, unsafe behaviors) are
consequences of the existing total safety dimensions in a construction organization,
which is determined by the six factors (and their corresponding indicators) already
identified. A structural equation model (SEM) was estimated to model the latent
constructs that describe total safety and to quantify relationships among them and
between these total safety determinants and safety performance of a construction
organization. Model constructs and associated hypotheses were appropriately defined
and, after numerous iterations, a final SEM specification was reached.
Total safety is extremely complex to define and measure as displayed though both the
multiattribute hierarchy and the multiple interrelationships of the SEM estimated in this
research. However, the SEM and the latent variables it describes constitute a powerful
framework for defining, measuring, and improving total safety. Analysis of data from the
83 measurable characteristics revealed that 50 could be used to describe a final set of six
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latent variables. These six latent variables can be considered characteristics of total safety
and may be used as indicators of safety performance as measured through safe work
behaviors.
The total safety model developed provides a framework for continuous measurement
and improvement of safety in the construction industry without adding complexity and
administrative burden. From a practical perspective, this model approaches safety as a
total process taking into consideration the interior and exterior individual and
organizational characteristics that determine the true safety environment of a company
and provide a quantitative framework to better understand and evaluate total safety
performance of construction industry. Since this model is fundamental in nature and
addresses safety from an integral perspective taking into account the personal,
organizational, behavioral and process perspectives collectively, it has the potential to
strategically achieve and sustain the goal of zero accidents.
Specifically, the research has provided the following contributions:
1. A framework showing the interrelationships among the factors defining total
safety and the relationship of these factors with the true safety performance of a
construction organization
2. The formulation and quantification of the interrelationships mentioned above to
facilitate measurement of total safety
3. A strategic tool providing a framework for continuous measurement and
improvement of total safety.
4. A strategic tool giving the construction participant a clear picture of the true
safety performance of the company, but would also suggest the individual,
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organizational, and process characteristics that need to be improved for sustained
improvement on total safety.
7.2 Strategic Industry Benefits
The researcher foresees the developed framework to be used as a tool by the industry
personnel to continuously improve safety in their organizations. It would not only give
the construction participant a clear picture of the true safety performance of the company,
but would also suggest the individual, organizational, and process characteristics that
need to be improved for sustained improvement on total safety.
Specifically, the developed strategic safety improvement framework can provide the
following benefits to the industry.
1. The current financial crisis has put the role of safety management in the
construction business into focus. For U.S. firms engaging themselves in the
construction business, one of the most effective means of mitigating financial
risks is through a strategic safety management model. The developed
framework can be adopted by U.S. contractors and subcontractors to measure
and continuously improve their safety performance and hence achieve the goal
of zero accidents.
2. The developed framework can be adopted by OSHA to devise strategies for
safety measurement and improvement in the construction industry on
sustainable basis. Since this model is based on an integral approach to safety,
it is deemed to have the adaptability to implement itself in the existing safety
management systems and hence will help induce a sustainable safety culture
in the construction industry.
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3. The developed framework can be adopted by construction owners to devise
strategies for evaluating the safety performance of construction contractors (at
the bidding stage or otherwise), who will now have the opportunity to present
their firm-specific safety strategies based on their own safety performance
levels.
4. The developed framework may largely reduce the administrative over-burden
for safety regulatory bodies (OSHA), owners, contractors and subcontractors
by providing a self-evaluation and self-improvement mechanism for safety
based on process measurement. Of course, this is not to say that this
framework will eliminate the requirement of monitoring the safety
performance of contractors and subcontractors from a regulatory perspective –
the mechanism will now be more powerful and less cumbersome because it
will be focusing on safety as a total process rather than focusing on unsafe
outcomes (accidents).
5. Since this framework is integral for implementing safety as a total process in
the construction industry, strategically, it may prove to be a best value system
for the industry. That is, the model, if successfully implemented, will not only
improve the safety performance of the construction industry, but will also help
the industry become more competitive and productive; hence providing best
value to its customers.
6. Although the framework has focused on the U.S. construction industry
commercial building sector, the nature of the model makes it suitable to any
sector of construction industry around the globe. This is particularly because
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the model was based on well-established principles and was focused on total
process measurement and improvement, both of which are independent of the
particular industry in which the model will be functional.
7. It is envisaged that this research effort will immensely contribute to the
development of education and training programs in construction safety, as this
model will help provide a strategic insight into the aspects to be included in
long-term and effective safety education and training programs. The very
premise (and the results) of this model provides a shift of focus from treating
safety as a systems approach to approaching it as a total (individual and
group) process that integrates personal and collective values, beliefs,
commitments,

attitudes,

perceptions,

interpretations,

emotions

and

understandings.
7.3 Recommendations
This SEM suggests that total safety dimensions are important determinants of safety
performance. The six characteristics described by the latent variables in the SEM may be
interpreted as action items that companies can use to improve their total safety
environment and their safety performance. Each latent variable can be summarized as a
total safety characteristic with corresponding action items that may improve safety
performance as follows:
Increase a company’s safety commitment:
•

Actively participate in safety;

•

Clearly emphasize on safety to be more important than production;

•

Involve workers in proactively identifying site hazards;
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•

Obtain commitment from all the supervisors and key people to incident and injury
free. (This may be done in orientation sessions and in the field.)

•

Identify and correct the causes of unsafe actions before they get translated to
accidents.

•

Recognize those people who have demonstrable success in safety and people
skills.

•

Encourage and reward those who “step out of the box” and take initiative.

•

Attempt to create the right attitude in those who need a little coaching.

•

Encourage coaching within crafts and across craft lines.

•

Post signs with Safety slogans on all drinking water cans and in conspicuous
places throughout the worksite. Move signs around.

•

Have Staff through Front Line Supervisors participate in High Performance
Safety Sessions.

•

Have all Craftsperson’s and Helpers participate in High Performance Safety
Meetings without any supervisors present.

Increase a company’s safety strategic concern:
•

Maintain an open-door policy on safety issues (offer opportunities for all
personnel to provide feedback regarding safety concerns;

•

Reward safe behaviors (create an understanding that field employees will be
recognized for safe performance);

•

Strengthen accountability measures at worker level; and
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•

Effectively communicate lessons from accidents to improve safety performance
of workers.

•

Acquire and retain those people who have exposure to the injury/ incident free
initiative.

•

Retain those people with the right attitude.

•

Treat the workforce to refreshments on occasion to reward them for a good job
and to help keep morale and awareness elevated.

•

Canvass other jobsites for ideas that would help keep awareness and enthusiasm
where it should be.

•

Encourage everyone to mention something regarding Safety in every
conversation. It does not have to be lengthy or sophisticated, just enough to keep
awareness up.

•

Share with employee’s info from the weekly HSE report from the company to
heighten awareness of things to prevent.

•

Encourage the working population to focus on Safety one hour at the time. Be
sure that Management has furnished them all that it takes to do that.

•

Keep a team intact to continue to work on barriers and solutions.

•

Share with other sites those things that work for yours.

Improve individual safety character and competence:
•

Increase individual capability of identifying potentially hazardous situations;

•

Encourage individuals to positively influence the level of safety performance;

•

Instill safety as an integral value of work performance; and
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•

Encourage safe behaviors.

•

Offer coaching.

•

Have Staff members greet employees as they come in each morning.

Improve a company’s supportive work environment:
•

Continuously emphasize on supervisors to maintain a positive attitude towards
safety;

•

Encourage workers to ensure that individuals are not working by themselves
under risky or hazardous conditions;

•

Encourage subcontractors to proactively participate in site safety and hazard
analysis;

•

Create long-term relationships with subcontractors; and

•

Promptly act upon suggestions to improve health and safety.

•

Have project manager, superintendents and supervisors visible in field as well as
accessible to the working population.

•

Hold job wide safety meetings on a monthly basis. Solicit some of the topics from
the workforce. Involve some speakers from the workforce.

•

Establish a Project Manager’s Safety and Quality Advisory Team with
representation from each craft. Have periodic meetings. Act on recommendations.
Provide feedback.

•

Encourage all supervisors to communicate their concern for and interest in each
member of the workforce.
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•

Establish a Front Line Supervisor’s forum. Meet on a periodic basis to discuss
needs, concerns, suggestions for improvement and new developments.

•

Make visible the fact that the Project Manager and the Safety Manager are
working closely together to manager the project.

Improve a company’s safety program:
•

Ensure that safety is a prime concern in site layout planning;

•

Enforce the use of personal protective equipment;

•

Ensure that accidents, incidents and near misses are reported and investigated
using a no-blame approach; and

•

Provide safety training emphasizing on identifying potential risks and
consequences.

•

Assure that job plans include plans for the safe execution of work assignments.

Improve the perception of valuing expediency over safety:
•

Demonstrate clear commitment that safety rules should not be broken, even when
worker believes it affects the production;

•

Emphasize on supervisors to value safety over productivity; and

•

Emphasize on supervisors to periodically inspect plant and equipment, even under
production pressure.

7.4 Limitations
Three potential limitations of the current research study, which are also suggestive of
future research paths, deserve attention. First and foremost, as with most research
surveys, the data collected were partly self-reported; hence, some of the relationships
may be exaggerated due to common method bias. Available information from top
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management and supervisors was used to reduce the bias, in particular, in matters
concerning management commitment, communication, and the supervisory environment.
A second limitation is that the scope was limited to general and specialty contractors
working in the building construction sector only. However, this is not really a limitation
because the fundamental nature of the model allows it to be used for other sectors in other
industries as well.
A third limitation is that the questionnaire was distributed only in English. Although a
reasonable sample from each company was achieved at the upper management, middle
management, and field levels, non-English speaking employees did not complete the
survey. In the future, a computer survey could be considered with multiple languages,
leading to automation and expediency of the data collection process. Employees without
access to computers would still require paper-based questionnaires.
Despite the stated limitations, this research shows that total safety can be quantified
and is related to safety work behaviors. The methodological framework presented in this
paper provides a new set of tools for identifying and measuring total safety. The
recommendations from this research are based on findings of this study. As more data are
collected and new variables are observed, these results may be further refined; however,
this research serves as a fundamental advancement in the industry’s understanding of
total safety and its correlation to safety performance.
7.4 Future Research Directions
The next step in the research could be to expand the data collection and develop the
framework into a “thermometer” of total safety environment. By automating the process
via computer, companies could distribute this questionnaire to all their employees and

317

quickly measure their total safety environment. Just as a poor cholesterol test identifies
increased risk of a heart attack, a poor total safety environment test would indicate
increased risk of an impending accident. More importantly, the test would help to identify
aspects of total safety needing improvement.
More formally, a tool to predict the likelihood of construction accidents, the accident
potential index (API) can be developed based on the strategic model developed herein.
No such tool is currently available in the construction safety research, although use of
such tools has been seen in other areas of construction research such as construction
disputes, wherein a dispute potential index (DPI) has been in use since 1994 to predict the
likelihood of legal disputes (Diekmann and Girard 1995). The API would be a predictive
tool designed to identify the presence of problem-prone characteristics in the safety
performance of a construction company, measure them, and report the results to the
participants in the company so they can take corrective action to prevent accidents.
The API would consist of a self-administered questionnaire asking a company leader
to answer critical questions about the total safety dimensions in the company. A computer
program may process the answers, analyzes them, and calculates two sets of numbers:
•

first, an overall numerical rating indicating generally whether the company is
likely to fall into the good, bad, or average range with respect to overall potential
for accidents; and

•

second, an individual score for each of six key total safety determinants, to
identify particular areas of the company that have the greatest potential for
breeding unsafe behaviors.

318

Appendix A – Survey Instrument 1

319

Assessment of Current Safety Attitudes and Approaches of Contractor Top
Management in the U.S. Construction Industry

(To be filled by Contractor Top Management/ Office Management, e.g. CEO,
Operations Manager, Safety Director, Project Director, etc.)

NOT TO BE FILLED BY ANY SITE RELATED PERSONNEL

All the information gathered here will be kept strictly confidential and will be used only
for research and analysis without mentioning the person or company names. Thank you
very much for your cooperation.
Personal Information (Optional)
Name of Respondent: ______________________________________________________
Present position in the company: _____________________________________________
Total work experience: _____________ years
Work experience in this company: ___________ years
Please provide contact info if you like to be contacted again regarding this questionnaire:
________________________________________________________________________
Company Information
Company Name: _________________________________________________________
Company Location (City & State): ___________________________________________
Type of Company (Contractor Trade):
 General Contractor (GC)
 Poured Concrete Foundation
and Structure Contractor
 Structural Steel and Precast
Concrete Contractor
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Framing Contractor
Masonry Contractor
Glass and Glazing Contractor
Roofing Contractor
Siding Contractor

 Electrical Contractor
 Plumbing, Mechanical &
HVAC Contractor
 Drywall
and
Insulation
Contractor
 Painting and Wall Covering
Contractor







Flooring Contractor
Tile and Terrazzo Contractor
Finish Carpentry Contractor
Site Preparation Contractor
Other
___________________________

Approx. company size (no. of persons): _________ (admin) ________ (technical)
Number of Years in Business: ___________
Approx. annual turnover (in millions): ______________
States of operation (Check all that apply):















Alabama
Iowa
Alaska
Kansas
Arizona
Kentucky
Arkansas
Louisiana
California
Maine
Colorado
Maryland
Connecticut
Massachuse
tts
 Delaware
 Michigan

 District of
Columbia
 Minnesota
 Florida
 Mississippi
 Georgia
 Missouri
 Hawaii
 Montana
 Idaho
 Nebraska
 Illinois
 Nevada
 Indiana
 New Hampshire
 New Jersey
 South Dakota
 New Mexico




















Tennessee
New York
Texas
North Carolina
Utah
North Dakota
Vermont
Ohio
Virginia
Oklahoma
Washington
Oregon
West Virginia
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Rhode Island
Wyoming
South Carolina

Below, you will be presented with a series of statements about the company’s top
management attitude towards health and safety. Please indicate your level of agreement
or disagreement with the statements with respect to your experience with the company by
checking (√ ) only one appropriate box. (1 = strongly disagree; 3 = neutral - neither
disagree nor agree; 5 = strongly agree).
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Score
Top Management Safety Attitude Statement

1
(disagree)

I. Safety Policy
1

The company has safety related criterion for
subcontractor selection (e.g. past safety
records).

2

The company has safety related criterion for
workers’ recruitment (e.g. experience, safety
training).

3

The company has safety related criterion for
managers’ & supervisors’ recruitment (e.g.
experience, safety training).

4

The revisions (where relevant) are promptly
brought to the attention of all employees.

5

The review arrangement includes feedback
from employees at all levels.

6

The safety policy clearly states that decisions
on other priorities should give due regard to
construction safety requirements.

7

There are effective arrangements for
reviewing the health and safety policy at least
once a year.

8

The company has a well-written substance
abuse program.

9

The company has a well-written light-duty,
return-to-work policy.

10

The policy endeavors to set targets (corporate
safety goals) for health and safety
performance including a commitment to
progressive improvement.
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2

3

4

5
(agree)

11

The policy identifies key senior personnel for
overall coordination and implementation of
the policy.

12

The company has a well established
disciplinary process for enforcement of safety
program/safety plan.

13

The company has a well-written safety field
manual.

14

As part of company policy, workers are given
a booklet containing work rules,
responsibilities, and other appropriate
information.

15

The company has a well-written personal
protective equipment (PPE) policy.

16

The policy is explained to new employees as
part of their training and orientation before
entry to a work on-site.

17

The company has a well-written policy on
accident reporting and investigation.

18

The policy explicitly commits the
organization to full compliance with all
relevant health and safety legislation.

19

The company has a well-written safety
program manual/ safety plan.

II. Management Commitment and Support
20

The number of safety officers delegated on a
site depends on the perceived/ evaluated
hazards and complexity of the site.

21

The management emphasizes on having
project safety committees.
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22

Safety is a mandatory part of the supervisor’s
performance evaluation.

23

There are effective arrangements to collect
and review worker feedback on health and
safety matters.

24

The executive management reviews accident
reports.

25

The safety officers are delegated the
responsibility and authority to suspend work
if there are unsafe acts.

26

The executive management involves itself in
promoting safety by giving directions/
motivation.

27

The executive management involves itself in
enacting incentive schemes to encourage staff
and subcontractors to observe safety

28

The executive management involves itself in
attending or chairing safety committees.

29

The management clearly emphasizes safety
over productivity.

30

The number of safety officers delegated on a
site depends on the accident records.

31

The executive management reviews safety
statistics.

32

The number of safety officers delegated on a
site depends on the requirements of the law/
the contract.

33

The executive management reviews
inspection reports.

34

The executive management involves itself in
requiring and facilitating regular safety
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inspection on sites.
35

The names and positions with responsibility
lines for safety performance management are
explicitly identified (such as an organization
chart).

36

The management sets corporate safety goals.

37

The management always keeps someone in
charge of updating health and safety including
changes to regulations, new codes of practice,
newly identified hazards, and new work
practices.

38

Management strongly emphasizes that safety
problems be openly discussed between
workers and supervisors.

39

Management strongly emphasizes that
workers be involved in site safety decisions.

40

As per management directives, a formal
behavior observation program exists on work
sites.

41

Management strongly encourages workers to
raise safety concerns with their supervisors.

42

Management emphasizes that workers be
involved in preparation of site safety plans.

43

Management strongly emphasizes that
subcontractors/ subcontractor safety rep/
subcontractor staff be involved in site safety
decisions.

44

Management communicates lessons from
accidents to workers in order to improve
safety performance.

45

As per management directives, site managers
and supervisors are required to engage
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themselves in regular safety talks with
operatives.

IV. Safety Training and Orientation
46

The safety program requires subcontractors to
hold regular safety meetings.

47

The effectiveness of health and safety training
is monitored by the company by checking
new skills.

48

Management strongly emphasizes on site
managers and supervisors in meetings to
maintain a positive attitude towards safety so
that workers take safety on the site seriously.

49

The safety program requires all subcontract
workers to attend a formal standard safety
orientation.

50

The health and safety training program/ plan
exists at the managerial level.

51

The safety program requires holding tool box/
tailgate safety meetings focused on specific
work operations/exposures.

52

The safety program requires conducting
safety inductions for site visitors.

53

The health and safety training program/ plan
exists at the supervisory level.

54

Safety training is always a line or compulsory
item within the budget.

55

The health and safety training program/ plan
exists at the workforce level.

56

The safety program requires conducting site
safety orientation for every person new to the
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job site.
57

The safety program requires safety training
meetings for each supervisor (foreman and
above).

58

The company has a well-documented health
and safety training program/ plan

59

The safety program requires equipment
operation/certification training.

V. Safety Administration and Procedures
60

The company has an established system to
recognize safety accomplishments (such as
award given out on a regular basis with
recognition given for good safety
performance.

61

Any non-compliance to wearing appropriate
PPE is required by the management to be
investigated.

62

Management motivates workers to work
safely by providing incentives/ awards/
recognitions for good safety performance (e.g.
monetary incentives).

63

The work rules are regularly updated.

64

There are appropriate arrangements to
monitor the effectiveness and thoroughness of
safety inspection.

65

There are appropriate arrangements to collect
and analyze the results of safety inspections.

66

There are appropriate arrangements to ensure
that action is taken as a result of the findings
of safety inspections.
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67

The safety program requires having pre-task
meetings before executing an activity.

68

The safety program requires performing site
layout planning before start of work.

69

The management discusses safety at all
preconstruction and progress meetings.

70

The company’s written safety program
addresses safety communications procedures.

71

The company’s written safety program
addresses safety risk identification and
management procedures.

72

The company’s written safety program
addresses safety planning procedures.

73

Management disciplines workers to work
safely by imposing disciplinary action (e.g.
penalties) for safety non-performance.

74

The safety program requires conducting
emergency response drills.

75

The company’s written safety program
addresses physical controls and rules.

76

The company’s written safety program
addresses safety organization and
responsibilities.

77

The company’s written safety program
addresses safety implementation, monitoring
and control procedures.

78

The company’s written safety program
addresses safety training and awareness
procedures.

79

The company’s written safety program
addresses safe work procedures.
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80

Safety bulletin boards are provided and
located so that every employee will see them
during working days.

81

The safety program requires maintaining a
site hazard register containing hazards,
impacts and preventive measures.

82

The company’s written safety program
addresses safety reporting procedures.

83

Safety signs and posters are prominently
displayed on work sites.

84

The company maintains jobsite safety
checklists (or similar tools) for inspection.

85

The company’s written safety program
addresses accident and emergency response
mechanisms.

86

The safety program requires conducting
regular job site safety inspections/ audits.

87

The company has documented safety work
rules/ procedures for all site operations
performed by the company (such as
excavation works, trenching works, high rise
work etc.).

88

Site safety inspections are required to include
routine safety inspection of equipment (e.g.,
scaffold, ladders, fire extinguishers, etc.).

89

There are established procedures to ensure the
proper use of PPE as well as its training and
inspection.

90

The company maintains PPE facilities on
worksites.

91

The company maintains continuous supply of
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first aid facilities on work sites.

VI. Accident Investigation and Reporting
92

The company has a system to effectively use
safety records and logs for enhancing safety
performance.

93

Management requires investigating near
misses to help prevent accidents.

94

Management requires reporting incidents/
near misses in the company’s reporting
system.

95

After each accident, appropriate steps are
taken to prevent similar accidents in future.

96

The company always investigates accidents.

97

Management requires keeping safety records
and logs (such as in a database that logs
injuries on past projects).
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Assessment of Current Safety Attitudes and Approaches of Supervisors and
Foremen in the Construction Industry
(To be filled by Foremen and Supervisors)
All the information gathered here will be kept strictly confidential and will be used only
for research and analysis without mentioning the person or company names. Thank you
very much for your cooperation.
Personal Information (Optional)
Name of Respondent: ______________________________________________________
Present position in the company: _____________________________________________
Total work experience: _____________ years
Work experience in this company: ___________ years
Please provide contact info if you like to be contacted again regarding this questionnaire:
________________________________________________________________________
Company Information
Company Name: _________________________________________________________
Company Location (City & State): ___________________________________________
Type of Company (Contractor Trade):
 Plumbing, Mechanical & HVAC
Contractor
 Drywall and Insulation Contractor
 Painting
and
Wall
Covering
Contractor
 Flooring Contractor
 Tile and Terrazzo Contractor
 Finish Carpentry Contractor
 Site Preparation Contractor
 Other
___________________________

 General Contractor (GC)
 Poured Concrete Foundation
and Structure Contractor
 Structural Steel and Precast
Concrete Contractor
 Framing Contractor
 Masonry Contractor
 Glass and Glazing Contractor
 Roofing Contractor
 Siding Contractor
 Electrical Contractor

Approx. company size (no. of persons): _________ (admin) ________ (technical)
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Number of Years in Business: ___________
Approx. annual turnover (in millions): ______________
States of operation (Check all that apply):















Alabama
Iowa
Alaska
Kansas
Arizona
Kentucky
Arkansas
Louisiana
California
Maine
Colorado
Maryland
Connecticut
Massachuse
tts
 Delaware
 Michigan

 District of
Columbia
 Minnesota
 Florida
 Mississippi
 Georgia
 Missouri
 Hawaii
 Montana
 Idaho
 Nebraska
 Illinois
 Nevada
 Indiana
 New Hampshire
 New Jersey
 South Dakota
 New Mexico




















Tennessee
New York
Texas
North Carolina
Utah
North Dakota
Vermont
Ohio
Virginia
Oklahoma
Washington
Oregon
West Virginia
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Rhode Island
Wyoming
South Carolina

Below, you will be presented with a series of statements about the responsibilities of a
foreman or a supervisor towards health and safety on a construction site. Please indicate
your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements with respect to your
experience with the company by checking (√ ) only one appropriate box. (1 = strongly
disagree; 3 = neutral - neither disagree nor agree; 5 = strongly agree).
Score
Supervisor Safety Responsibility Statement

1
(disagr
ee)

I. Safety Training and Orientation
1

I am responsible to provide job-specific safety
training

2

I am responsible to hold tool box/ tailgate
safety meetings focused on specific work
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2

3

4

5
(agre
e)

operations/exposures
3

I am responsible to hold safety meetings

4

I am responsible to coach workers

5

I am responsible to explain safety operations/
rules to workers

6

I am responsible to orient new workers

II. Safety Administration
7

I am responsible to establish inspection teams
for hazard analysis

8

I am responsible to investigate accidents

9

I am responsible to correct unsafe conditions

10

I am responsible to take unsafe tools out of
production

11

I am responsible to correct unsafe acts

12

I am responsible to report all incidents/ near
misses

13

I am responsible to authorize regular
maintenance or repair of equipment

14

I am responsible to report all accidents

15

I am responsible to maintain first aid facilities

16

I am responsible to conduct (safety)
inspection of my own division of work

17

I am responsible to send the injured or sick
workers for medical attention

III. Maintaining Discipline
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18

I am responsible to require workers to report
any malpractice by a fellow worker

19

I am responsible to conduct emergency
response drills

c20

I am responsible to report a worker for unsafe
acts

21

I am responsible to discharge a worker’s
duties

22

I am responsible to recommend promotion or
demotion to a worker

23

I am responsible to issue warnings to workers
in case of unsafe acts

24

I am responsible to enforce the use of
personal protective equipment whenever
necessary

IV. Safety Communication
25

I am responsible to recommend changes in
safety policy

26

I involve/ consult workers in preparation of
task safety plan

27

I encourage feedback from workers on safety
issues

28

I am responsible to improve safe work
procedures through worker involvement

29

I keep an open-door policy on safety issues

30

I take responsibility to communicate workers’
safety concerns to management

31

I take responsibility to make suggestions to
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improve safety
32

I take responsibility to discuss safety
problems with the management

V. Safety Commitment and Support
33

I emphasize on workers to contribute to job
safety analysis

34

I ensure good preparedness for emergency
among workers

35

I allow workers to act decisively if they find
any situation contrary to safe conditions on
site

36

I participate actively in developing /
reviewing health and safety procedures

37

I take responsibility to ensure that the
workload is reasonably balanced among
workers

38

I emphasize on workers to contribute to
accident investigations

39

I continuously emphasize on workers that
safety rules should not be broken, even when
worker believes it affects the production

40

I emphasize on a no-blame approach to
highlight unsafe work behavior

41

I emphasize on workers to achieve high levels
of safety performance

42

I take responsibility to provide right
equipment to the workers so that they can do
the job safely

43

I take responsibility to detect potential

336

hazards as part of the planning exercise
44

I often remind workers to work safely

45

I emphasize on workers that everyone has the
responsibility to reflect on safety practice

46

I emphasize on workers that safety is the
number one priority while working

47

I keep safety as a primary consideration when
planning

48

I take responsibility to never allow working
with defective equipment

49

I emphasize on workers to report accidents,
incidents, and potentially hazardous situations

50

I emphasize on workers to offer help to fellow
workers when needed to perform the job
safely

51

I emphasize on workers to maintain a good
relationship with fellow workers

52

I emphasize on workers to play an active role
in identifying site hazards

53

I endeavor to maintain a positive attitude
towards safety during meetings so that
workers take safety on the site seriously

54

I take responsibility to identify potential risks
& consequences prior to execution

55

I emphasize on workers to ensure that
individuals are not working by themselves
under risky or hazardous conditions

56

I react strongly against workers who break
health and safety procedures / instructions /
rules.
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VI. Maintaining a Positive Attitude
57

I engage myself in regular safety talks
(discuss safety problems openly with workers
and supervisors)

58

I never advocate working around safety
procedures to meet deadlines

59

I welcome reporting safety hazards/incidents

60

I gather ideas from workers about improving
safety when significant changes to work
practices are suggested

61

I provide the help, authority, information &
resources workers need to behave safely

62

I always inform workers of safety concerns
and issues.

63

I take responsibility to solve safety problems

VII. Motivating
64

I take responsibility for assuring job security
of workers under my belt

65

I am responsible for recommending
recognition/ reward for good safety
performance

66

I take responsibility for helping and caring for
workers’ personal problems

67

I take responsibility for creating feeling of
belonging among workers

68

I take responsibility for promoting job
satisfaction among workers
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Assessing the Criticism on the Role of OSHA as a Driving Force towards
implementing a Total Safety Culture in a Construction Organization

(To be filled by Contractor Top Management incl. CEO, Operations Head,
Construction Head, Safety Department Head, Project Management Division Head,
etc.)

Personal Information (Optional)
Name of Respondent: ______________________________________________________
Present position in the company: _____________________________________________
Total work experience: _____________ years
Work experience in this company: ___________ years
Please provide contact info if you like to be contacted again regarding this questionnaire:
________________________________________________________________________
Company Information
Company Name: _________________________________________________________
Company Location (City & State): ___________________________________________
Type of Company (Contractor Trade):
 General Contractor (GC)
 Poured Concrete Foundation
and Structure Contractor
 Structural Steel and Precast
Concrete Contractor
 Framing Contractor
 Masonry Contractor
 Glass and Glazing Contractor
 Roofing Contractor
 Siding Contractor
 Electrical Contractor

 Plumbing, Mechanical & HVAC
Contractor
 Drywall and Insulation Contractor
 Painting
and
Wall
Covering
Contractor
 Flooring Contractor
 Tile and Terrazzo Contractor
 Finish Carpentry Contractor
 Site Preparation Contractor
 Other
___________________________
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Approx. company size (no. of persons): _________ (admin) ________ (technical)
Number of Years in Business: ___________
Approx. annual turnover (in millions): ______________
States of operation (Check all that apply):















Alabama
Iowa
Alaska
Kansas
Arizona
Kentucky
Arkansas
Louisiana
California
Maine
Colorado
Maryland
Connecticut
Massachuse
tts
 Delaware
 Michigan

 District of
Columbia
 Minnesota
 Florida
 Mississippi
 Georgia
 Missouri
 Hawaii
 Montana
 Idaho
 Nebraska
 Illinois
 Nevada
 Indiana
 New Hampshire
 New Jersey
 South Dakota
 New Mexico




















Tennessee
New York
Texas
North Carolina
Utah
North Dakota
Vermont
Ohio
Virginia
Oklahoma
Washington
Oregon
West Virginia
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Rhode Island
Wyoming
South Carolina

Based on your experience and judgment, please select your level of agreement with each
of the following negative statements about OSHA. Please indicate your level of
agreement or disagreement with the statements with respect to your experience/ expert
judgment by checking (√ ) only one appropriate box. (1 = strongly disagree; 3 = neutral neither disagree nor agree; 5 = strongly agree).
Note that “Strongly Agree” (5) means you strongly agree to the negative statement (i.e.
OSHA is doing very bad on the aspect under question), while “Strongly Disagree” (1)
means you strongly disagree to the negative statement (i.e. OSHA is doing very good on
the aspect under question).
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Score
OSHA Performance Statement

1
(disagr
ee)

I. Regulations and Standards
1

OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver an
overbearing and unwanted presence that has a
negative impact on worker productivity.

2

OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver an
overbearing and unwanted presence that has a
negative impact on worker acceptance to
safety policies and procedures.

3

OSHA takes extraneous amount of time to
actualize new regulations/ standards.

4

Existing OSHA procedures are not updated
timely.

5

OSHA health and safety procedures/
instructions/ rules are not generally
practicable (implementable).

6

OSHA health and safety procedures/
instructions/ rules generally fail to reflect how
the job is actually done.

7

OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver an
overbearing and unwanted presence that
greatly restricts an organization’s ability to
develop as well as compete

8

OSHA regulations and standards fail to
incorporate current technology.

9

OSHA regulations/ procedures can be easily
manipulated by some companies.

10

OSHA regulations/ standards/ procedures are
generally burdensome (trying to do too much
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2

3

4

5
(agre
e)

without any practical advantage).
11

OSHA regulations are generally over-strict.

12

OSHA regulations/ standards/ procedures are
generally confusing (not very clear to
implement).

13

Substantial amount of capital has been
needlessly wasted by your organization for
complying with OSHA standards.

14

Substantial amount of working hours have
been needlessly lost by your organization for
complying with OSHA standards.

15

The cost of implementing OSHA regulations
is usually unjustified as against their benefit
in achieving reduced worker injury.

II. Enforcement Methods
16

The priority of OSHA inspections is mostly
centered towards imposing penalties, rather
than preventing accidents and/ or identifying
problems.

17

OSHA fails to provide adequate reward
mechanisms.

18

OSHA performs inadequate number of
inspections.

19

OSHA generally seems more interested in
issuing the fine rather than correcting the
problem.

20

OSHA’s methods are mostly directed towards
correcting only single events, such as the one
your company was fined for.
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21

The penalties/ fines imposed by OSHA are
not usually justified in proportion to the
violation.

22

OSHA inspections are unbalanced distributed
among construction firms.

23

OSHA inspections are unbalanced distributed
among different types of construction
expertise.

24

OSHA training programs are generally
ineffective.

25

OSHA inspection procedures are generally
ineffective.

26

OSHA is an overbearing bureaucracy with
methods bearing little or no sensitivity to the
needs & limitations of employers who are
struggling to survive in a competitive
marketplace.

27

OSHA’s heavy fines restrict an organization’s
ability to develop as well as compete.

28

OSHA follow-up inspections (after initial
citations have been issued) are usually
performed at an unreasonably slower rate.

29

OSHA deals with workplace accidents usually
at an unreasonably slow rate.

III. Vision and Approach
30

OSHA has generally failed to take a proactive
approach in developing long term safety
measures.

31

OSHA standards are mostly ineffective in
setting up a Total Safety Culture on a
construction jobsite (OSHA is the driving
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force to implement a total safety culture in a
construction organization).
32

OSHA has not been concentrating enough on
positive safety reinforcement.

33

The expenditures made for compliance with
OSHA regulations and/ or paying for fines
could be spent in a more strategic way that
would create a safer work environment and a
better understating of safety.

34

OSHA does not focus on the strategic picture
by taking into consideration the underlying
factors leading to accident (such as
leadership, work pressure, communication)
but rather focuses on the apparent causes of
accident (such as lack of PPE).

35

OSHA emphasizes more on appointing
supervisors to administer fines in the
workplace, rather than appointing personnel
to act as health and safety advisors.

36

OSHA, as a safety organization, is not
actively participating in necessary research
activities to view and incorporate safety as an
industrial development process, which would
have improved ways construction
organizations can incorporate safety in the
industry.

37

OSHA representatives do not usually provide
follow up information pertaining to the
incident such as: how the accident could be
corrected or any appropriate training that
could be utilized to ensure the incident is not
repeated.

38

OSHA should train their inspectors better
regarding on how to facilitate developing a
strategic safety culture in a construction
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organization leading to total safety.
39

OSHA representatives do not usually provide
information about how to improve safety
strategically in your organization.

40

OSHA is more devoted to inspections
(monitoring) than to safety as a strategic
concern.

41

OSHA's safety approach restricts your
organization by compelling it to increase
investment in following procedures rather
than investing in long-term safety objectives.

42

OSHA focuses more on the employer actions
rather than on the employee safety, thereby
increasing the short term expenses of the
organization instead of the long term
investment.

43

OSHA places a heavy burden on
organizations by forcing increased operational
fees and the costs associated to retrofit
outdated equipment rather than investing on
improving the processes for achieving longterm (strategic) safety objectives.

44

OSHA’s inspection and penalty approach of
enforcement is an inappropriate and
ineffective way to ensure workplace safety in
the long-term.
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Appendix D Survey Instrument 4
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Assessing the State of Adoption and Implementation of Total Safety Management in
Construction Industry & Assessing the Readiness of Construction Contractors
towards Implementing Total Safety Management

(To be filled by Contractor Top Management and Middle Management)

All the information gathered here will be kept strictly confidential and will be used only
for research and analysis without mentioning the person or company names. Thank you
very much for your cooperation.
Personal Information (Optional)
Name of Respondent: ______________________________________________________
Present position in the company: _____________________________________________
Total work experience: _____________ years
Work experience in this company: ___________ years
Please provide contact info if you like to be contacted again regarding this questionnaire:
________________________________________________________________________
Company Information
Company Name: _________________________________________________________
Company Location (City & State): ___________________________________________
Type of Company (Contractor Trade):
 General Contractor (GC)
 Poured Concrete Foundation
and Structure Contractor
 Structural Steel and Precast
Concrete Contractor
 Framing Contractor
 Masonry Contractor
 Glass and Glazing Contractor
 Roofing Contractor

 Siding Contractor
 Electrical Contractor
 Plumbing, Mechanical & HVAC
Contractor
 Drywall and Insulation Contractor
 Painting
and
Wall
Covering
Contractor
 Flooring Contractor
 Tile and Terrazzo Contractor
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 Finish Carpentry Contractor
 Site Preparation Contractor

 Other
___________________________

Approx. company size (no. of persons): _________ (admin) ________ (technical)
Number of Years in Business: ___________
Approx. annual turnover (in millions): ______________
States of operation (Check all that apply):















Alabama
Iowa
Alaska
Kansas
Arizona
Kentucky
Arkansas
Louisiana
California
Maine
Colorado
Maryland
Connecticut
Massachuse
tts
 Delaware
 Michigan

 District of
Columbia
 Minnesota
 Florida
 Mississippi
 Georgia
 Missouri
 Hawaii
 Montana
 Idaho
 Nebraska
 Illinois
 Nevada
 Indiana
 New Hampshire
 New Jersey
 South Dakota
 New Mexico




















Tennessee
New York
Texas
North Carolina
Utah
North Dakota
Vermont
Ohio
Virginia
Oklahoma
Washington
Oregon
West Virginia
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Rhode Island
Wyoming
South Carolina

Below, you will be presented with a series of statements about the state of adoption and
implementation of total safety management in your company and the readiness of your
company towards embracing total safety management. Please indicate your level of
agreement or disagreement with the statements with respect to your experience with the
company by checking (√ ) only one appropriate box. (1 = strongly disagree; 3 = neutral neither disagree nor agree; 5 = strongly agree).
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Score
TSM Statement

1
(disagree)

I. Knowledge of TSM
1

TSM can be achieved by measuring and
keeping records of the number of accidents
and incidents and applying punitive measures
to workers that are caught violating safety
rules.

2

I am aware of construction industry programs
implementing TSM.

3

TSM programs should be based on scientific
decision making.

4

TSM can be achieved by making and
maintaining a safe and healthy workplace as
part of the company’s strategic plan.

5

TSM can be achieved by ensuring safe
working through positive reinforcement and
advice and improving by adopting good
practice that exceeds legislative requirements.

6

TSM programs should be strategically
focused.

7

TSM can be achieved by motivating staff
through a measurement and reward scheme
and providing the skills and information to
enable staff to work safely via training and its
intranet.

8

TSM programs should focus on peak
performance.

9

TSM programs should have unity of purpose.

10

TSM programs should be committed to
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2

3

4

5
(agree)

employee empowerment.
11

TSM programs should be committed to
continual improvement.

12

TSM programs should be performance and
process oriented.

13

TSM programs are largely dependent on
executive-level commitment.

14

TSM programs should contain
comprehensive, ongoing training.

15

TSM programs should be teamwork oriented.

II. Strategic Vision of Safety
16

My company views safety as a tool to
increase profits.

17

My company views safety as a competitive
advantage.

18

My company’s safety policy can be best
defined as “Implementation of a set of safety
rules by the Company with punitive measure
for violators.”

19

My company’s safety policy can be best
defined as “a set of processes developed to
manage safety aspects of a project including
encouraging, measuring and rewarding
behavior that creates a safe working
environment rather than catching people who
break the rules.”

20

My company’s safety policy can be best
defined as “a performance-and-processcontrol oriented approach to safety and health
management that gives organization
sustainable competitive advantage in the
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marketplace by establishing a safe and
healthy work environment that is conducive
to consistent peak performance and that is
improved continually.”
21

Poor safety performance decreases
productivity and organizational performance.

22

The company management strongly believes
that excellence in safety would positively
affect the ability to achieve excellence in
other areas; e.g. production, etc.

23

My company views safety and health as an
integral part of its business.

24

My company believes that poor safety
performance restricts strategic organizational
growth.

25

OSHA regulations provide a driving force to
implementing TSM.

26

My company views safety as achieving zero
accidents.

27

My company views safety as elimination of
hazards.

28

A TSM program is (will be) beneficial for my
organization.

III. Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement
29

Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement program
include: “A dollar value has been assigned to
the cost of unsafe behaviors”.

30

“Obtaining client satisfaction” is a major
objective of my organization’s safety
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improvement program.
31

Training currently emphasizes: data gathering
& analysis.

32

“Pressure from competitors” was a key factor
that provided the motivation to start the safety
improvement program.

33

Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement program
include: “Benchmarks for improvement have
been defined”.

34

“Environmental issues/considerations” was a
key factor that provided the motivation to
start the safety improvement program.

35

“Increasing productivity” is a major objective
of my organization’s safety improvement
program.

36

Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement program
include: “Organizing a multi-disciplinary
team”.

37

Company’s safety training is oriented towards
TSM (or continuous safety improvement).

38

The company’s safety improvement program
is centered on Total Safety Management and/
or zero accident strategies.

39

“Safety of processes” was a key factor that
provided the motivation to start the safety
improvement program.

40

Training currently emphasizes: process
improvement.

41

Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement program
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include: “Data has been collected to measure
the safety performance”.
42

“Demanding customers” was a key factor that
provided the motivation to start the safety
improvement program.

43

“Need to reduce costs and improve
performance” was a key factor that provided
the motivation to start the safety improvement
program.

44

Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement program
include: “An educational program has been
implemented”.

45

“My company’s chief executive” was a key
factor that provided the motivation to start the
safety improvement program.

46

Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement program
include: “Safety problems have been
identified”.

47

Training currently emphasizes: teamwork.

48

Training currently emphasizes:
communication.

49

“Achieving zero accidents” was a key factor
that provided the motivation to start the safety
improvement program.

50

“Ensuring involvement of employees in the
safety building effort” is a major objective of
my organization’s safety improvement
program.

51

Steps taken in implementing my
organization’s safety improvement program
include: “An internal awareness program is
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underway”.
52

Training currently emphasizes: zero accident
strategies.

53

Formal training in TSM or other safety
improvement philosophies is given to
employees.

54

After the implementation of my safety
improvement program, the relationship with
my customers and suppliers has improved.

55

My organization’s safety improvement
program can be described as formal with
widespread employee awareness.

56

As part of the management team, we have a
TSM Steering Committee/ a TSM Facilitator/
a safety improvement project team.

57

The company provides feedback loops to
determine if the safety improvement practices
are working.

58

After the implementation of my safety
improvement program, worker behaviors have
improved.

59

“Employee safety” was a key factor that
provided the motivation to start the safety
improvement program.

60

“Health and Safety agencies (like OSHA)”
was a key factor that provided the motivation
to start the safety improvement program.

IV. Employee Involvement and Empowerment
61

Methods adopted in the company to
encourage employees to fulfill their
responsibilities towards TSM (or continuous
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safety improvement) include: serving
effectively on improvement teams”.
62

There is an anonymous way for employees to
make safety improvement suggestions. e.g.
drop box.

63

The company has a mentoring program for all
new employees to develop safe working
habits.

64

The company has incentive programs to
reward workers, supervisors, superintendents,
or specific teams for outstanding safety
performance and/or for generating ideas to
reduce the number of accidents.

65

Methods adopted in the company to
encourage employees to fulfill their
responsibilities towards TSM (or continuous
safety improvement) include: “practicing
hazard identification techniques constantly”.

66

The level of feedback collected from
employees is very significant for setting
safety goals.

67

The level of feedback collected from
employees is very significant for selecting
safe projects.

68

Methods adopted in the company to
encourage employees to fulfill their
responsibilities towards TSM (or continuous
safety improvement) include: “encouraging
fellow employees to work safely”.

69

The extent to which the employees provide
input that is useful in making continual safety
improvements to the organization is very
significant.
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70

The level of feedback collected from
employees is very significant for measuring
safety improvement.

71

The level of feedback collected from
employees is very significant for identifying
solutions.

72

Methods adopted in the company to
encourage employees to fulfill their
responsibilities towards TSM (or continuous
safety improvement) include: “setting positive
examples of working safely”.

73

Methods adopted in the company to
encourage employees to fulfill their
responsibilities towards TSM (or continuous
safety improvement) include: “recommending
accident prevention strategies”.

74

Employee feedback is almost always included
in the safety decision making process.

75

Employees are empowered to make
significant safety improvement suggestions
and changes to operations.

76

The level of feedback collected from
employees is very significant for identifying
safety issues.

77

The importance of employee input in my
company’s safety improvement program is
very high.

V. Readiness to Embrace TSM
78

All team members understand how unsafe
team members will be guided for
improvement.
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79

Decisions are supported by all in my
organization.

80

All team members understand how team
decisions are made.

81

“Company executives/ managing directors”
are involved in safety management efforts/
activities.

82

“Appropriate storage practices” are my
company’s strength in terms of safety.

83

Company looks at the past safety performance
(safety portfolio) of a prospective employee
as an important criterion for selection.

84

“Consistent commitment to improvement”
promotes safety conscience in my company.

85

The organization has a mission statement with
specific responsibilities for approval of
recommendations for improvement of the
work environment.

86

My company provides (or strives to provide):
safety information.

87

In my company, we would never compromise
safety to meet deadlines.

88

“Employee participation” promotes safety
conscience in my company.

89

The organization has a mission statement with
specific responsibilities for building safety
and health concerns into the strategic plan.

90

The responsibility of the accidents and their
effects belongs to the whole organization.

91

“Management leadership” promotes safety
conscience in my company.
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92

Team’s success is understood by all team
members in my organization.

93

Team’s goal is understood by all team
members in my organization.

94

“An active TSM steering committee/ safety
improvement team” is my company’s strength
in terms of safety.

95

All team members understand their authority
within the team and that of all other team
members.

96

All team members know the responsibilities
of all other team members.

97

“A capable and committed safety director” is
my company’s strength in terms of safety.

98

When unforeseen inhibitors impede progress
all members know what to do.

99

The whole organization is responsible to
follow and get involved in the safety & health
mission accomplishment.

100

My company provides (or strives to provide):
management encouragement towards safety.

101

Company uses the method of positive
reinforcement for good safety practices.

102

Safety practices are recognized and rewarded.

103

The whole organization is responsible to
assess the safety precautions and rules.

104

Company follows independent (cold eye)
safety reviews and ratings.

105

My company provides (or strives to provide):
safe working environment.
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106

“Company administration and support” are
involved in safety management efforts/
activities.

107

“Self accountability” promotes safety
conscience in my company.

108

My company provides (or strives to provide):
clearly defined mission statement.

109

“Commitment by senior management” is my
company’s strength in terms of safety.

110

“Individual employees” are involved in safety
management efforts/ activities.

111

Peer pressure exists among workers to work
in a safe and healthy manner.

112

Everyone is open and honest with each other
in my organization.

113

Safety mission is understood by all team
members in my organization.

114

Company looks at past safety performance of
the subcontractors/ suppliers as an important
criterion for selection.

115

The organization has a mission statement with
specific responsibilities for regular review of
the safety and health program in order to keep
up with the safety best practices.

116

“A comprehensive safety and health plan” is
my company’s strength in terms of safety.

117

My company provides (or strives to provide):
safety manager or safety committee.

118

“Safe facilities” are my company’s strength in
terms of safety.
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119

“Up-to-date safety procedures” is my
company’s strength in terms of safety.

120

My company provides (or strives to provide):
formal, written statement of corporate safety
policies and objectives.

121

“Safe equipment” is my company’s strength
in terms of safety.

122

“Project managers” are involved in safety
management efforts/ activities.

123

“Site managers” are involved in safety
management efforts/ activities.

124

My company provides (or strives to provide):
personal protective equipment.
Score

TSM Benefits

1
(disagree)

125

TSM improves performance.

126

TSM increases employee morale.

127

TSM increases profits.

128

TSM provides the opportunity to avoid costly
redesign or project delay by addressing
hazard issues as early as possible.

129

TSM provides traceable and effective hazard
management system.

130

TSM provides a check-and-balance
mechanism at different stages of a project
lifecycle.

361

2

3

4

5
(agree)

Score
1
TSM Obstacles

(disagree)

131

“Changing attitudes and behaviors” is an
obstacle in TSM implementation.

132

“Emphasis on short-term objects” is an
obstacle in TSM implementation.

133

“Lack of top-management commitment/
understanding” is an obstacle in TSM
implementation.

134

“Lack of education and training to drive the
improvement process” is an obstacle in TSM
implementation.

135

“Schedule and cost treated as the main
priorities” is an obstacle in TSM
implementation.

136

“Current bidding climate” is an obstacle in
TSM implementation.

137

“Lack of employee commitment/
understanding” is an obstacle in TSM
implementation.

138

“Lack of expertise/resources in TSM” is an
obstacle in TSM implementation.

139

“Tendency to cure symptom rather than eradicate
the root cause” is an obstacle in TSM
implementation.
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2

3

4

5
(agree)
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